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Context of collaboration 
This study was part of a development programme for practice, research and education 
entitled “Dialogical Collaboration in Southern Norway” (Kristoffersen & Ulland, 
2010). This programme evolved from over ten years of implementing, developing and 
scientifically exploring dialogical and network-oriented practices in Southern Norway. 
It was developed through collaboration between the Institute for Psychosocial Health 
at the University of Agder, the Department of Child and Adolescent Mental Health at 
Sørlandet Hospital Health Enterprise and user organizations and municipalities in the 
county of Agder. 
For the purpose of the study, a research team was organized consisting of two PhD 
candidates—Per Arne Lidbom at Sørlandet Hospital Enterprise and myself, Tore Dag 
Bøe, at the University of Agder, Norway—and two co-researchers, Karianne 
Zachariassen and Gunnhild Ruud Lindvig, who participated on the basis of their 
experience in the areas of mental health difficulties and mental health care. Both co-
researchers worked as consultants at Sørlandet Hospital. Our supervisors were also 
part of the research team; Professor Kjell Kristoffersen of the University of Agder, 
Professor Jaakko Seikkula of the University of Jyväskylä, Finland and Professor 
Dagfinn Ulland of the University of Agder. In addition to this research team, a group 
of practitioners from the Department of Child and Adolescent Mental Health at 
Sørlandet Hospital was organized. The research team had regular meetings with this 
group to discuss the progress of the research. One of the co-researchers assembled a 
group of adolescents who had experienced mental health difficulties, and this group 
was included in discussions of the study. 
In October 2013, we invited Emeritus Professor John Shotter of the University of New 
Hampshire to visit Sørlandet Hospital and the University of Agder, and we had the 
opportunity to consult him regarding our ongoing research. The “Network for Open 
Dialogical practices”, an international network for dialogical approaches in human 
practices (Open Dialogical Practices, 2014), initiated a series of International 
Conferences on Dialogical Practices. The first was held in Helsinki, Finland in 2011, 
the second was held in Leuven, Belgium in 2013 and the third is to be held in 
Kristiansand, Norway, in September 2015. This network and these conferences have 
offered an opportunity to present and discuss our ongoing research with an 
international network of researchers and practitioners. 
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Foreword 
Is there a dark side of the study? What I write—the papers, the thesis—all seems to 
have a poorness to it. There has been great richness, a great variety of ideas, feelings, 
sensations, hunches, words, interruptions, turns and connections that have occurred 
during the explorative adventure of this study; all this has emerged or happened 
between us, in the interfaces, in the dialogues, the encounters—but then I have to write 
it down! I have written some words in a document, but I don’t know. What I write 
feels like a betrayal of all this; it is nothing compared with what we have been through 
and all that has happened. The thesis, in a sense, leaves me with a sense of loss, a 
feeling of “only this?” This may sound bad—a kind of condemnatory or degrading 
judgment of both my writing and my work, and thereby also of my co-authors and 
collaborators. But no, perhaps these are good statements? Uplifting, encouraging? In 
paradoxical ways? This is because they also point to the superiority of living—living 
before any comprehension or even any description of what has happened in me, in 
others, and between us. To point out that a text is a loss, a betrayal, poorness, in a way 
is to point out the events of life and our participation in them as “something” infinitely 
rich that we try to honour and praise. The living hovers above anything that can be 
written down. Life is much more, something else, somewhere else, some other time. 
Is there a bright side of the study? In an online conversation,1 a colleague of mine, 
Bård Bertelsen, wrote some lines about this study and about the scope of research: 
“I think Tore Dag’s project is a beautiful example of research as collective 
movement. Here the research process seems to me like a jam session, where the 
researcher-author assumes a role akin to a record producer, taking responsibility 
for recording what transpires, mixing it, and presenting what has been recorded 
to the world in some form.” 
Perhaps the significance of a study, and the study that I will now present, cannot be 
reduced to texts, or the readings of those texts. The whole “fireworks” of encounters 
and movements that research sets off should be taken into account. 
There are so many people I want to thank: Karianne Zachariassen and Gunnhild Ruud 
Lindvig were my closest collaborators and co-researchers. I did not know them from 
before, so what luck I had; they were just wonderful to work with, and we had great 
and important fun. Thanks to Kjell Kristoffersen, my truly patient, encouraging, 
                                                 
1
 In a Taos Institute online conversation in April 2015 (see http://www.taosinstitute.net/). 
  
iv 
 
inspiring supervisor. Our meetings always left me in higher spirits. Thanks to my two 
co-supervisors, Dagfinn Ulland for his motivating, facilitating ways of being “in this”, 
and Jaakko Seikkula for his collaboration, for sharing his ground-breaking work, ideas 
and practices and for including our research in an international network. Thanks to Per 
Arne Lidbom, Odd Kenneth Hillesund and Bård Bertelsen, all at Sørlandet Hospital, 
who were very important to me during these years of working on my PhD. They have 
not only become my dear friends, but oh, the conversations we have and the tone we 
have found! Thanks to John Shotter, whose talks were jaw-dropping to me when I first 
heard him in Hämeenlinna, Finland. I thank him for his inspiring responses to our 
study when he visited us in Kristiansand. Thanks to Ånund Brottveit for his generosity 
in our conversations about “these things”. My colleagues at the University of Agder, 
Martinez Santiago, Sylfest Lohmheim and Dag Aasland, helped with some tricky 
words and ideas; I thank them. Thanks to Stine Holte at the University of Oslo for help 
with some words and ideas from Levinas. Thanks to my colleagues at the Faculty for 
Health and Sports Science: Anders J.W. Andersen, Anne Brita Thorød, Inger Beate 
Larsen and Erna Ulland. Their support meant much to me. Thanks to Karl Erik 
Karlsen and Arne Thomassen at Sørlandet Sykehus for facilitating my project at a 
crucial early point. Odd Volden gave inspiring and valuable input at initial stages; 
thank you. Thanks to my colleague Nina Falsen Krohn, who has generously helped 
with translating quotes from the material into English. 
Thanks to all the respondents. I wish I could thank them all by name. They really let us 
into their lives through the windows of these interviews. They have my great respect 
and they moved me. The opportunity to present preliminary ideas for our study to a 
group of adolescent participants really gave life to the process. Thanks to each and 
every one of them. Thanks to all the practitioners involved for their efforts. Our 
gatherings with buns and soda, and our discussions, were fun and important to our 
study. 
To my wife Hanne and my sons Bendik and Julian—you are my home, my world in 
the world, to whom I always return - thank you for being there for me. Thanks to my 
father and my sisters for your interest, concern and support for my interests and my 
work. 
August 2015 
Tore Dag Bøe 
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Summary 
The field of mental health is comprised of a variety theoretical perspectives and 
practical approaches. Within this variety, there is an increasing focus on social and 
relational approaches, which are progressively being implemented and scientifically 
explored. Dialogical practices are among such approaches, and are characterized by 
the way they operate in the realm of social relations. Recovery studies based on the 
experiences of people who have recovered from mental health difficulties clearly 
indicate that the social and interpersonal domain is crucial. This thesis emerged from 
the frameworks provided by dialogical practice and recovery research. 
The aim of the study was to explore change related to mental health from the 
perspective of lived experience in the context of a network-oriented and dialogical 
approach to providing assistance for adolescents. Experiences in relation to the 
network meetings and the social arenas of everyday life of the respondents were of 
interest. The overall research questions were: 1. How do adolescents and people in 
their network describe their situation and the processes of change in their lives at the 
time they receive help through a dialogical network-oriented approach? 2. Based on 
these descriptions, how can we describe and understand the social and relational 
aspects involved in change related to mental health? 
Following a participatory and dialogical research design, two co-researchers with 
experience in the area of mental health participated at every stage of the research 
process. Furthermore, a group of adolescent participants and a group of practitioners 
were involved. Adolescents, people in their social networks and practitioners from 
eight cases participated in a series of interviews over a period of 6–12 months. The 
data were analysed within a phenomenological-hermeneutical methodological 
framework and interpreted using approaches inspired by dialogical perspectives. The 
findings of all studies emerged through an explorative process whereby data are 
considered in the context of a dialogue with theoretical perspectives, in particular the 
ideas of Mikhail Bakhtin and Emmanuel Levinas. 
The findings of the four substudies, in various ways, conceptualize change as an 
ethical speech event and offer concepts and themes that suggest multidimensionality in 
change, and in which ethical aspects seem to be pivotal. 
In the first study, change as an ethical event was explored based on the ideas of 
Bakhtin and Levinas and discussed in relation to one of the cases of the study. The 
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study suggests that change is an ongoing event in which we as humans constantly 
become: 1. as responsible, 2. in speaking and 3. in answering the unknown. 
A second study focusing on areas of everyday life suggests that change seems to be 
closely related to movement, and in particular the feeling of being able to move—or 
not—in relation to others. In a main theme, this is conceptualized as a proposition: 
Change is an event of becoming through movement in ethical time and space. It is 
suggested that the experience of time and space in which to move (or move into) is a 
relational and ethical experience. Experienced time and space for movement is 
dependent on the responses of others either occurring in the past (experienced in an 
After-Event) or anticipated in the future (in a Before-Event). This ethical quality of 
time and space appears to depend on others, and could be either life giving or life 
deteriorating depending on the valuing or devaluing character of their responses. 
In a third study focusing on the network meetings, the following main theme is 
suggested: Dialogues open for moving and living through inviting attentiveness 
(ethics), expressive vitality (expressivity) and new meaning (hermeneutics). The 
dialogues of the network meetings seemed to be helpful, and they facilitated change 
through 1. ethical aspects, which concerned the way participants felt cared for, 
respected and permitted to say what they wanted; 2. expressive aspects, which 
concerned their sense that they could speak and move freely, and be moved by the 
speech and movements of others, and 3. hermeneutical aspects, which were the ways 
in which words to understand and find meaning in their situation and future 
possibilities could be found in the dialogues. Furthermore, it is suggested that these 
aspects operate through a temporal dimension where the dialogue seemed to 1. open 
the past, 2. open the moment, and 3. open the future. 
A fourth study focusing on the interplay between inner and outer dialogues in a 
network meeting suggests that inner voices must be included to describe and 
understand the polyphonic multiplicity of voices in dialogues. The interplay between 
outer and inner dialogues seems to have an important role in the emergence of 
significant and meaningful moments in network meetings. This study also showed that 
dialogical perspectives provide a theoretical framework and concepts that are useful in 
investigations of the dynamics of change in conversations facilitated by mental health 
practitioners. 
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Based on the findings of these four substudies, this thesis suggest that dialogues are 
change-facilitating events that include a multidimensionality that may be 
comprehended according to four overarching themes: 1. Change is an ethical event 
(Diaconia); 2. Change is a speech event (Dialogue); 3. Change is a temporal–spatial 
event (Diachronia–Diatopia), and 4. Change is a cultural event (Diagnosis) (Diagnosis 
in this context is used in its original meaning dia gnosis, through knowledge, or to 
discern, distinguish. Moreover, I argue that this discerning is a cultural act concerning 
cultural forms and identities.). These themes are discussed in relation to theoretical 
ideas and relevant studies. 
The thesis suggests that practitioners should be attentive to ethical aspects in 
encounters with help seekers. These ethical aspects involve bodily movement and 
responsivity. It is suggested that further research should continue exploration of 1. the 
significance of the ethical aspects of change in mental health; 2. the significance of 
bodily movement in mental health; 3. mental health as future-opening practice, and 4. 
the interplay between ethics, time, space, body, anticipation, experience and culture in 
mental health. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Prologue: Zombies and heaven 
A girl we interviewed for this study reported that she felt like a “zombie”—one of the 
living dead—at school: “I come to school, I sit, I don’t speak to anyone, never raise 
my hand. Then I leave, without any contact.” She then gave us a diary note on which 
the following lines were written: 
“Cruel mocking words, and me walking past the row of boys in the class, who 
quickly jerk away when they see me … their faces twisted in disgust … I felt 
excluded and alone … I couldn’t say a word … I feel I am in a completely 
wrong world. I don’t belong at all. Everything in me turns inwards. Nothing in 
me manages to go outward to meet other people. It is as if I am behind walls of 
glass that shut out all air, colours, and light. I promise myself never to become 
visible again, never to speak if no one asks me to, never to look into the eyes of 
others, never to attract any attention, never to hope, ‘cause it just hurts if you 
fall … I wish I didn’t need any of them” (Catherine, 17). 
Another girl, Anne (16), told us about how her life had become very difficult when her 
grandmother, who was very dear to her, died. She told us that she now felt as if she 
had lost the one place she could always go. She felt left out at school, she had 
difficulties in making friends, and at home she had the impression that it was her fault 
whenever there was trouble. This was contrary to the way she felt when she was with 
her grandmother. 
Anne With grandma everything I did was perfect [smiles with tears in 
her eyes]. Whatever I did, it was precisely what I should do in that 
situation. It was always the perfect thing to do. 
Gunnhild I am very touched [points at her eyes]. 
Anne We had a great time together. We would always sit and talk and 
laugh … ’til late at night … and I told her absolutely everything 
that happened in my life. We just talked about everything. 
Tore Dag Yes [enthusiastically]. 
Anne Yes. She was the only one who like knew me better than I knew 
myself. She understood … I don’t know … she could put things 
into words that I couldn’t, and they kind of fitted exactly …  
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Tore Dag What … eh … do you think, eh … eh … do you think you will 
ever meet your grandma again? 
Anne I know I’ll meet her again … I am not a religious person, but … 
she [is in] this place with a green meadow and a river … she is 
there waiting for me. 
  
Is it possible—as the girls in the two quotes above suggest—that mental health 
concerns the way in which our lives are constantly in a kind of interplay with those of 
others? This interplay may be life giving, such as when Anne was with her grandma, or 
life deteriorating, such as when Catherine was at school. Mental health difficulties, 
then, may involve some kind of break-down in dialogue with others, and ways to 
improve mental health may be found when the interplay with others takes on better 
forms. The descriptions provided by the participants in this study point to the 
significance of precisely such aspects. Moreover, in a way, this view resonates with 
various ideas from dialogical theory and indicates the perspectives developed in this 
thesis. 
“They say yes; they don’t say no” is the title of this thesis. This is a condensed quote 
of how Phillip, 16, described how his life had changed to the better. I suggest that in a 
simple, striking and beautiful way, he expresses the essence of this thesis. 
1.2. Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is based on four published papers, which are included in their entirety. In 
this chapter, I introduce some core concepts and current research relevant to the focus 
of the thesis. In Chapter 2, the theoretical perspectives are presented through some 
chosen concepts before I introduce the aims and research questions of the thesis and its 
substudies in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, I suggest a framework within philosophy of 
science that this study adheres to and further describe the particular methodological 
procedures used. The findings of the four published papers are summarized in Chapter 
5, and in Chapter 6 I suggest some overarching themes based on all four substudies. 
These themes are discussed in relation to theoretical perspectives and relevant 
research. Finally, in Chapter 7, the originality and the specific contribution of this 
thesis are suggested and possible implications for practice and further research are 
indicated. 
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1.3. Search for research papers 
Relevant research is introduced in Sections 1.6 Recovery Approaches and 1.7 
Dialogical practice. The overview of relevant current research was obtained through 
1. searches of databases, and 2. continuous attention to and searches for relevant 
studies in the literature, conversations with other researchers, colleagues, conferences 
and other sources. Searches were conducted of the Chinal, Medline, Psychinfo and 
Scopus databases. The Svemed database was also searched for studies published in 
Nordic languages. The studies deemed relevant were assessed in terms of their 
scientific quality before they were included. It should be noted that the less systematic 
process of searching for relevant studies through ongoing reading using citations in 
relevant studies to find others, conversations and email communication with other 
scholars and researchers, and searches of Google and Google Scholar for authors, 
concepts, themes and similar terms proved to be the most productive way of finding 
relevant studies. 
I proceed by describing some movements in the field of mental health and research 
relevant to the questions raised in this thesis. Attention to ethical and relational aspects 
is a guiding principle. 
1.4. Change: From instrumental causality to ongoing events of becoming 
A large body of research in the mental health field is comprised of efficacy studies 
related to various methods and interventions. These studies are mainly randomized 
controlled trials related to pharmacological and psychotherapeutic approaches 
(Hubble, Duncan & Sparks, 1999; Norcross & Wampold, 2011; Thomas, Bracken & 
Timimi, 2012; Wampold, 2001). In principle, this research tells us whether there is 
change related to an initiative in terms of positive outcomes, but does not offer any 
description or understanding of the processes involved. Efficacy studies represent the 
foundation of what is referred to as evidence-based practice or evidence-based 
medicine (Sackett et al., 1996; Sackett et al., 1997; Guyatt & Rennie, 2002). Critical 
considerations are discussed by authors such as Gupta (2009) and Wifstad (2008). 
Although in principle the evidence-based paradigm is not founded or dependent on any 
specific theory of disorders that explicates the nature of the change processes involved, 
this kind of research and practice still appears to be embedded in 
technical/instrumental and causal ways of understanding change (Thomas, Bracken & 
Timimi, 2012). Kogstad, Ekeland & Hummelvold (2011) point to the instrumental 
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rationality implicit in the evidence-based paradigm that may suppress communicative 
rationality (p. 480). 
Shotter’s (2003, 2009, 2012) ideas on change may highlight some drawbacks inherent 
in such causality models. He points to the way in which change may be approached 
from two opposite points of departure: either we take “what is invariant as … primary 
subject matter”, which makes change problematic, or we take “activity and flux as 
primary”, which makes stability problematic (Shotter, in Jaworski & Coupland, 1999, 
p. 22). Causality models of change seem to take invariance and stability as primary, 
and consequently change is understood in terms of how identifiable and stable objects 
or states (dependent variables) are changed through manipulation by a specific 
intervening force (independent variable). With this alternative starting point, where 
movement and flux are primary, change is always already “there”, and the challenge 
lies in finding ways to describe and understand this constantly changing reality of 
human life. Quoting Bergson, Shotter points to the way in which this constant flux 
may be taken for stability, but this is not stability; it is counterfeit: 
Like eddies of dust raised by the wind as it passes, the living turn upon 
themselves, borne by the great blast of life. They are therefore relatively stable, 
and counterfeit immobility so well that we treat each of them as a thing rather 
than as a progress, forgetting that the very permanence of their form is only the 
outline of a movement (Bergson in Shotter, 2013, p. 43). 
Along similar lines, Ingold (2013) suggests a new paradigm in human sciences where 
the concept of “human beings” is replaced by the concept of “human becomings”. 
Ingold says that such a paradigm of becoming, as opposed to being, introduces an 
“entirely different ontological foundation.… We can no longer think of the … human 
… as a discrete, bounded entity, set over against the environment. It is rather a locus of 
growth within a field of relations traced out in flows of materials” (p. 10). Similarly, 
Levinas points to shifts within Western philosophy. He says he learnt from Heidegger 
that being should be seen as a verb, not a noun; being refers to doing, moving, 
acting—not to a thing, an object, or an essence. “With Heidegger”, Levinas says, 
“‘verbality’ was awakened in the word ‘being’, what is event in it, the ‘happening’ of 
being? It is as if things and all that is ‘set a style of being’ … Heidegger accustomed us 
to this verbal sonority” (Levinas, 1985, p. 38). 
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Such suggested notions of existence, human living and change belonging to primary 
domains of flux and ongoing movement form a framework for the exploration of 
change in this thesis. 
1.5. Mental health: From inside the head to between people in contexts 
In recent years, there has been a development of various initiatives in the mental health 
services that may be characterized as community mental health (Karlsson, Borg, & 
Kim, 2008; Ness, Karlsson, et al., 2014). These initiatives may be characterized as 
assertive and user involving (Eriksen, Sundfør, Karlsson, Råholm, & Arman, 2012; 
Hovish, Weaver, Islam, Paul, & Singh, 2012; Killaspy et al., 2009; Verhaegh, 
Bongers, Kroon, & Garretsen, 2009). Furthermore, they are collaborative, 
transdisciplinary (Holmesland, Seikkula, & Hopfenbeck, 2014; Holmesland, Seikkula, 
Nilsen, Hopfenbeck, & Arnkil, 2010; Ness, Borg, Semb, & Karlsson, 2014; Ness, 
Karlsson, et al., 2014), network-oriented (Piippo & Aaltonen, 2004; Seikkula, Laitila, 
& Rober, 2012; Ulland, Andersen, Larsen, & Seikkula, 2014) and health promoting 
(Herrman, Saxena, & Moodie, 2005). These lines of development in mental health care 
represent ways of helping people with mental health difficulties through contextual 
and interpersonal approaches rather than medical models for individuals. Community 
mental health-care approaches are person centred, contextual and community based 
(Karlsson, Borg, & Kim, 2008; Mezzich, Snaedal, Van Weel, & Heath, 2010; Sjølie, 
Karlsson, & Kim, 2010), and need adapted (Borchers, Seikkula & Arnkil, 2014). 
Medical diagnoses, which are individual in their nature, are not necessarily seen as 
decisive starting points for the initiatives. 
Such perspectives in mental health, which focus on the interplay between people 
within a community, form the basis for the mental health strategies developed by the 
World Health Organization (2015), which suggests the following definition of mental 
health: 
 … a state of well-being in which the individual realizes his or her own abilities, 
can cope with the normal stress of life, can work productively and fruitfully, 
and is able to make a contribution to his or her community. 
As Wexler & Eglinton (2015) point out, this definition “hints at the historical, 
political, economic, and other socio-cultural” contexts that affect mental health (p. 
127). Nonetheless, Wexler and Eglinton continue, this definition does not fully 
constitute a relational or contextual framework for understanding mental health. 
  
6 
 
However, this definition represents a shift from individual and even intrapsychic 
perspectives to perspectives that focus on the interactions between people within a 
community or a culture. Such social and interactional perspectives are pursued in this 
thesis through exploring lived experience and attention to the ways in which events at 
an interactional and social “level” matter to, and offer conditions for, the subject. 
1.6. Recovery approaches: From universal methods to personal–social processes 
1.6.1. An ethical turn in research: asking for people’s lived experiences 
Mental health can, and has been, explored in various ways, for instance, through 
observation and the descriptions of observers, or through neurobiological approaches 
made possible by technological advances. Such approaches may represent a kind of 
“externalism” (Wifstad, 2008) related to mental health that fails to include the 
subjective perspective found in the lived experience of sufferers (Kogstad, Ekeland, & 
Hummelvoll, 2014). With this recognition of a neglect of people’s lived experiences, 
we now see a growing body of studies using the perspective of lived experience as 
their point of departure. As Kogstad et al. (2011) note: “When people with mental 
health problems tell about what helped them in their recovery process, fundamental 
beliefs about what constitute effective and necessary treatment are often challenged” 
(p. 479). 
1.6.2. The significance of ethical–relational aspects 
Reviews of studies of mental health and recovery from the perspective of lived 
experience clearly point to the significance of social aspects (Leamy, Bird, Le 
Boutillier, Williams, & Slade, 2011; Tew et al., 2012). When people describe their 
difficulties, they seem to concern their lives and experiences in various social arenas: 
family, work, friends, school and society (Topor et al., 2006; Topor, Borg, Di 
Girolamo, & Davidson, 2011). These difficulties could be interpreted as resulting from 
a feeling of not being recognized or as struggles for recognition (Andersen & 
Svensson, 2012; Eriksen, Sundfør, Karlsson, Råholm, & Arman, 2012) or in terms of 
feeling outside, or denied access to, social arenas and relations (Davidson et al., 2001). 
Furthermore, their difficulties could be experienced as a kind of “not knowing how to 
make their way in the world”, like “being stuck”, at an “impasse” (Davidson et al., 
2010, pp. 101 and 105), “living in a maze”, experiencing “social death” (Biong & 
Ravndal, 2009, p. 8), “feeling like a stranger in life and places” (Andersen & Larsen, 
2012), or “not belonging” (Mezzina, Borg, et al., 2006; Mezzina, Davidson, et al., 
2006). These experiences may be in the realm of personal relations (Topor et al., 2006) 
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or experiences of being outside society, deprived of civil rights or citizenship 
(Andersen & Svensson, 2012; Mezzina, Borg, et al., 2006; Tew et al., 2012). 
Experiences and accounts of recovery similarly point to the significance of relations 
and social aspects (Schon, Denhov, & Topor, 2009; Topor et al., 2006) and the 
qualities of the communication in which they are involved (Guregård & Seikkula, 
2014). In one study, Mezzina et al. (2006) conclude that recovery could be seen as an 
“ongoing interpersonal and social process” in which the significance of others can be 
expressed in terms of “standing alongside me”, “being there for me”, or “doing more 
for me” (pp. 63, 68 and 77). Additionally, material aspects such as having a home and 
having an occupation and money are, directly or indirectly, conditions for access to 
social arenas that are important during recovery (Borg et al., 2005; Topor et al., 2011), 
and the significance of dealing with crises in the context of an everyday life is 
emphasized (Borg & Davidson, 2007; Winness, Borg, & Kim, 2010). Kogstad et al. 
(2011) clearly point to ethical–relational aspects when they summarize their findings 
of the elements of recovery in users’ stories: 1) “Dialogue, respect, care, understanding 
and good encounters emerge as important conditions”, 2) “Respect, security, time, 
understanding and a feeling of dignity are demonstrated to be central factors in 
recovery stories”, and 3) “Good relations and confident dialogues are central 
ingredients in the processes described” (pp. 483–484). 
Some of these studies explicitly suggest that mental health should perhaps be 
understood as a relational and social concept belonging to the interpersonal, social, and 
political domains (e.g. Andersen & Svensson, 2012; Mezzina, Davidson, et al., 2006; 
Strong, Rogers-de Jong & Merritt, 2014). 
1.6.3. Recovery research—some considerations 
It should be noted that the status of the data in the above research has been questioned. 
Nyttingnes (2007) acknowledges the importance of recovery research; nevertheless, he 
indicates what he identifies as the problem of attribution. When we attempt to explain 
or understand complicated processes or complicated results, for example in recovery 
processes, we often attribute the results to certain causes in simplistic ways. Therefore, 
the causes of recovery that are identified may be misleading. Nyttingnes reminds us 
that this is true both for professionals and for people considering their own 
experiences. Topor (2003) raises the question of the relation between the stories of 
respondents and the reality to which they presumably refer. Whether the descriptions 
are reproductions of real events, or whether they should be taken as narratives that 
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follow certain rules and structures, is a question that must include reflections on 
epistemological and philosophical positions. Topor states that his research is not 
dependent on any evaluation of the truthfulness of the descriptions, and his 
epistemological position is somewhere between radical realism and radical 
constructivism (2003, p. 21). This thesis addresses these complex questions and their 
philosophical implications by exploring the dynamics between experience, 
communication and reality within a phenomenological–hermeneutical framework (see 
Chapters 2 and 4). 
The exploratory component of this thesis, in line with recovery research, begins with 
the descriptions and experiences of people receiving mental health care. Because of 
my particular interest in relational and social aspects, the respondents who were 
chosen were offered a network-oriented and dialogical approach. I describe these 
approaches in the following section. 
1.7. Dialogical practice: From changing the person to generating dialogue 
1.7.1. Emergence of dialogical practice through ethical turning points 
Wifstad (1997) analysed shifts in thought and practice in the family therapy field. 
Referring to Anderson & Goolishian’s not-knowing position (Anderson & Goolishian, 
1988, 1992) and to Andersen’s reflecting team (Andersen, 1987, 1991), he notes that 
these approaches depart from other approaches in the family therapy field because they 
are fundamentally non-strategic (p. 127). Wifstad states that this leads to a shift in 
notions of change, leaving behind the idea that an understanding of the causes of 
problems is the crucial point of departure, which implies that change is not achieved 
by manipulating a factor identified as causing the problem. The approaches found in 
the reflecting team and the not-knowing position are seen as generating a dialogue 
where “new meanings are continually evolving toward the ‘dissolving’ of problems” 
(p. 132). One of Wifstad’s (1997) main conclusions is that social constructionist 
epistemology does not adequately account for the most important sides of these 
approaches. The ways in which we participate in clients’ situations and engage in 
dialogue with them should be understood as an ethical project rather than an 
epistemological one (p. 143). 
Andersen notes that the way of working developed in the reflecting team came about 
because of the unease they felt was connected to the way in which they used the one-
way mirror according to the Milan approach (Andersen, 1991; Shotter, 2009). This 
resulted in their turning of the one-way mirror into a two-way window in 1985. The 
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family was given the opportunity to observe the discussion/reflections of the 
professional team. This change seemed to be ethically motivated. Shotter (2009) 
describes how Andersen himself described the development of his practice as a result 
of listening to the “disquiet” in him when arriving at a point where he no longer felt he 
could continue in the same way for ethical reasons. “Each new way came from him 
reaching a ‘crossroads’, from him not being able to continue any longer in the same 
way, from stopping something he came to see as ethically wrong … and then finding 
that, as he turned away from it, ‘alternatives popped up almost by themselves’” (p. 22). 
A crucial point in the development of the open dialogue approach can also be 
recognized as ethically motivated. In 1984, Seikkula and his colleagues decided that 
there should be no planning of the treatment before meeting the families; they should 
be included from the start, from the very first meeting, and no plans or decisions 
should be made regarding the person and family of concern without their presence2 
(Seikkula, 2011; Seikkula & Arnkil, 2006). Because of this shift, help seekers and 
their families were no longer excluded from the planning or decisions made about 
them and their situation. 
1.7.2. The experience of dialogical practices 
Few studies appear to have explored dialogical practices from the perspective of the 
lived experiences of the participants. Piippo and his colleagues used qualitative 
interviews to explore the Integrated Network and Family Oriented Model, which 
includes mental health services, municipal social services and relatives in 
multidisciplinary treatment (Piippo & Aaltonen, 2004, 2008, 2009). Patients reported 
that the facilitated collaboration created an atmosphere in which they felt free to say 
what they “wanted and needed to say”, and this led to an experience of release from a 
“single, inevitable interpretation” and allowed a variety of possible views (Piippo & 
Aaltonen, 2004). The participation of relatives led to mutual trust, increased a mutual 
feeling of safety and opened the way for new kinds of good, supportive relationships 
in which fears for the future diminished, and worries and burdens decreased (Piippo & 
Aaltonen, 2009). 
Another study of the open dialogue approach confirmed the importance of including 
social networks (Brottveit, 2013). Based on observations and interviews with clients, 
people from private networks and practitioners, Brottveit suggested that the 
                                                 
2
 It should be noted that Seikkula does not specifically refer to these decisions as ethically motivated. 
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significance of the meetings is not found by asking “What was said?”, but rather by 
asking “What happened?”. He proposed that what happened was not a matter of 
“speaking about life” but a matter of “speaking in life”. What happened was 
experienced as real and felt in the body in terms of physical and emotional responses. 
Brottveit’s study posited that change did not require a detour via insight or 
understanding because what happened in the meetings had a direct impact on the 
“social reality” of the participants’ lives (p. 246). The aspects of facilitating change 
were “direct and dynamic” and not “reflective and representational” (ibid.) because 
significant others were present. 
Holmesland and her colleagues (Holmesland et al., 2010; Holmesland et al., 2014) also 
explored the open dialogue approach through interviews with professionals and 
observations of the network meetings. They found that this transdisciplinary approach 
called for a process of role transformation by the professional, a release from role by 
reducing the impact of therapeutic skills and allowing the help seekers to guide the 
communication with the aim of increasing their activity. The professionals found that 
self-disclosure of thoughts, feelings and physical reactions seemed to promote 
dialogue and the growth of the participants (Holmesland et al., 2014). 
1.7.3. Dialogical practice—some considerations 
Larner (2009, 2015) advocates dialogical practice and dialogical ethics in mental 
health approaches, yet he is critical of those who from a dialogical and ethical position 
reject therapeutic expertise or therapeutic methods and claim that such resources fall 
outside dialogical approaches because they are unethical and depersonalizing. In his 
view, dialogical practice and ethics concern responding, and the best responses 
involve expertise and methods. 
1.8. Dialogue, ethics and lived experience 
Dialogue: The word dialogue is both part of our everyday language and a concept 
permeated with great philosophical richness. In this thesis, the concept of dialogue 
draws on certain philosophical ideas and traditions found in what is often referred to as 
dialogism or dialogical philosophy (Linell, 2009). Linell points to three senses of 
“dialogue”. The first sense is the concrete empirical sense, and refers to the encounter 
between two or more people who interact by means of semiotic resources such as 
spoken language and accompanying body language (p. 4). This, he continues, includes 
face-to-face interaction, real-time interaction via media such as telephones or 
computers, and delayed interaction such as by email, SMS or chat systems. This is 
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basically the way in which “dialogue” is used in everyday language. The second sense, 
Linell continues, is normative; the term “dialogue” is used as a reference to high-
quality interaction characterized by a high degree of symmetry and co-operation, with 
equal opportunities for turn-taking by the participants without coercion. Dialogue 
means “ideal dialogue” and stresses “clarity, symmetry, egalitarianism, mutuality, 
harmony, consensus and agreement” (p. 5). Linell links the third sense to dialogism, or 
dialogical theory, where dialogue has a more abstract and comprehensive sense. 
Dialogue, in this sense, indicates certain dialogical ways of understanding sense 
making, semiotic practice, action, interaction, thinking, or communication. Moreover, 
the term, in this third sense, suggests specific ways of exploring language activity, 
human existence and even the world. 
The dialogical practice explored in this thesis and the dialogical theories applied 
perhaps include all the above senses. Nevertheless, the theoretical framework of this 
thesis is related to the concept of dialogue in the third sense, in particular through the 
use of the dialogical ideas found in the writings of Emmanuel Levinas and Mikhail 
Bakhtin. This will be elaborated in the next chapter. 
Ethics: In this thesis, the concept of ethics is pivotal. Ethics, in the sense in which I use 
it, based on Levinas, Bakhtin and others, does not concern the way in which values 
and norms are established and function as guiding principles for human conduct, nor 
does it concern the values, norms and procedures of ethical decision-making. Rather, 
the term “ethics”, in the sense in which it is used in this thesis, is related to primordial 
and original constitutional aspects of living. Living always concerns being in dialogue 
with or responsive to other humans. This fundamental responsiveness in human living, 
according to both Bakhtin and Levinas, is inevitably also ethical. 
Lived experience: In this thesis, the concept of lived experience is important in relation 
to both the methodological approach and the themes for investigation. Lived 
experience, as used in the phenomenological and hermeneutical tradition, derives from 
Husserl’s concept of “erleben”, which literally means “living through something” (van 
Manen, 2004). Husserl’s point was that the phenomena of the world could not be 
investigated from any position outside (externalism), only in the way that they were 
experienced or “lived through”. Furthermore, as will be described, within dialogical 
theory lived experience is not necessarily seen as existing prior to language. No lived 
experience is understood as emerging through dialogue (Bakhtin, 1993; Cresswell, 
2012; Sullivan, 2012). This means that to understand how dialogical practice “works” 
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in mental health, we should take into account the way lived experience is conditional 
upon dialogue. 
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2. Theoretical perspectives: A certain light … and its shadows 
As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain,  
as far as they are certain, they do not refer to reality. 
(Albert Einstein) 
In this chapter, I present some chosen ideas that will shed a certain light on and add a 
certain touch to my exploration of change. From the start, dialogue has been a key 
concept of both the practices examined and the theoretical framework of this thesis. To 
structure the presentation of theory, I make use of five concepts that have emerged 
during the explorative process that may offer a broad and multifaceted view of human 
living and existing as dialogical. All concepts derive from the Greek, and have the 
word dia as their prefix, followed by a word indicating the domain of interest: dia-
logue (language), dia-conia (ethics), dia-topy (place/space), dia-chrony (time), and dia-
gnosis (knowledge/culture). 
In a sense, the ideas that are presented are part of the findings of this thesis, as they are 
the result of continuous exploration—asking, listening, feeling, moving, writing, 
reading, discussing and reflecting in an iterative procedure in various settings 
throughout the research process (that continues even as I write). This is consistent with 
an explorative process that more closely resembles “moving around” and “going back 
and forth” (Shotter, 2014) than a chronological step-by-step procedure. The concepts 
and ideas we have tried and used—favouring some, discarding and perhaps forgetting 
others—have been in constant flux. Concepts and ideas have been suggested 
enthusiastically, but at the same time with a shadow of doubt and fear: What do these 
concepts, ideas, and words conceal? What is lost from sight in the specific light that 
they offer? Through this theoretical light and approach we may discover some aspects 
of the participants’ lived experiences, knowing that other aspects are concealed from 
us and driven into the shadows. 
2.1. Dia-logue, dia-conia, dia-chrony, dia-topy, and dia-gnosis: Change and 
existence as threshold events 
Dialogical practices, which this thesis investigates, are inspired by dialogical theory 
and philosophy, and in particular the ideas of Mikhail Bakhtin (1895–1975) (Seikkula, 
2011; Seikkula, 2011; Seikkula & Trimble, 2005; Shotter, 2006, 2010, 2012, 2015). 
Bakhtin puts dialogue at the core of not only his linguistic theory or his theory of 
literature, but also of his philosophy of human living and existence, which have 
dialogue as a key concept; this is often referred to as “dialogism” (Holquist, 2002; 
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Linell, 2009). The ideas of Emmanuel Levinas (1906–1995) are also among the 
philosophical sources from which dialogical practice draws (e.g. Andersen, 2001; 
Larner, 2015; Seikkula & Arnkil, 2006). Levinas places his own philosophy among 
philosophies of dialogue (Levinas, 1998b, p. 137ff), but he makes clear that he sees a 
“first event of the encounter” (Levinas, 1969, p. 199), which is an ethical event, that in 
a way precedes dialogue, The responsibility for the other is the first event: “Dia-conie 
avant tout dialogue” (Diacony3 before all dialogue) (Levinas, 1982, p. 103). 
The word “dialogue” originates from the Greek and is composed of the two words dia 
and logos. Etymologically, dia means through, by, or over to, but may also mean 
something like divided, split, or separated (Linell, 2009; Slåttelid, 1998; Oxford 
English Dictionary, 2015). Moreover, logos has a variety of possible meanings such as 
word, speech, discourse, or reason (Linell, 2009; Oxford English Dictionary, 2015). 
Therefore, dialogue may have the meaning of through the word, but also the word that 
is divided, or the word that divides. 
In a play on the metaphors given by the etymology of the prefix dia, I wish to 
emphasize its ambiguity, as it may indicate both a movement through or over to 
(something) as well as a division of or a split in (something). Dia indicates a border, a 
threshold, a separation and a moving over or through to “something/someone” at this 
point. 
To suggest a broad, complex and multidimensional view of how change can be 
understood through dialogical perspectives, I introduce some concepts, also with 
Greek origins, in addition to dialogue that similarly have dia as the prefix, indicating 
both moving through/across and splitting or separating, followed by a word indicating 
a domain or sphere of this movement or split. These concepts are: dia-logue 
(language), dia-conia (ethics), dia-topy4 (space), dia-chrony (time) and dia-gnosis 
(knowledge, culture). I suggest that these in turn leave us with the following thresholds 
or borders. There is a linguistic border at which one approaches another through 
speech—a border between words as unique subjective expressions and words as 
cultural, historical signs, as indicated by the concept of dia-logue. There is an ethical 
border between me and others who are fundamentally different from me, and yet are 
                                                 
3
 The English text reads “Dia-chrony”; however, the translation is wrong since the French word is Dia-conie. 
(See also Welz & Verstrynge, 2008, p. 199.) 
4
 Diatopy is a concept known from sociological linguistics introduced by Leiv Flydal. I use it in a somewhat 
different sense (see Auer & Schmidt, 2010). The concept, as I use it here, also has connotations of Bakhtin’s 
concept of chronotope (time–space) (Bakhtin, 1981, pp. 84–258, see also Morson & Emerson, pp. 366–432). 
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of profound concern to me, as indicated by the concept of dia-conia. A spatial border 
exists between places. This lies between the place in the sense of where I stand, and 
the place in the sense of where I am going, or the border between my place in the 
world and your place in the world, as indicated by the concept of dia-topy. There is a 
temporal border between past and future (via the present), as captured in the concept 
of dia-chrony. Finally, there is a cultural/epistemic border, established through 
knowledge, between the world “as we know it” and the world that we are part of 
before we have any knowledge about it as indicated by the concept of dia-gnosis. This 
interplay of metaphors in the etymology of dia indicates a movement at or across 
various borders or thresholds (Bakhtinian metaphors) (e.g. Bakhtin, 1984; p. 287) or 
an abyss (a Levinasian metaphor) (e.g. Levinas, 1998c, p. 89). 
Human existence and change should perhaps not be explored by examining an 
assumed structure, state or dynamics of the individual human mind, body, personality, 
or identity. Rather, human existence and change could be explored by attention to 
events at these various borders and attending to such threshold events. This 
multidimensionality of human living, existence and change can be illustrated by the 
following outline of the dialogical ideas that I discuss. 
Concepts Aspects of change/existence Subject is an event 
1. Dia-logue The linguistics of human existence and 
change 
The subject is a 
speech event 
2. Dia-conia The ethics of human existence and 
change 
The subject is an 
ethical event 
3. Dia-chronia– 
Dia-topia 
The temporality and 
spatiality of human existence and change 
The subject is an event 
of movement 
4.  Dia-gnosis The forms and identities of human 
existence and change 
The subject is a 
cultural event 
 
All these concepts and aspects will be introduced mainly with reference to Levinas and 
Bakhtin, but the corporality involved in all these aspects is emphasized by a brief 
reference to Sheets-Johnstone’s (2009, 2011b) phenomenological–evolutionary 
analysis of human living as bodily movement. 
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2.1.1. Dia-logue—the linguistics of human change: The subject is a speech event 
Faust: 
“Tis writ, “In the Beginning was the Word!” …  
The word I cannot set supremely high …  
“In the Beginning there was thought” …  
Does thought create, and work, and rule the hour? 
In the beginning there was the Power …  
The spirit comes to guide me in my need, 
I write: “In the Beginning was the Deed”.5 
(Goethe’s Faust in Redner, 1982, p. 41) 
In both Levinas and Bakhtin, we find a view of language that includes more than the 
re-presenting and epistemological sides of language (the content). For both authors, 
but in different ways, consciousness, the body and the subject are dialogical. Both 
have linguistic concepts at the core: saying, speech, voice, words, signs, utterances, 
responses, answers and gestures. 
Levinas writes according to, yet in opposition to, the ideas of phenomenology, which 
have intentionality at their core. Intentionality refers to the way in which 
consciousness in an active and directed manner constitutes a meaningful reality from 
what strikes the senses. Perception, through conscious intentionality, is not passive 
reception but active constitution. Levinas challenges this primacy of intentionality that 
phenomenology seems to proclaim. If intentionality characterizes our relation to the 
human other, then it is a relation based on knowledge; the other, for me, is one that I 
(epistemologically) constitute. Levinas’s whole philosophy opposes this view, and 
critically he writes of “the indiscretion of intentionality”.6 To take understanding the 
other, knowing the other, giving him or her an identity (in relation to other identities) 
as primary relation is a break with an original ethical relation. Levinas describes this 
original ethical relation or approach in terms of language and speaking. He refers to an 
original language prior to intentionality and thematization: 
[I]n speech … subjectivity … enters into contact with a singularity, excluding 
identification in the ideal, excluding thematization and representation—an 
                                                 
5
 In Goethe’s (1749–1832) classical work we find Faust struggling with the meaning of this first line of the 
gospel of John as he sets out to translate it. Perhaps we might say that Faust gives a sense of the manifold 
meanings within the word “word”: it might be a word, it might be thought, it might be power, it might be deed. 
Faust ends up with “In the beginning was the Deed”, and he seems content. Deed means not only doing or 
acting, but also points to the moral character of the act/movement; doing something for the best of another. 
6
 According to Peter Dews in a lecture at the Department of Philosophy and Society at the University of Essex. 
Available on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lGRu7xZnp5I (retrieved 25.04.2015). 
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absolute singularity, as such unrepresentable. This is the original language, the 
foundation of the other one. The precise point at which the mutation of the 
intentional into the ethical occurs, and occurs continually, at which the 
approach breaks through consciousness, is the human skin and face. Contact is 
tenderness and responsibility (Levinas, 1987, pp. 115–116, italics added). 
The speech event is contact and tenderness, with skin and face. This contact, as 
original language, occurs before—or through an opening in—the identification and 
representation of intentionality. Becoming a subject happens as I am touched by the 
other, before I recognize him/her, before I see him/her as something. The original 
language is this event, where skin and face speaks, as Levinas puts it. Language is 
contact (1987, p. 84) before it is thematization and identification (p. 78). Coming into 
existence through saying is an ethical, not hermeneutical, event. To put this in another 
way, in the event of saying, the subject becomes “a singularity prior to the distinction 
between the particular and the universal” (Levinas in Biesta, 2009, p. 360). 
Bakhtin calls attention from the interior of our mind to the boundary between people: 
The most important acts constituting self-consciousness are determined by a 
relationship toward another consciousness (toward a thou). Not that which takes 
place within, but that which takes place on the boundary between one’s own 
and someone else’s consciousness, on the threshold.… To be means to 
communicate.… A person has no internal sovereign territory, he is wholly and 
always at the boundary (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 287). 
For Bakhtin (as for Levinas), it seems that we become and find ourselves and each 
other as humans in this event of saying, communicating—in dialogue. 
Dialogue, one might say, is a movement towards reality and others in that reality 
through speaking (dia-logue meaning through words). Bakhtin (1981) writes about the 
word as a path from the speaking subject to the objects of the world. To Bakhtin, 
words, and consequently the path that words offer, involve emotional, volitional and 
axiological tone (Bakhtin, 1993). The ways we enter reality through words involve 
feelings, will and values. The path goes through a “complex play of light and shadow” 
found in dialogues where the objects of the world are both “highlighted” and 
“dimmed” (p. 277). This path to the world goes through a “dialogical, agitated and 
tension-filled environment of alien words, value judgments and accents, weaves in and 
out of complex interrelationships” (p. 276). This means that the path offered by words 
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both reveals the world to us and conceals it. As Bakhtin states, the word is never mine 
alone; the word, or any expressive gesture, is always borrowed from someone else 
who has already used it (e.g. Bakhtin, 1986, p. 121). Dialogue allows a moving 
towards, or over to, reality through words and at the same time creates a split through 
the way words conceal, or “dim”, the world from us. 
Bertau (2014), referring to Bakhtin among others, explains how language is both 
presentation and re-presentation: she states that language is “representation by 
presentation” (p. 448). Drawing on Bakhtin and Vygotsky, she points to the way in 
which language is presentation; the performance of speaking—voice, sound, and 
body—is reality. Language is “vivid materiality”, she writes. At the same time, reality 
is re-presented to us through speaking. The sounds of voices are symbols and signs; 
they point to something else. They re-present something, something outside the 
materiality of the actual dialogue. Accordingly, she points to a kind of double 
community in dialogue/language. First, language generates a specific now: “being 
together in time and space, evolving across time in a coordinated manner”: the 
community of a presented present. Second, language generates a stage: “being 
together not-there and not-now, being together absent … on a stage we generate by our 
language activities, it is being together absent from our concrete, physical here-and-
now … a social not-now” (p. 451); the community of a re-presented present. 
In a sense, both Bakhtin and Levinas offer a philosophy of the body. As Levinas 
indicates, the “place” of an (ethical) speech event is skin and face. According to 
Bakhtin, a person participates in dialogue “with his eyes, lips, hands, soul, spirit, with 
his whole body and deeds” (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 293). Voloshinov (1986) suggests that 
“[T]he reality of the psyche is the same reality as that of the sign” (p. 26). He goes on 
to point out what this reality of the sign is about: 
Any organic activity or process: breathing, blood circulation, movements of the 
body, articulation, inner speech, mimetic motions, reaction to external stimuli 
(e.g. light stimuli) and so forth … can become the material of experience, since 
everything can acquire semiotic significance, can become expressive (p. 28). 
This entails that consciousness (or the psyche) can be explored through the ways in 
which we corporeally and materially engage in the use of signs. The locus of the 
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subject and the locus of the psyche are found “somewhere between the organism and 
the outside world, on the borderline separating these two spheres of reality” (p. 26).7 
Sheets-Johnstone, taking a phenomenological view of the body, explores human 
existence and living as human movement, and furthermore explores human movement 
as language. “The body is a semantic template” (Sheets-Johnstone, 2009, p. 248) and 
language is structured intercorporeally (p. 242). She suggests that human movement is 
always responsive interaction with the movements of others. This movement always 
“means something, communicates something, accomplishes something”; thus, it 
should be regarded as language. This movement, as language, makes others “respond 
by moving—or not moving” and in this bodily interplay, we make sense together by 
moving and perceiving movement (p. 241). 
The point here is that human living and existence seen as dialogue and language both 
concern the vitality of the body in interplay with other bodies and the way in which 
signs emerge from this. These signs, in turn, make meaning and representation 
possible. Becoming a human subject through dialogue involves both this bodily 
movement and expressiveness, and in this way meaning and thematic relation to 
reality are made possible. From this dialogical event, I now continue by taking a step 
back, so to speak, to the ethical event within dialogue, which according to Levinas is 
where any dialogue originates. As Levinas (1982, p. 103) puts it, “Dia-conie avant tout 
dialogue”. 
2.1.2. Dia-conia—the ethics of human change: The subject is an ethical event 
And never, never before had she talked like that to me, 
so that she even astonished me, 
for the first time I breathed like a living human being. 
(Spoken by Rogozhin in The Idiot, Dostoevsky, 2004) 
Dia-conia is not a common word in English, but is a concept from Christian theology. 
It means something like “to serve”, and the related word “deacon” means “servant” 
(Online Etymological Dictionary, 2015). The prefix dia is the same as in dia-logue. 
The etymology of the word conia (in dia-conia) appears to be somewhat unclear. 
                                                 
7
 However, according to Morson & Emerson (1990) there is a crucial difference between Voloshinov and 
Bakhtin that is important for the arguments of this thesis. For Voloshinov, “communication between people is 
made possible by the rhythms and intonations they share, by their ‘common surroundings, common knowledge 
and understanding’ … whereas ‘Bakhtin places the reverse emphasis, on how I can transcend the chorus, and 
on how … I can produce the new’” (p. 195). For Bakhtin this implies the “need to resist a collapse into 
communality and rhythm” (ibid). 
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Conia seems to stem from the Greek word ken, which means to be active, to set 
oneself in motion (ibid.). From the Latin “conari”, conia may mean trying, striving for 
something or “conato”, which means outbreak (Diccionario Etimologico, 2015). 
Therefore, although its meaning is uncertain, it seems that the word dia-conia may 
mean something like through trying, striving, putting oneself into motion, or even 
through an outbreak. 
It is my point of departure that the philosophy of Levinas and Bakhtin displaces the 
focus of attention related to subjectivity (and thus to mental health) in the sense that 
individual consciousness is not seen as primary; rather, our consciousness is 
determined by—and emerges from—our relations to others. Responsibility (Levinas) 
or answerability (Bakhtin), speaking, relating and dialogue come first. Erdinast-Vulcan 
(2008) states that both Levinas and Bakhtin offer “a phenomenology of ethical 
subjectivity” in the way they describe and explore “the ethical subject as living on 
borderlines, facing the other, irremediably vulnerable and infinitely responsible” (pp. 
43–44). 
Levinas describes the subject in ethical terms as follows: “the very node of 
subjectivity is knotted in ethics” (Lévinas, 1985, p. 95). In Levinas’s philosophy, 
responsibility is a key concept (Aasland, 2007; Levinas, 1998c; Murray, 2000, Biesta, 
2009). Before being I, before being free, there is responsibility for the other. 
Responsibility in fact is not a simple attribute of subjectivity, as if the latter 
already existed in itself; it is, once again, initially for another.… To say here I 
am [me voici]. To do something for the other. To give … [that is] the 
incarnation of human subjectivity (Levinas, 1985, p. 97). 
The other haunts me with his or her strangeness, nakedness, and vulnerability, and 
calls for my response. This call interrupts me and animates me—my thoughts, my 
feelings, my actions are responses to this ethical demand. 
In Levinas’s philosophy, which he states was in defence of the subject at a time when 
the subject was under attack in current postmodern philosophy, there is a priority of 
the other. The encounter with the other is an ethical interruption of my being (“being” 
in the sense of having an identity within an order of identities) and I am evoked as a 
subject as I leave myself. The subject, in Levinasian terms, is an “excursion from the 
self” towards the other (Ganteau & Onega, 2013, p. 148; Levinas, 1999). This dia-
conia, this approach to the other, is an ethical event, prior to the dia-logos. 
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Bakhtin, through the concept of answerability, also explores human living in terms of 
ethical intersubjectivity based on alterity/otherness. Living, according to Bakhtin, is 
participating in the ongoing and the once-occurrent event of being (Bakhtin, 1993, pp. 
2 and 12). This event of being shows itself as an ought (p. 30), and our being is the act 
that answers this ought. 
[E]verything in me—every movement, gesture, lived-experience, thought, 
feeling—everything must be such an [answerable] act or deed; it is only on this 
condition that I actually live, that I do not sever myself from the ontological 
roots of actual being (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 44). 
The ongoing process of becoming a subject is about answering the ought of the event 
of being that we participate in together with others. I am obliged to act, and I am 
obliged to act in such ways that space is created also for others to act in the event. 
Thus there is a “morally ought-to-be attitude” in my existence (Bakhtin, 1993, pp. 23–
24; see also Murray, 2000; Shotter, 2006). 
Responsibility and answerability have alterity (Levinas) and outsideness (Bakhtin) as 
their fundamental conditions. This alterity and outsideness could both be described in 
terms of time and space. The position, place, of the other and me (must) never coincide 
(space). Furthermore, my response to the other is never simultaneous and is always 
“outside” the moment of the one to whom I respond (time). This is a fundamental dia-
chrony and dia-topy at the roots of human existence, which I now examine more 
closely. 
2.1.3. Dia-chronia/dia-topia—the temporality and spatiality of existing: The subject is 
an event of moving 
Yes! Now I see Ludvik. I can see the door is open at Ludvik’s house … Yes …! 
Now there are people there; this will be fun! 
(Said in joy and anticipation by my 10-year-old son 
as he hastened over to his friend Ludvik.) 
Becoming or existing as a temporal event can be described as continuance or 
durability. I am (stably) myself throughout the course of time; I am what is sustained 
from event to event in a line that is formed by past–present–future (dia-chrony as 
through time). On the other hand, existing as a temporal event may also entail a 
rupture in time, an ever-occurring newness of existing, or existing as an event of 
appearing and disappearing (dia-chrony as split time). 
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Correspondingly, becoming as a spatial event could entail always being present in a 
certain place, moving “within” the world (dia-topy as through space/place). 
Alternatively, existing as a spatial event could also entail moving into a space (that you 
are not yet in). Space for existing and moving, then, is not about where you are, but 
about where you go (dia-topy as a split/rupture in space). 
Bakhtin accentuates outsideness vis á vis the other as fundamental in dialogue. My 
view of the other, and consequently my response to him/her is and must always be 
from another perspective than his or hers. Only by this dia-topy, this spatial 
separateness, can I offer the crucial surplus that dialogue and human existence needs, 
which prevents us from merging into one: 
In what way would it enrich the event if I merged with the other, and instead of 
two there would now be only one? … Let him rather remain outside me, for in 
that position he can see and know what I myself do not see and do not know 
from my own place, and he can essentially enrich the event of my own life 
(Bakhtin, 1990, p. 87). 
For Bakhtin (as for Levinas), this outsideness vis á vis the other is a precondition for 
ethics. My life and experience is “axiologically … toned or colored” (p. 88) from 
outside myself by others’ responses. The relationship to the other, and the dialogue 
with the other, does not occur in any common place. Dialogue, and consequently 
subjectivity, depends on how we respond to each other from different places (and from 
different “times”). My subjectivity is an ongoing response to the fundamental alterity 
of the other. Dialogue and subjectivity in a way presuppose that I am never fully there 
together with the other. 
Levinas says that the other’s face “shatters the human being there” (Levinas, 1998a, p. 
216, italics added). Levinas describes the event of becoming a subject in a paradoxical 
way as “a no-place”, a utopia, in opposition to Heidegger’s “Dasein”: “A no-place 
prior to the there of being there, prior to the Da of the Dasein” (p. 216). In other 
words, subjectivity is a kind of moving towards an unreachable place. Responsive 
subjectivity is dia-topical. 
One might argue that any responsiveness, by definition, must be dia-chronic. A 
response comes after what it responds to and can never by synchronic. Syn-chronicity 
is a matter of parallel, simultaneous movements, not responsive movement. The 
response is always from “outside” of the moment of the other or what is responded to, 
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and consequently it is dia-chronic. A concept such as mirroring would not account for 
what happens through responsibility. Mirroring would imply copying or pure 
imitation. The animation of the subject, according to Levinas, “is the way a 
relationship between uneven terms, without any common time, arrives at a 
relationship” (Levinas in Bevis, 2007, p. 324). In an ethical relationship evoked by 
alterity, any “synthesis and contemporaneousness are refused; proximity, as though it 
were an abyss, interrupts being’s unrenderable essence” (Levinas, 1998c, p. 89).8 
For Levinas, diachronicity, which is fundamental in his ethics, concerns the way the 
other always precedes me. My subjectivity is a response to the other, who is already 
lost in the past when I respond. Burggraeve (2007) explains this Levinasian idea: “I 
discover myself as already marked by an event that radically precedes me” (p. 48). 
For Levinas, there is ethicality inherent in all human movement. If we put dia-conia 
and dialogue at the heart of existing, moving always involves being moved. One is 
moved by the other, from another time and from another place. Dialogue—and our 
becoming and moving in dialogue—is constantly upheld by a fundamental dia-chrony, 
which is the way we never coincide in time and a fundamental dia-topy which is the 
way we never coincide in space/place. Human movement is ethical movement, “a non-
synchronizable diachrony” (Levinas, 1998c, p. 93). I move as I am pulled from the 
outside by an ethical “force”. 
Bakhtin describes ethical subjectivity in terms of answerability. A word or a voice—
and consequently a human being—is formed by the already spoken, to which it 
responds, and the yet to be spoken, the future answers that it anticipates. In this 
linguistic dia-chrony, we exist and move: 
[E]very word is directed toward an answer and cannot escape the profound 
influence of the answering word that it anticipates … oriented toward a future 
answer-word: it provokes an answer, anticipates it and structures itself in the 
answer’s direction. Forming itself in an atmosphere of the already spoken, the 
word is at the same time determined by that which has not yet been said but 
                                                 
8
 Levinas scholar and translator Alphonso Lingis beautifully describes the way responsibility concerns the 
different times of the interlocutors: “To address someone is not simply to address a source of information; it is 
to address one who will answer and answer for his or her answer. The time delay between statement and 
response is the time in which the other, while fully present there before one, withdraws into the fourth 
dimension—reaffirming his or her otherness, rising up behind whatever he presents of himself, and rising up 
ever beyond whatever I represent of her and present to her—to contest or to confirm it” (Lingis, 1994, p. 87). 
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which is needed and in fact anticipated by the answering word (Bakhtin, 1981, 
pp. 279–280). 
In this way, the past and the future are included in the dynamics of any living dialogue. 
There is always a “yet-to-be-ness” in our being. Our existence is not determined by 
what is prior to our expressions and movements that causal rationality would imply. 
Our existence, in terms of our expressiveness, is formed by others’ future responses.9 
Our living, our vitality, depends on being answered. Therefore, there is a horror 
implicit in dialogue: “For the word (and, consequently, for a human being) there is 
nothing more terrible than a lack of response” (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 127). 
Human movement is language, states Sheets-Johnstone, and movement should be 
investigated within its “experiential realities” (Sheets-Johnstone, 2009). This entails 
that movement takes place in a “rich and complex qualitative spatio–temporal–
energetic dynamic created by movement itself” (Sheets-Johnstone, 2011a, p. 460, 
italics added). This implies a shift from our common notion that movement takes place 
in space and in time, as if space and time existed independent of this movement. 
Rather, as Sheets-Johnstone indicates, human movements are intentional, expressive 
gestures and signs; human movement is language, and the time and space for this 
movement are created by movement itself. We move and are moved in time and space 
where these are experiential realities, not objectively given reality. 
The dia-conia of existing and the subject as an ethical event both point to a pre-cultural 
side of human existence. Dialogue, diachrony, dia-topy and movement involve signs 
and forms, and consequently they involve a cultural domain. As the above perspectives 
already imply, human existence may consist of events at the border between a pre-
cultural domain and a cultural one. I examine cultural aspects more closely through the 
concept of dia-gnosis. 
                                                 
9
 Bråten (2009) discusses the possibility of shared time, a shared immediate moment between two or more 
people, from a philosophical and a physicist point of view, and he explains the difficulties of the idea of such a 
shared moment. He even questions the idea that a person is simultaneous with herself/himself. Moreover, he 
relates this to an example where a boy, Thomas, is feeding his sister: “For, surely, the individual observer would 
have to be considered to be simultaneous with herself/himself, or would s/he? … When executing the feeding, 
Thomas, carries out an act planned in the past. When opening his mouth as his sister is about to open hers to 
take the food, he is unwittingly anticipating and virtually participating in the act to be completed in the future 
by his sister. Hence, in a curious sense, he is not simultaneous with himself” (Bråten, 2009, pp. 86 and 87). One 
might perhaps say that Bråten here describes the way a relational view of the individual implies that this 
individual from the very start is diachronic, not synchronic, in relation to him/herself. Nonetheless, Bråten, 
through his theory of the dyadic self, which includes both the virtual and the actual other, ends by arguing that 
there can be a shared immediate presence. 
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2.1.4. Dia-gnosis—the forms and identities of existing: The subject is a cultural event 
 … she took of its fruit and ate. 
She also gave to her husband with her, and he ate. Then the eyes of both of them were opened, and 
they knew that they were naked …10 
(Genesis, chapter 3, v 6–7, Bible—New King James Version) 
We know the terms diagnosis11 (noun) and to diagnose (verb) from the practice and 
rationale of modern medicine; the illness or pathological state is identified with the use 
of a current diagnostic classification system. This is seen as the decisive starting point 
of treatment. In the following, I use the term “dia-gnosis” in a slightly different or 
broader manner. To diagnose, as a verb, means something like to discern or to 
distinguish something from something else (Online English Dictionary, 2015). Again, 
the etymology of the word dia means through, by, over to and split, divided. Gnosis, 
also from the Greek, means knowledge. Dia-gnosis, then, means something like 
through knowledge, but also separating or dividing by means of knowledge. To 
perceive or experience “something” is to perceive or experience it precisely as 
something, and this involves an act of discerning, an act of distinguishing and an act of 
identifying. One may claim that this implies that experience and even perception are in 
a way dia-gnostic acts, sensing through (dia) knowledge/identities (gnosis) made 
possible by signs. 
This ability to distinguish, to discern, and to have a knowledge relation with the reality 
that strikes our senses is dependent on culture. Signs are formed in social, 
communicative interplay within a culture. Signs are formed when expressivity takes on 
forms that are recognizable to others; signs emerge and are formed within cultures and 
signs form culture. Sensing “something” as something is a cultural act/event. We 
experience and relate to the world by means of signs as if from an outside position and 
are no longer blind and mute, immersed in reality. The signs given by the culture in 
which we live form not only the way we understand reality but also the way we 
perceive and sense it. “Experience is a reading, a hermeneutics and not an intuition. [It 
is] this taken as that” (Levinas, 1996, p. 38). 
                                                 
10
 In the Biblical myth of the fall of Adam and Eve, they eat from the tree of knowledge and obtain the ability to 
tell good from bad. Man starts to name the world, and make judgments. Man has transcended a mute, blind, 
immersed living in the world. This, one might suggest, is a myth indicating the beginning of man’s diagnostic 
(through knowledge, discerning) relation to reality. 
11
 My choice of the term “diagnosis” in the way I use it here was made doubtfully. The way it corresponds with 
the other “dia” concepts is a poor argument. Nonetheless, when I experimented with the idea, it seemed 
viable. 
  
26 
 
What, then, about the ethical event, the original speech event that Levinas mentions? 
This event, according to Levinas, is pre-cultural, and it is also the source of our 
subjectivity. One might suggest that human living is formed at a threshold between a 
pre-cultural encounter—where the other cannot be reduced to a cultural being, nor 
thought of in terms of knowledge—and a proceeding cultural encounter found in the 
response that involves expressiveness by means of cultural gestures. 
According to Levinas (1996), a human being is animated through “the cultural effort 
of that incarnate being that expresses itself” (p. 52). The other, who is not a “cultural 
signification”, makes me responsible and demands a response. This response, in turn, 
is “my cultural gesture of expression”. As absent and strange to each other, yet 
responsible, we are in a pre-cultural domain—ethics. As present to each other, as 
manifest, we are “expressed and disclosed by our own cultural initiative, by corporeal, 
linguistic or artistic gestures” (p. 53), we are in the cultural domain—expressivity and 
hermeneutics. As Levinas puts it, we are “text by its context” (p. 52). The other, who 
is “extra-ordinary” (outside any order!), comes towards us and is “making an entry” 
(p. 53), and through cultural gestures he or she is integrated into the world. This 
entering into the world takes place not only by taking on a form by means of “cultural 
ornaments” (p. 53). The entry of the other will also “disturb and jostle” (p. 53) the 
culture that is entered. The entry to culture in which strangeness and singularity 
become a subject is “a detachment from its form in the midst of the production of its 
form” (p. 53). 
Bakhtin also describes human living at this threshold. In his essay The problem of the 
text, Bakhtin (1986) points to what he identifies as two poles in the text. By text, he 
means any utterance, oral or written, of a subject within a “coherent complex of signs” 
(p. 103). The first pole is the system of conventional signs in a given collective (or a 
culture, I may add). This conventional system of signs makes it possible to repeat or to 
reproduce sounds (oral text) and letters and words in ink (written text). Without this 
system of signs—language—the sounds of our voices or the ink on a piece of paper 
would be merely natural, not signifying, sound or ink. The second pole of the text is 
the individual, unique, unrepeatable utterance. Bakhtin claims that within this 
uniqueness lies the entire significance of utterances. The uniqueness of the individual 
utterance still depends on the first pole, the sign system given by language; the 
unrepeatable utterance is realized by means of the sign system. Bakhtin states that an 
utterance is always to some extent a free revelation of the personality (second pole) 
that admits no causal explanation (p. 107). Nonetheless, he continues, this unique, 
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unrepeatable, revelation takes place within the internal necessity and internal logic of 
the coherent complex of signs that makes it recognizable (first pole).12 Exploration of 
human existence should take both poles into account, or pay attention to the threshold 
between a text as a unique utterance and a text as a cultural complex of signs. 
Again, both Levinas and Bakhtin point to language and text as the “domain” of human 
living and subjects’ becoming. Furthermore, subjects’ becoming through language 
happens at the threshold between the pre-cultural domain (uniqueness, singularity and 
unrepeatability) and the cultural domain (repeatability, conventionality and 
recognizability). The unique subject comes forth through and within the cultural and 
common domain, and at the same time the subject “disturbs and jostles” this cultural 
and common domain. 
Culture offers signs, language and names through which we relate to reality. In a 
similar way, culture offers gestures, styles and forms for our movements. Any human 
movement may be understood as a gesture and a sign (Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Sheets-
Johnstone, 2011a). Movements are cultural, and the exploration of human movement 
should include this fundamental cultural aspect of movement: the ways we move, both 
in relation to others and when moving in solitude, are ways of moving, moving with a 
style, moving as a gesture that expresses something, and these take on a meaning. We 
move with the style, the gestures and the forms found in the repertoire of the culture 
we inhabit. Movement is never entirely unique, and “cannot be assigned to a single 
mover”.13 Sheets-Johnstone articulates the primacy of movement in this way: “Indeed, 
movement forms the ‘I’ that moves before the ‘I’ that moves forms movement” 
(Sheets-Johnstone, 2011c, p. xxxii). She points to the way in which what we refer to as 
the ‘I’ emerges from the dynamics of movement. Furthermore, this movement is found 
at the intersection between uniqueness, singularity and culture. She says that every 
human movement has a style, or a “kinesthetic melody”: “In … habitual movement 
patterns, we recognize kinesthetic melodies … they bear the recognizable stamp of our 
own familiar qualitatively felt synergies of meaningful movement” (Sheets-Johnstone, 
2011b, p. 460). This quality of movement is our own, yet it is formed via responsive 
cultural interplay. 
                                                 
12
 “An utterance … even if it has only one word, can never be repeated; it is always a new utterance (even if it is 
a quotation)” Bakhtin (1986, p. 108). 
13
 Paraphrasing Bakhtin (1986, p. 121): “The word cannot be assigned to a single speaker.” 
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2.2. What is at stake in all this? 
It may be argued that the perspectives discussed above that illuminate human living 
and existence in a certain way to some extent lack the most crucial element; in what 
way does this matter to us? What are the consequences of the perspectives we find in 
Bakhtin, Levinas, Sheets-Johnstone and others for my exploration of change in this 
study? Existing in and through dialogue, dia-conia, dia-chronia, dia-topia, and dia-
gnosis created in the encounter with the other/others are not of primary interest in this 
exploration. The interest of this thesis is in the way we, the adolescents in this study, 
me and you, are animated (given life with a form) through movements, leaps and 
events at these thresholds and how this matters to us. The important question is in 
what ways your, their and my precise movements, experiences, anticipations and 
feelings are conditioned by these suggested threshold events. These thresholds draw a 
“landscape” in both positive and negative ways; on the dark side, there is vulnerability, 
frailty, hurt, despair, shame, guilt, perplexity, fear, anxiety, alienation, violation, 
humiliation, hopelessness and distrust. However, on the brighter side there is joy, 
hope, pride, delight, trust, care, eagerness, well-being and interest. The above 
perspectives are an attempt to show how the human phenomena and experiences that 
we refer to as mental health difficulties may be described with the help of this bundle 
of threshold events. Again, through these perspectives some aspects of living may 
come into view, while others fall into the shadows. 
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3. Aim of the study 
The overall aim of this thesis is to explore the social and relational aspects of change 
related to mental health difficulties. The specific aim is to focus on change related to 
dialogical and network-oriented approaches in health initiatives for adolescents and 
their networks. Furthermore, the researchers wished to make the lived experiences of 
the adolescents and other stakeholders the primary angle of exploration. Another 
important aspect of the study was that its focus was not limited to experiences of the 
network meetings facilitated by services. Experiences and descriptions of events 
related to various important areas of the adolescents’ lives were included in the 
investigation. The thesis explores change related to mental health in general, not only 
that of adolescents. 
The overall research questions were the following: 
1. How do people in psychosocial crises, and people in their networks, describe 
their experiences related to their situation and the processes of change within 
their lives when they receive help through a dialogical, network-oriented 
approach? 
2. Based on these descriptions, how can we describe and understand the social and 
relational aspects involved in change related to mental health? 
These overall aims and questions were pursued through four substudies with the 
following aims, research questions and foci: 
Study 1: The aim of the first study was to explore the ethical and relational aspects of 
change related to mental health. The study explores these aspects through analyses of 
ideas from dialogical theory found in Emmanuel Levinas and Mikhail Bakhtin in 
combination with a case study. Interview data from one chosen case were explored. 
Study 2: The aim of this study was to explore the social dynamics of change related to 
people in psychosocial crises from the perspective of lived experience. The focus was 
on life as lived and experienced in various social arenas. Through exploring and 
analysing empirical data from all the interviews, the study sought to answer the 
following research questions: 
1. How do people in psychosocial crises describe their experiences of changes in 
their lives? 
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2. How can their experiences help us to understand the social and relational 
aspects of the dynamics of change related to mental health? 
Study 3: The aim of this study was to explore change in mental health from the 
perspective of lived experience and its relationship with network meetings using 
dialogical practices. By exploring the same empirical data used in study 2, the 
researchers considered the following research questions: 
1. How do the participants in dialogical practices describe their experiences of a 
network meeting? 
2. On the basis of these descriptions, how can the dynamics of change in 
dialogical practices be described and understood? 
Study 4: The aim of this study was to explore how the interplay between inner and 
outer dialogues contributes to significant and meaningful moments for the 
interlocutors in a network meeting. This was explored through analysing video-
recorded network meetings and interviews with all the participants. The sequences in 
the conversations that were perceived as significant and meaningful were explored 
through the following research questions: 
1. What characterizes the interplay between the participants’ inner and outer 
dialogues in the sequences that they experience as significant? 
2. How do the participants’ inner dialogues contribute to the outer dialogue, and 
how does the outer dialogue contribute to the participants’ inner dialogues? 
The results from these substudies are presented in four scientific papers and form the 
foundation of this thesis. The thesis also suggests some new overarching themes that 
offer a possible synthesis of the findings of the four substudies. These are presented in 
the discussion in Chapter 6. 
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4. Methodology: Scientific position and procedures 
The child begins to perceive the world not only through his eyes but also through his speech. 
(Vygotsky, in Shotter, 2014, p. 95) 
In this chapter, I examine some methodological issues related to the study through the 
following steps. First, I suggest a position for this thesis within the philosophy of 
science. Second, I identify some implications of such a position for the process of 
creating and analysing data. Third, I describe the specific methodological procedures 
of the four studies. 
Methodologically, this thesis follows the phenomenological and hermeneutic tradition 
of Husserl (1970) and Gadamer (2004). These two philosophers laid the foundations of 
a variety of methodological approaches, in particular in qualitative research (Alvesson 
& Sköldberg, 2009; Dahlberg, Nyström, & Dahlberg, 2008; Kvale & Brinkmann, 
2009). The methodological perspectives of this thesis are mostly found in the scientific 
tradition following Husserl and Gadamer and more precisely in approaches that 
consider the significance of language and dialogue. Levinas and Bakhtin represent 
scholars in the phenomenological and hermeneutical tradition. Both put language at 
the core of their philosophies, and have inspired methodological approaches (Kunz, 
2006; Kunz, 2010; Shotter, 2014; Sullivan & McCarthy, 2005; van Manen, 2006). In 
this chapter, I draw on both Levinas and Bakhtin, but for the analytical and 
interpretative, procedures I mainly refer to Shotter (2014), Sullivan (2012) and 
Cresswell (2012), who all rely on Bakhtinian ideas and concepts in their methodology. 
The data are drawn from dialogues in the interviews. Some of the respondents of this 
study expressed the view that these dialogues seemed to facilitate new experiences and 
new ways of relating to previous events in their lives: 
“In a way, it all became more real when those words were said” (Maria). 
“What I told you just now … actually I have never thought of it that way 
before” (Catherine). 
“In these conversations [interviews] it’s a bit like … gifts that sprinkle down. 
Kind of important words with parachutes that fall” (Maria’s mother). 
Such utterances supported the assumption in dialogical approaches that interviews are 
not about “collecting” or obtaining access to experiences that are “there” already, 
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ready to be communicated. Rather, the interviews (and any dialogue in life for that 
matter) seem to be dialogical events where experiences are evoked and formed. 
The studies in this thesis investigated change related to mental health through the lived 
experiences of those involved. A somewhat interesting aspect—as will hopefully 
become clearer through this chapter—is that methodological questions that include 
“What is lived experience, and how is it formed?” in a way coincide with the overall 
interest of the study, namely processes of change related to mental health. This is so 
because a core aspect of mental health is concerned with how life is experienced and 
the conditions involved in changing the experience of life. 
4.1. Science and reality: Between honouring and betraying 
In The crisis of European sciences and transcendental phenomenology, Husserl (1970) 
claimed that Western science had lost its roots in reality and in our “life-world”. 
Husserl used the metaphor of sedimentation, indicating that representations—
knowledge constructions—that science took for reality had taken on a petrified 
character with layers on layers of representations. This sedimentation created by 
scientific knowledge had removed the original lived experience from sight. Husserl 
stated that the way we experience the world in our everyday lives, our life-world, was 
the starting point of all science. Husserl offered phenomenology as a universal 
scientific method that could bring science out of its crisis. Levinas acknowledges this 
contribution by Husserl. According to Levinas, the phenomenology of Husserl 
contributed to what he calls “the ruin of representations” (Levinas, 1998, p. 111). 
Levinas relates Husserl’s ideas to his own key concepts of same and other or the 
corresponding concepts of totality and infinity. He sees the endless accumulation of 
knowledge as a process of assimilating the otherness and infinity of reality into the 
sameness and totality of knowledge. Science, in the sense of production of knowledge, 
turns the infinity of reality into a totality where everything is identified and given a 
place in an orderly manner in relation to everything else. Levinas distinguishes 
between saying and the said, and speaks of the betrayal of the said (Burggraeve, 
2007). The said, as content and knowledge, betrays infinity and otherness. 
Interestingly, Levinas also states that saying, as an ethical approach, honours the world 
and the other in that world (Levinas, 1993). 
Phenomenological life-world research, or investigation of lived experience, should 
prevent or interrupt epistemological totalization. Max van Manen (2006), a scholar of 
phenomenological methodology, explains with explicit reference to Levinas (and 
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Derrida) the impossibility of grasping reality through writing. He recognizes how the 
use of signs and language is involved in all experience, and further that reality itself is 
of a mode or character that can never be captured by language. In a sense, reality 
escapes language and experience. One reaches out, desiring the strange (saying), to 
grasp it, and in the act of grasping it, it vanishes (said) (van Manen, 2006). 
In accordance with these perspectives, the methodology of this thesis takes as its point 
of departure the lived experience of the respondents. Scientific exploration of the 
phenomena of reality, and in the case of our exploration of change related to mental 
health, should repeatedly return to, or seek out, the threshold between the world as it 
exists “outside” and prior to experience and knowledge on one hand, and the way this 
world shows itself to the subject via experience and knowledge on the other. Scientific 
exploration should have its “place” on the border between the impressions that reality 
imposes on us and the expressions we find for these impressions. 
4.2. The word and the world: The dialogicality of lived experience 
Holquist states that throughout his works, Bakhtin was pursuing experience in the 
particularity of a specific life and its immediacy: “[in the] sheer quality of happening 
in life before the magma of such experiences cool, hardening into igneous theories, or 
accounts of what happened” (Holquist, 1993, p. x). However, Bakhtin recognized that 
this “naked immediate experience”, prior to any dialogue, is beyond reach. Bakhtin 
introduces the word as man’s path to reality. This path, offered by the word, is far 
from straightforward. Words “highlight and dim”, and the path they offer goes through 
a “complex play of light and shadow” (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 277). The world, as 
experienced through words, is “charged with value, already enveloped in an obscuring 
mist—or, on the contrary, by the “light” of alien words that have already been spoken 
about it” (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 276). 
Sullivan (2012) gives an account of various qualitative methodologies. Based on two 
key concepts from Paul Ricoeur, trust and suspicion, he claims that within the variety 
of approaches in qualitative research a line can be drawn between approaches based on 
trust and those based on suspicion. On the one hand, he points to grounded theory and 
phenomenological analyses as examples of approaches based on trust, as they examine 
the content of talk as a “gateway into lived experience” (p. 8). Such approaches are 
trusting and exploratory in spirit. On the other hand, approaches such as discourse 
analysis and some forms of narrative analysis are based on suspicion. They represent 
an attitude of suspicion because they examine the content of talk as a reflection of 
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power relations or negotiations. Such approaches are suspicious, critical and analytical 
in spirit. 
Sullivan’s (2012) point is that dialogical analyses of qualitative data, based on 
perspectives from Bakhtin, offer an approach that encompasses both an attitude of 
trust and one of suspicion. Sullivan points to a key notion in Bakhtin: the concept of 
double-voiced utterances. An utterance is double voiced in the sense that inherent in it 
is the voice of others. This implies that distrust (or doubt or suspicion) of one’s own 
utterance is present in the utterance. The attitude of trust and suspicion that the 
researchers bring to the analysis is already present in the double-voiced nature of the 
speaker’s utterances, and the speaker is aware of it. The respondents speak with self-
suspicion and doubt. This entails a presence of multiple meanings and an ambiguity 
inherent in the said. Bakhtin, according to Sullivan, brings a parallel undercurrent of 
suspicion to the attitude of trust found in phenomenology. During the interview, the 
participants are already engaged in the dilemma of trust or distrust vis á vis the content 
of their own speech. 
An indication of this double-voiced nature of utterances and the ambiguity of trust and 
suspicion may be found in the way we (both interviewers and respondents) spoke in 
the dialogue of the interviews. The utterances are filled with breaks, hesitations, 
withdrawals, half-said sentences and the addition of discourse markers such as kind of, 
in a way, like, and as if. It was as if the respondents withdrew the said when saying it. 
There was a holding back or withdrawal in what we said because we included a doubt: 
a fear that our way of naming an event could suppress other, equally valid, ways of 
naming the event. 
Cresswell (2012) suggests that immediate phenomenological experience is also always 
sociolinguistic. Lived experience, not just meaning or knowledge, is created in 
discourse and dialogue. The way in which we account for our lives through dialogue 
experientially matters. We should not miss the “experiential lived-ness” (p. 565) of 
people’s accounts. Cresswell articulates a position between, on the one hand, a 
phenomenological approach that overlooks the significance of language in experience 
and takes experience as prelinguistic and, on the other hand, approaches in discourse 
psychology that miss the experiential aspect involved in language use and end up only 
exploring how we talk about experience (p. 565). It is through the expressions 
permitted by dialogues that experiences emerge and take form (Cresswell, 2012). 
Qualitative interviews could be seen as such experience-forming dialogues. 
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Dialogic interaction is not only a matter of the content of what we say. Rather, our 
bodies, our emotions and our values must all be included. Sullivan puts the concept of 
“voice” at the core of his analytical approach. With voice, a point of view is expressed 
through intonation: “Intonation is the sound that value makes” and “such intonation 
gives discourse a textured feeling of heaviness and lightness and also colour as 
discourse becomes lived experiences” (Sullivan, 2012, p. 44, italics added). 
Consequently, attention should be given to the emotional aspects and expressiveness 
involved in saying: tone of voice, bodily gestures, facial expressions, pace of speaking, 
and so on. 
This entails several interactional levels that must be taken into account: all aspects of 
the actual dialogue in the interview, the various dialogues a person participates in 
outside the actual interview and the discourses and various languages of the culture 
he/she lives in. In this multidialogical environment, utterances find expression and 
lived experience emerges. 
4.3. Polyphonic and participatory research 
4.3.1. Participatory research 
Two co-researchers with personal experience related to mental health difficulties were 
part of the research team that conducting the studies in this thesis. Davidson, Ridgway, 
Schmutte, & O’Connell (2009) propose that involving people with first-hand 
experience in research is related to (at least) two agendas. The first agenda concerns 
the research itself, as co-researchers will improve the quality, relevance and utility of 
mental health research. This involvement of co-researchers can be useful in relation to 
both a) the implementation of conventional approaches in mental health, and b) 
research intended to develop new approaches in mental health (pp. 90–91). The second 
agenda is related to the lives of people with first-hand experience. It enables the claim 
that research is a fundamental social and cultural institution, and thus it contributes to 
the overall “process of the restoration of their full citizenship in society” (p. 93). 
Callard & Rose (2012) argue that user participation in mental health research is the 
most effective way of enhancing user involvement as called for by the World Health 
Organization (Muijen, 2011, according to Callard & Rose, 2012). Faulkner & Thomas 
(2002) state that contributions from users in research are important, especially in an 
age of evidence-based medicine that is “at odds with common morality because it 
assesses interventions in terms of only efficacy” and the need for user involvement in 
research is advocated because of a need to put “ethics before effectiveness” (p. 1). 
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User involvement in research, they claim, may lead to a redefinition of outcome 
measures from a narrow definition of symptom relief. A greater and wider range of the 
subjective, lived experience of emotional distress should be included (p. 2). User 
involvement turns the focus towards experiential dimensions, moves research closer to 
a phenomenological level and heightens its ecological validity (Faulkner & Thomas, 
2002; Moltu, Stefansen, Svisdahl, & Veseth, 2013). Such knowledge, generated 
through research in collaboration with users, should be included in multiperspective 
evidence in mental health (Rose, Thornicroft, & Slade, 2006). 
Beresford (2013) points to three broad approaches: 1) user involvement in research, 
where service users are added to an existing arrangement, 2) collaborative or 
partnership research, where service users and/or their organizations jointly participate 
in developing and undertaking projects, and 3) user-controlled research (p. 142). If we 
refer to these levels of approaches, the participation of co-researchers in our studies 
seems close to level 2: a collaborative partnership. 
4.3.2. The voice of the researcher 
As the lead researcher in the studies in this thesis (studies 1, 2 and 3), my experience, 
theoretical preferences, engagement, values, style, and so on, clearly influence and 
give them form. I am trained as a social worker, and have a master’s degree in 
community mental health. I have worked as a mental health practitioner in various 
mental health services in Norway. Since my days of training to be a social worker, my 
interest has been in the relational and dialogical aspects of human living as found in 
the philosophies of scholars such as Martin Buber (1970), Knud Ejler Løgstrup (1971), 
Paulo Freire (2000), Emmanuel Levinas and later Mikhail Bakhtin. I took an early 
interest in the open dialogue approach (Seikkula & Arnkil, 2006), as it seemed to me 
to offer a way of working in mental health that resonated with the ideas and values that 
already influenced me. These experiences, ideas and values are incorporated in the 
studies in this thesis through my own voice. 
4.4. Procedures 
In line with the ideas presented above, two co-researchers with first-hand experience 
of mental health difficulties and mental health services (Lindvig and Zachariassen) 
were included in the research team from the planning stage of the study. They 
participated throughout all stages of the research process, formulating research 
questions, preparing and conducting interviews, analysing and interpreting the 
transcribed texts and writing the papers. 
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Furthermore, we included a variety of people, perspectives and voices—through a 
multitude of dialogues and meetings—in the explorative process. The involvement of 
various participants in the study included the following groups and areas: 
 Research team: The research team was comprised of a lead researcher (Bøe), 
co-researchers (Zachariassen and Lindvig), three supervisors (Kristoffersen, 
Seikkula, and Ulland) and a PhD candidate from Sørlandet Hospital (Lidbom). 
The team met at various intervals, six to eight times a year. 
 Core group: Within the research team, the lead researcher and the two co-
researchers formed a core group that held frequent meetings. 
 Group of practitioners involved in the cases: This group met every second 
month. 
 Group of adolescents: Three meetings were held with this group. 
 The respondents, drawn from adolescent participants and people in their 
networks, met through the series of interviews. 
The involvement of two co-researchers with first-hand experience was consistent with 
the dialogical design of the study. Our previous experiences guide our attention, 
making us notice this and not that, remember this and not that, distinguish this from 
that, and so on. In our study, the impacts of the co-researchers on the exploration were 
manifold. The data in the dialogues of the interviews were probably influenced by the 
co-researchers’ openness about their own experiences and the way in which they 
responded to the adolescent participants from this perspective. A greater variety of 
aspects were noticed and pursued. I, as lead researcher, participated in all interviews 
together with one of the two co-researchers. The three of us, as a core group, met 
regularly to discuss our impressions from our participation in the interviews and from 
the videotapes and transcribed texts. 
A group of adolescents with experience of mental health difficulties was involved in 
our preparation for the study. They provided input into the exploration of changes in 
adolescents’ lives and finding a good way to speak with adolescents about this in the 
interviews. In the process of interpretation, preliminary findings were presented to 
another group of adolescents with experience of mental health difficulties on two 
occasions. It seemed that the adolescents could relate their own experiences and stories 
to the themes and concepts presented. They offered additional suggestions for the 
further articulation of essential aspects of change. In the course of the investigation, 
we also discussed the ideas and impressions that emerged from our reading of the 
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material with the practitioners in the selected cases. This participatory process 
continued in parallel with the analysis process that I describe below. 
4.4.1. Respondents 
These respondents were chosen from among a group of adolescents who received help 
through dialogical and network-oriented practice. This supported our investigation of 
the social and relational aspects of change. 
Respondents were selected from referrals to a child and adolescent mental health-care 
unit at a hospital in Southern Norway over a limited period. The inclusion criteria were 
that participants 1) should be 16–18 years of age, 2) should not be in receipt of prior 
specialized mental health care, and 3) should have been offered help through network 
meetings. The adolescent participants selected one or two additional respondents from 
their social networks, and the practitioners involved were included as respondents in 
the final interview in each case. Eight cases were included, and we interviewed a total 
of 22 respondents: eight adolescents, four mothers, one father, two friends, one sister 
and six practitioners. The respondents were interviewed from one to three times over a 
period varying from six to 12 months (see Table 1).  
When people involved in the first seven cases were interviewed, the research team 
considered the need to include more cases and respondents. The aim of the study was 
to conduct a qualitative exploration focusing on the complexities and particularities of 
each case. This led us to conclude that seven cases provided sufficient material to 
investigate the research questions. Nonetheless, we decided to proceed with yet 
another case to ensure that saturation of data was obtained. 
4.4.2. Creating data 
Twenty-eight interviews were conducted with either an adolescent alone or with the 
adolescent together with a person from the adolescent’s network. In cases six and 
eight, there was only one interview. In the other six cases, a series of interviews was 
conducted over periods ranging from six to 12 months. In the interviews, we asked 
about specific significant events and experiences—positive and negative—related to 
family, friends, school, work, being alone and the network meetings. The interviews 
were videotaped, and this gave us the opportunity to observe bodily expressivity. 
Interviews were conducted in Norwegian, and all interviews were transcribed in 
Norwegian by me, as lead researcher, with the inclusion of descriptions of bodily 
expressivity where considered relevant. Quotes used in the published papers and in 
  
39 
 
this thesis were translated into English by me in co-operation with a Norwegian-
speaking colleague with a master’s degree in English. 
Table 1: Overview of respondents and interviews 
Case Number of respondents 
Number of 
interviews 
Time from first 
to last interview 
Remarks 
1 
3 (adolescent, sister, one 
practitioner) 
5 8 months  
2 
4 (adolescent, mother, 
two practitioners) 
6 12 months  
3 
2 (adolescent, one 
practitioner) 
 
3 10 months 
The adolescent did not want 
us to interview people in the 
social network 
4 
4 (adolescent, father, 
mother, one practitioner) 
5 12 months  
5 
4 (adolescent, mother, 
two practitioners) 
4 6 months  
6 1 (adolescent) 1  
Contact with the service was 
terminated soon after the first 
interview 
7 
3 (adolescent, friend, one 
practitioner) 
3 7 months  
8 2 (adolescent, friend) 1  
Contact with the service was 
terminated soon after the first 
interview 
Totals 
22 separate respondents 
(the same practitioner 
participated in cases 1 
and 3) 
28 interviews   
 
We created an interview guide to remind us of some key aspects of what we wanted to 
explore. Nevertheless, the dynamics of the interviews primarily arose from what 
emerged in the dialogue. As interviewers, we attempted to pursue the points that 
appeared to be relevant to the research questions. It was important to be guided by 
what seemed important to the informant, and so we paid attention to aspects that 
seemed to engage the feelings of respondents. These feelings could be enthusiasm, 
excitement, eagerness, or joy, or they could be feelings of despair, hurt, anger, or 
sorrow. They could either laugh or cry. This way of being guided by the feelings of the 
respondents was based on the assumption that these feelings showed us that we were 
close to something that really mattered to them, so it was also significant to our 
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exploration of change. We also allowed ourselves to be guided by our own emotions, 
remaining sensitive to what excited or touched us. Our assumption was that corporeal, 
emotional and cognitive–reflective aspects are interwoven, and should all be included 
when creating data. 
4.4.3. Analysing and organizing the material 
In what we might call a polyphonic explorative approach (Sullivan, 2012), several 
voices were involved in continuously reading and analysing the dialogues in the 
material. The voices of the respondents were given priority, yet a multitude of 
additional voices were involved. With a polyphonic, dialogical approach, theoretical 
perspectives are counted as one of many voices. After all, theoretical ideas are 
utterances articulated by people through their ethical, emotional and expressive efforts 
to express something truthful or constructive about reality. In this way, the ideas of 
Bakhtin, Levinas, Sheets-Johnstone and others, as presented in Chapter 2, influenced 
the reading of the material. 
First, we read through the transcribed texts with “deliberate naiveté” (Kvale & 
Brinkmann, 2009) to get a sense and first impression of the material. Then, the two co-
researchers and I read all the transcripts again in a thematic and affect-sensitive 
exploration, in line with Shotter’s (2014) suggestion that feelings be included when 
examining data, “beginning with feelings rather than calculations … the sense of a 
‘something’ of importance and value here” (p. 10). In a second step, we then re-read 
the material, identifying key moments, in accord with Sullivan’s (2012) dialogical 
approach to qualitative data analysis. A key moment, Sullivan suggests, is a sequence 
of utterances/voices in which we find a significant unit of meaning, and the key 
moment is characterized by its readiness for further responses (p. 72). Key moments 
were chosen not only in judgments about the thematic relevance of what was said in 
response to research questions, but were also chosen from among affective, bodily and 
interactional aspects observed in the interviews, such as tone of voice, bodily gestures 
and pace of speech. This made it possible to explore these sequences of the transcribed 
interviews in greater detail. In a third step, the key moments were re-read by me, as 
lead researcher, and possible themes related to the research questions were identified. 
Ideas about themes found in the key moments and ways of conceptualizing these 
themes were discussed within the core group and the research team in regular 
meetings. Guided by these emerging themes, in a fourth step we returned to Bakhtin 
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and Levinas, and in a more systematic way using some of their theoretical ideas to 
develop further the concepts and findings. 
Sullivan (2012) suggests four conceptual tools/aspects when analysing key moments: 
genre, discourse, chronotope and context. The research team discussed various ways of 
analysing the key moments and decided to make use of the three linguistic dimensions 
introduced by Levinas: the ethical, the expressive and the hermeneutical (Levinas, 
1987). The utterances in the interviews were considered to be responses in an ethical 
(i.e. care, recognition, sincerity, need for an answer), expressive (i.e. bodily 
movement, facial expressions, tone of voice) and hermeneutical (content, propositions, 
meaning, ideas) sense. We also included three levels where these dimensions were at 
play: 1. the (past) events and experiences described in the interview, 2. the responsive 
events in the interview itself, and 3. the responsive events from reading the transcripts. 
These dimensions and aspects are integrated in Table 2. In the table, I provide an 
example of the analysis of a key moment. 
The following excerpt from an interview was identified as a key moment (for the 
purpose of presenting it here, it has been slightly shortened). Those present in the 
interview were the adolescent, “Catherine”, the co-researcher, Karianne Zachariassen, 
and myself. 
 
Tore Dag Could you tell us about yourself before you became 
anxious? And something about what made you anxious, or 
something from when you gradually started realizing that 
you had this fear of people? 
Catherine It was around fourth grade. (…) At that time I could just 
walk around and talk with them [smiles]. 
Tore Dag Yes. And you said something about bullying? 
Catherine Yes. Exactly, because it was a while before I would call it 
bullying at all. Because they did it in a way that was sort of 
very discreet. So I couldn’t run and tell anyone, because 
they didn’t really do anything wrong. 
Tore Dag No. 
Catherine  It’s just kind of … Children can just say your name in a 
way, and you realize that they kind of put you down in a 
way. So you are just, kind of frozen out. (…) 
Karianne Mm. That is the kind of bullying I think is the worst, right? 
Because it is so difficult to define really. (…) And 
sometimes, as you’re saying, it is just a look. And it is not 
easy to go to the teacher and say, “They look at me in a 
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strange way.” That’s why it is so difficult, as you say. (…) 
Tore Dag What did they do? You said … 
Catherine Exactly. It was so discreet. 
Tore Dag Yes. 
Catherine I asked if I could go to their house. But instead of saying 
“No”, because then you could say they were kind of rude, 
they said “Maybe”. They said “Maybe”, and they continued 
to say “Maybe” all day until they went home. 
Karianne Yes. That not knowing. 
Tore Dag Yes. Right. 
Catherine Yes. I kind of think that. 
Tore Dag Yes. That is kind of worse, a “Maybe” that doesn’t happen. 
Catherine: That is why, kind of, now, I am a bit like … even though no 
one actually treats me badly, nevertheless I think they 
actually do, only that it is hard to see. 
Tore Dag Mm. Yes. That it is a possible explanation also now? I mean 
that people can be … there’s a “Maybe” like that now also, 
kind of. (…) 
Catherine I thought, kind of, that this is why I don’t want to talk with 
them, because then I’ll find out that they actually don’t like 
me. 
Karianne And it is better not to know. 
Catherine Yes. 
 
This key moment was read by the three of us in the core group (GRL, KZ and TDB) 
and then discussed and notes shared. Notes were also taken from these discussions, 
and I read the key moment again with the following diagram for “multidimensional 
responsible analyses” that we created as an analytical lens (see Table 2). 
It should be noted that only some chosen key moments were analysed in full using this 
diagram. Perhaps this was not a weakness in our approach, because the use of such a 
schematic procedure may help us to conduct a thorough analysis, but at the same time 
it may constrain the personal touch of the analyses in a way that may suppress the 
voices of the transcript and the responding voice of the researcher. Nevertheless, the 
analytical concepts and the multidimensionality this approach offers underpinned our 
reading, reminding us of the multiplicity of aspects involved in the creation of data 
when we take a dialogical perspective into account. 
Substudy 4 followed a somewhat different methodological procedure. This study 
explored a specific network meeting in one case. In this network meeting, two mental 
health practitioners met an adolescent boy and his mother. The conversation was 
video-recorded (step 1). Inspired by a method developed by Rober, Elliott, Buysse, 
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Loots, & De Corte (2008), each participant in the meeting was interviewed 
individually within four days following the meeting (step 2). In this interview, each 
person, together with the interviewer, watched the entire recording of the meeting. 
Before watching it for a second time, they were instructed to stop the video when they 
saw something significant and meaningful happening, and during these pauses they 
were asked: What went through your mind right there? These interviews were also 
video-recorded. Both the network meetings and the following interviews were 
transcribed (step 3). From these transcripts, sequences where all participants stopped 
were identified. From these transcripts, an overview of the selected sequences of the 
network meeting were shown in a diagram in a way that displayed each participant’s 
inner and outer voices in relation to each other in a chronological manner (step 4). 
4.4.4. Ethical considerations 
This study invited respondents to be interviewed about sensitive aspects of their lives, 
and it was emphasized, both in writing and orally, that respondents should not feel 
compelled to speak about themes with which they were uncomfortable. Any emotional 
difficulties experienced as a result of the interviews could be followed up by 
practitioners in their existing clinical teams. All participants gave their qualified 
informed consent. In this paper, all cases are de-identified. Hard disks with data and 
copies of transcribed text were stored securely. The study was approved by the 
Norwegian National Committee for Medical and Health Research Ethics (2010/2973-
2). 
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Table 2: Multidimensional responsive analysis of a key moment14 
 
 
                                                 
14
 This table is a refined and translated version of the original analysis of this key moment. 
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5. Findings from the four substudies 
This thesis contains four substudies that explore change related to mental health 
through varying perspectives. Papers relating to the substudies have been published in 
two journals: papers on substudies 1, 3, and 4 have been published in the Australian 
and New Zealand Journal of Family Therapy and a paper on substudy 2 has been 
published in Contemporary Family Therapy. These papers are included in this thesis. 
In this chapter, I present an overview of the aims, methods, findings and conclusions 
of each paper (see Table 3) and summarize each paper. In Chapter 6, I suggest a way 
of conceptualizing some overarching themes based on these separate substudies. 
5.1. Substudy 1 
The first study is based on theoretical perspectives and empirical data from one case. 
The findings have been published in the paper entitled Change is an ongoing ethical 
event: Bakhtin, Levinas and the dialogical dynamics of becoming (P1). 
In this study, dialogical ideas about change related to human existence and to mental 
health are highlighted. The study argues that the idea of instrumental causality is 
perhaps not suitable to describe or understand change in the human domain. Drawing 
on the metaphor theory of Lakoff and Johnson, it is suggested that causal 
understanding implies the use of a prototypical metaphor: the manipulation of objects 
by force. This metaphor takes stability and fixed states as its point of departure. In 
opposition to such metaphors of causality, it is argued that change is ongoing and 
always already there in human existing and living. Moreover, in the roots of this 
ongoing event of becoming there is what we may identify as an ethical event. Both 
Levinas and Bakhtin offer ideas on the way the subject originates in ethics and 
dialogue. With the point of departure in their key concepts of responsibility and 
answerability, they show that human becoming has its dynamics in ethical 
responsivity. 
From exploring the existential ethics of both Levinas and Bakhtin, the study suggested 
three ethical–dialogical aspects of change. As humans, we constantly become 1. as 
responsible, 2. in speaking, and 3. in answering the unknown. These aspects reflect the 
ways in which both Levinas and Bakhtin link human existence not only to ethics but 
also to language/speaking and to fundamental differences vis a vis other people that 
are pivotal to responsiveness, ethics and human becoming.Table 3: Overview of the 
substudies 
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Table 3: Overview of the four substudies 
 Aim Method Findings Conclusion 
1 To explore the ethical 
aspects of change. 
Theoretical analyses of 
ethical aspects in 
Levinas’s and Bakhtin’s 
dialogical ideas combined 
with exploration of a 
single case. 
Change is an ongoing ethical 
event. 
As humans we constantly 
become: 
1. by being responsible, 
2. by speaking, 
3. by responding to the 
unknown. 
Ethical aspects seem to be 
at the core of change 
facilitation. Practitioners 
should attend to these 
ethical aspects. 
2 To explore, through 
lived experience, the 
social and relational 
dynamics of change 
related to adolescents 
in psychosocial 
crises, focusing on 
various social arenas 
of everyday life. 
Empirical study based on 
a series of interviews in 
eight cases. 
Dialogical, 
phenomenological, and 
hermeneutical analyses. 
Theoretical perspectives: 
Bakhtin, Shotter, Dastur 
and Sheets-Johnstone 
Main theme: Change is an 
event of becoming through 
movement in ethical time and 
space. 
Dialogues can be life giving or 
life deteriorating. Conditions 
for movement are found in a 
Before-Event: anticipation of 
responses and in an After-
Event: meaning given to 
responses. Time and space for 
movement are experienced as 
ethical dimensions: “A place 
for me” or “No place for me” 
(space) and as “A future for 
me” or “No future for me” 
(time). 
Mental health seems 
inextricably linked to the 
conditions of movement 
found in the social events 
of everyday life. People 
from the social network 
should be included in the 
meetings, and 
practitioners should be 
attentive to bodily aspects 
and movement in the 
meetings. 
3 To explore, through 
lived experience, the 
social dynamics of 
change related to 
adolescents in 
psychosocial crises, 
focusing on the 
network meetings 
and relations with 
practitioners. 
Empirical study based on 
a series of interviews. 
Dialogical, 
phenomenological, and 
hermeneutical analyses. 
Theoretical perspectives: 
Bakhtin and Levinas 
Main theme: Dialogues allow 
moving and living through 
inviting attentiveness, 
expressive vitality and new 
meaning. Three temporal 
dimensions are identified: 
Dialogues reveal 1. the 
moment, 2. the past, and 3. the 
future. Three linguistic 
dimensions are identified: 
inviting attentiveness and 
valuing (ethics of speaking), 
new vitality (expressivity of 
speaking) and new meaning 
(hermeneutics of speaking). 
A multitude of aspects 
should be taken into 
account when describing 
change in dialogical 
practice. Practitioners 
should engage with the 
help seekers in ethical and 
expressive as well as 
hermeneutical ways. 
Attention to the future 
seems important. 
4 To explore the 
interplay between the 
participants’ inner 
and outer dialogues 
in sequences 
experienced as 
significant and 
meaningful in the 
network meetings. 
Empirical study based on 
video recordings of 
network meetings and 
interviews with the 
participants about this 
recorded meeting. 
 
The interplay between inner 
and outer voices seems to have 
an important role in our 
understanding of the 
emergence of significant and 
meaningful moments. A one-
sided focus on participants’ 
utterances or inner dialogues is 
insufficient. A dialogical 
approach provides a theoretical 
framework and concepts that 
are useful in investigations of 
therapeutic conversations. 
The study suggests that 
the dynamics of the 
interplay between outer 
and inner voices must be 
taken into account in 
developing therapeutic 
conversations. 
Practitioners are urged to 
rely more on conversation 
in itself and less on 
specific interventions. 
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5.2. Substudy 2 
The second study was a qualitative exploration of data from eight cases and 28 
interviews with participants in network meetings. Experiences related to change in 
various areas of their everyday lives were identified and analysed. The results were 
published in the paper entitled “She offered me a place and a future”: Change is an 
event of becoming through movement in ethical time and space (P2). 
Movement in relation to others seemed to be at the core of many descriptions. With 
help from phenomenological, hermeneutical and dialogical theory, temporal, spatial 
and ethical aspects were identified as significant in the descriptions of movement. The 
feeling of being able to move—or being unable to move—seemed fundamental. This 
movement (or difficulty in moving) seemed to be a matter of moving in responsive 
interplay with others. To describe the conditions for this movement, the study 
suggested that movement should be related to anticipation and experience of 
responding others. The study suggested that adolescents move within a line that could 
be described by the following concepts: 1) A Before-Event of anticipation, 2) An 
Event of moving, and 3) An After-Event of experience. The Before-Event concerns the 
way in which they sensed and anticipated the future, and responded in that future 
(including the immediate future). Then, they actually moved, and others responded by 
moving in the Event. They related to this Event of moving through the experience of 
what happened in an After-Event; meaning was given to what had happened. Ethics 
and values seemed to be crucial in this. Anticipating valuing responses from others (in 
the Before-Event) and experiencing responses as valuing (in the After-Event) could be 
identified as life-giving lines of movement. Anticipating devaluing responses from 
others and experiencing responses as devaluing could be identified as life-
deteriorating lines of movement. These conditions for becoming and changing were 
found within what was identified as ethical time and ethical space. Time and space 
become ethical realities, because a space (place) and time (future) to move into 
presuppose responding others. In other words, this is because the questions “Will I be 
given a place in this world?” and “Will I be given a future in this world?” are 
inevitably inherent in the experience of time and space. 
The study suggests that mental health is inextricably linked to the conditions of 
movement found in the social events of everyday life. People from the help-seekers’ 
social network should be included in the meetings, and practitioners should be 
attentive to bodily aspects and movements in the meetings. 
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5.3. Substudy 3 
The third study is another qualitative exploration of the same data. The aim was to 
identify and analyse experiences of change related to the network meetings. The 
findings were published in the paper entitled Through speaking, he finds himself … a 
bit’: Dialogues open for moving and living through inviting attentiveness, expressive 
vitality and new meaning (P3). 
This substudy continued the exploration based on the findings of substudy 2. 
Following the ideas found in Levinas’s and Bakhtin’s work, the study suggests a 
multidimensional understanding of the dynamics of the dialogical event of change. 
The findings are articulated in the following main theme: Dialogues enable movement 
and living through 1) inviting attentiveness (ethics), 2) expressive vitality 
(expressivity) and 3) new meaning (hermeneutics). These three aspects, inspired by 
Levinas’s view of language, seemed to help us reveal a richness and complexity in 
their experiences: the ethics of dialogues seemed to concern the respondents’ feelings 
of being cared for and respected, and permitted to say what they wanted. The 
expressivity of dialogues seemed to concern the ways in which they could speak and 
move freely, and be moved by the speech, gestures and facial expressions of others. 
The hermeneutics of dialogues seemed to concern how dialogues could be places 
where new ways of understanding their situation and their future possibilities could 
emerge. 
The study relates these three dimensions of dialogue to three temporal dimensions: 4) 
dialogues open the past, 5) dialogues open the moment, and 6) dialogues open the 
future. The study suggest that these temporal dimensions operate across the first three 
dimensions of dialogue in the sense that through dialogues the participants may re-
relate to the past ethically, expressively and hermeneutically (dialogues open the past). 
Through dialogues, the participants move and sense in the present moment in ethical, 
expressive and hermeneutical ways (dialogues open the moment). Finally, and perhaps 
most crucially, the dialogues open the future in ethical, expressive and hermeneutical 
ways. This means that dialogues create an anticipation in the participants of being 
valued in the future (even the immediate future in the meeting) (ethical) and they can 
move, speak and express themselves into this future (expressive) and understand their 
future and opportunities offered in new ways (hermeneutics). 
This study suggests that a multitude of aspects must be taken into account when 
describing the possibilities of change in dialogical practice. Practitioners should 
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engage with the help seekers in ethical, expressive and hermeneutical ways. Attention 
to the future seems important. 
5.4. Substudy 4 
Substudy 4 is a qualitative exploration of another set of data from the same cases. This 
study was part of Per Arne Lidbom’s PhD, researched with the assistance of the same 
team. Data from the videorecording of one chosen network meeting and subsequent 
interviews with the participants asking for thoughts and feelings that they had not 
expressed in the meeting provided the material for this study. The results were 
published in an paper entitled A study of a network meeting: Exploring the interplay 
between inner and outer dialogues in significant and meaningful moments (P4). 
This procedure made it possible to display each participant’s inner and outer voices in 
relation to each other in a chronological manner. The originality of this study lies in its 
method of revealing inner and outer dialogues/voices in a conversation between 
several people, which makes new ways of understanding therapeutic conversations 
possible. The study uses a theoretical framework found in the dialogical theory. Inner 
voices must be included in the polyphonic multiplicity of voices in dialogues. The 
study suggests that without this inclusion of inner voices, it is difficult to understand 
the dynamics of such a conversation. This interplay between inner and outer voices has 
an important role in investigations of the emergence of significant and meaningful 
moments. A one-sided focus on participants’ utterances or inner dialogues is 
insufficient to explain their significance and meaning to the interlocutors. This study 
also showed that a dialogical approach provides a theoretical framework and concepts 
that are useful in investigations of the dynamics of change in conversations facilitated 
by mental health practitioners. 
The study suggests that the conversations in themselves could be relied on to generate 
change without the need for specific interventions. 
  
50 
 
  
51 
 
6. Overarching themes and discussion 
In this chapter, I combine all four studies for overall reflection and discussion, and 
suggest four overarching themes. In the presentation of these themes, the findings of 
the four studies are discussed in relation both to other research and to the theoretical 
perspectives of this thesis. 
It seems that the conversations and encounters within the services and in the everyday 
lives of the respondents were significant and made a difference in terms of “opening 
speech events”, and in terms of traces and reverberations of these events. All studies, 
in various ways, conceptualize change as an ethical speech event (P1, P2, P3 and P4). 
The originality and significance of the studies in this thesis may reside in the way in 
which they show 1) that the articulated lived experience of the respondents seems to be 
compatible with dialogical perspectives and enriches these perspectives with manifold, 
nuanced and “living” descriptions that reveal what is at stake, and 2) that this lived 
experience, in dialogue with theoretical perspectives, offers concepts, ideas and 
possible understandings that indicate the complexity and multidimensionality involved 
in dialogical events of change. These concepts and ways of understanding change do 
not belong within a causality framework, but within a phenomenological–
hermeneutical one. Within this framework, all studies suggest that the ethical and 
expressive (corporeal) aspects are crucial and should not be overshadowed by 
widespread attention to understanding (hermeneutics) found in common rationalities 
in therapy and mental health. 
On the basis of a new reading of the published papers, I suggest the following four 
overarching themes:15 
1. Change is an ethical event (Diaconia) 
2. Change is a speech event (Dialogue) 
3. Change is a temporal–spatial event (Diachronia–diatopia) 
4. Change is a cultural event (Diagnosis). 
These themes are intended to provide a conceptual framework, or an imaginative 
landscape, for recognizing and understanding experiences that are laden with feelings 
and senses of living—or dying. Examples of expressions of this could be “I didn’t 
know where to go or what to do. I thought of killing myself”, or “To walk in that door! 
                                                 
15
 These overarching themes are not based on any new systematic reading of the data. However, I make use of 
some examples from the material that are not included in the published papers. 
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It was like passing a million danger signs.” On a more positive note were utterances 
such as “I could always go to grandma, with her everything I said and did was 
perfect”, or “Suddenly I dared to walk over to that girl and say ‘Hi’”, or “With them, 
nothing I say sounds stupid.” 
I now describe these overarching themes. 
6.1. Change is an ethical event (Diaconia) 
 … someone who cares, someone you can speak with when you’re having a hard time 
 … someone who wishes you the best …  
(Isabell, 17) 
The idea that ethics are at the core of the dialogical nature of the subject, as proposed 
by both Levinas and Bakhtin (P1), could also be recognized in the descriptions of the 
respondents (P2, P3, P4). The aspects of caring, and the anticipation or experience of 
being valued seemed to be crucial in various descriptions of ways out of difficulties 
(P2). Conversely, when respondents described how they had encountered difficulties, 
it was often about how they abandoned attempts to approach others, making 
themselves invisible, withdrawing and isolating themselves. In a sense they ceased to 
exist (in the etymological sense: to step out/come forth) because of what we might 
identify as experiences—or anticipations—of ethical–relational breakdowns (P1, P2). 
This observation appears to correspond with studies of recovery that point to social 
and relational aspects (Leamy, Bird, Le Boutillier, Williams, & Slade, 2011; Tew et 
al., 2012; Topor, Borg, Di Girolamo, & Davidson, 2011). This is seen, for example, in 
the description “simply to be let in” (Davidson et al., 2001), and in the opposite 
experience of being an outsider (Biong et al., 2008, p. 38) or being frozen out (Biong, 
2009, p. 327). The studies in this thesis similarly suggest that change—or new ways of 
existing—originate in the space and time offered to them by others, both in the arenas 
of their everyday life (P2) and in the network meetings (P3, P4). 
In substudy 4, there was a certain sequence where one of the therapists reported her 
inner dialogue in the following way: “I have to ask him in such a way that he (Phillip, 
who is seeking help) does not feel pressure to tell us that he is failing in some way” 
(P4, p. 140). It seems that the therapist is hesitating and holding back because she is 
afraid she may ask in a way that forces the boy, Phillip, to reveal his failures. This 
could be seen as a kind of “ethical holding back”, or “ethical hesitation”, in which she 
guards herself so that she does not say any words that will close the space for the boy 
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to express himself. This implies that the inviting attentiveness that is suggested in the 
third substudy (P3) as a first condition for dialogue to begin may also involve a kind of 
ethical holding back so as not to occupy or suppress space and time for the movement 
of the other. 
The change-generating aspects of network meetings in the ethical domain suggested in 
substudies 1, 2 and 3 may offer a possible interpretation of Holmesland’s (2014) 
finding that the role transformation and the self-disclosure of the professionals 
promotes dialogue and growth among help seekers. Moreover, it supports Piippo & 
Aaltonen’s (2008) finding that trust was crucial, and that openness to many 
perspectives seemed to create this trust. 
This may also be in line with a theoretical study by Biesta (2014) exploring some 
perspectives from Levinas. The “event of subjectivity happens” Biesta comments, and 
this is an ethical event; I come into the world when someone “singles me out” (Biesta 
2014, p. 21). Uniqueness, in a Levinasian sense, is not about uniqueness of identity, 
which is based on how the characteristics and qualities of one person differ from those 
of another. This, Biesta suggests, could be called uniqueness-as-difference. 
Uniqueness in a Levinasian sense is of another kind, and could be referred to as 
uniqueness-as-irreplaceability. Attention then shifts from a question about what 
(qualities/identities) makes each of us unique to a search for “situations in which it 
matters that I am unique” (p. 21), when I cannot be replaced or substituted by someone 
else. Perhaps this may be in line with the ways in which Isabell, Catherine and John 
attempted to describe significant encounters in their lives (P2, P3). John, for example, 
seemed to regard the practitioner he met highly; as he said: “There is something about 
him”, “He is the world’s best psychologist”, “He is quirky” and “You just have to see 
him.” His good experience with his practitioner seemed to fall outside what he could 
put into words (P3). It was not (only) the qualities or skills of the practitioner that 
mattered, but perhaps the way it was precisely him (the practitioner) that met precisely 
him (John). They singled each other out. 
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6.2. Change is a speech event (Dialogue) 
It’s a bit easier now … I can say what I want to my friends 
and they answer me nicely. They say yes. 
(Phillip, 16) 
Interplay with others in various social arenas, in terms of movement and 
expressiveness, seemed to be at the core of many descriptions (P2) indicating that 
movement and the body seemed to be crucial in experiences of change. When focusing 
on participants’ experiences of the network meetings (P3), the researchers found, in a 
similar way, that the ethical and expressive aspects of the network dialogues seemed 
just as important as the hermeneutic aspects. The possibility of expressivity and 
vitality offered by an ethically laden invitation to speak seemed to open the future, and 
offered opportunities for positive change. 
Dialogical approaches represent a break with systemic epistemology and practice and 
turn to the significance of language (Wifstad, 1997). There is a large body of studies 
that explore therapeutic encounters from a linguistic or dialogical perspective. These 
often attend to the hermeneutical aspects of language (e.g. Hammack, 2008; Rober, 
2005; Seikkula, 2011). Seikkula & Arnkil (2006) emphasize the importance of 
network dialogues as an area where a shared language and a new, mutual, co-created 
understanding (pp. 45 and 91) may emerge.16 The findings of this thesis suggest that 
understanding is not necessarily the most important aspect. The space to tell, and the 
quality of the responses generated, even if there is no joint understanding, appear to be 
helpful in terms of their ethical and expressive aspects (P1, P2, P3). Bakhtin points out 
the necessity of outsideness with regard to the other, and Levinas states that “speech 
proceeds from absolute difference” (P1). From the notion of alterity as a necessary 
condition for dialogue, I suggest that, in a sense, there may never be a common 
understanding. Ways of understanding are infinite, and in a sense dialogue generates 
this diversity rather than overcomes it. A common understanding, taken literally, 
would end the dialogue. Dialogue, in a sense, must entail people talking past each 
other. 
Catherine (P2) said that it was helpful when the practitioners asked her various 
questions to get to know her. However, when they seemed to reach a position of 
knowing her and her situation and tried to solve her problems, she told us that the 
                                                 
16
 Interestingly, Seikkula and Arnkil also write that “mutual understanding is not possible” (2006, p. 96). Here, 
they refer to Levinas’s philosophy. 
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conversations were no longer so helpful. It may seem that an attempt to become 
acquainted, from a prior position of not knowing, is dialogical and helpful, but when 
the practitioners assumed a position of knowing her, the dialogue seemed to lose its 
source in difference, and so its helpful dynamics faded. 
This is consistent with an apparent shift in dialogical practices from attention to the 
hermeneutic or epistemological dimensions to attention to the body and bodily 
responsiveness during the facilitated encounters (Andersen, 2007; Seikkula, 2011; 
Seikkula & Trimble, 2005; Shotter, 2010, 2015). The significance of the dialogue was 
not exhausted in the way in which new meaning was co-constructed. 
6.3. Change is a temporal–spatial event (Diachrony–diatopy) 
… the “stranger on earth” … the stateless or homeless person, who dares not enter. 
The interior of the mental is perhaps originally this. Not in the world, but in question. 
(Levinas, 1998a, p. 129) 
At the core of the adolescents’ descriptions of their ways into and out of their 
difficulties was their sense of the future (time) and of whether there was a place 
(space) for them in this future. We have suggested, from the way this time and space 
seemed to emerge dependent on the valuing or devaluing responses of others, that time 
and space could be conceptualized as ethical time and space (P2). The adolescents, in 
their speech and expressive movement, exist, so to speak, in the saying and the 
movement, and in anticipation of and dependent on a response. This seems to 
correspond with the research of Sheets-Johnstone. She suggests that “What we 
corporeally express in our bodily movements is authenticated and affirmed through the 
responsitivity or lack of responsitivity of the addressee of the movement” (Sheets-
Johnstone, 2009, p. 231). 
Some studies in dialogical practice focusing on bodily aspects seem to focus on and 
interpret what happens in terms of synchronicity and immediacy (e.g. Seikkula, 
Karvonen, Kykyri, Kaartinen, & Penttonen, 2015). Following the fundamental 
diachrony suggested in this thesis, one might argue that crucial aspects of the 
dynamics of such bodily interplay cannot be described in terms of synchronicity. As 
Seikkula et al. show, bodily movement or activity in the nervous system of one person 
may occur in close relation to bodily movement and activity in the nervous system of 
other participants. They interpret this in terms of synchrony (p. 1). Perhaps this close 
relation in time between the interlocutors bodily responses could also be interpreted as 
diachronic because they are unique responses vis á vis others’ unique movements (and 
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consequently precisely not simultaneous or synchronic). Furthermore, there is a 
difficulty in regarding bodily movement and activity of the nervous system as 
immediate if experience or anticipation is involved, because this means that sensing 
something “as something”, or anticipating “something” is involved, meaning is 
involved, and this is dependent on mediation through signs and identification. 
Meaningful experience and anticipation are mediated and not immediate. 
In the chapter on theoretical perspectives, I discussed the dia-chrony and the dia-topy 
of existence and movement. To understand the difficulties, the hurt, the despair, the 
bewilderment, the fear and the “stuck-ness” that people with so-called mental health 
difficulties experience, it may be fruitful to pursue the idea that the moment, besides 
being an event in which we participate with our bodies and move, is also always a 
before-event, a kind of existing, not (only) in the present, but in what is to come. 
Following this view, one could perhaps suggest that there always is a future within the 
moment and through this reveal new ways of describing what happens in dialogues in 
general and those in mental health in particular. John (P3) relates to what he is entering 
as a future of possibilities, and for him a swarm of threats, “a million danger signs”. 
To see the world that he is entering presupposes an outside position, in temporal and 
spatial terms, with respect to what he is entering: dia-topy and dia-chrony. As human 
existence is always movement, one could suggest that it is not the present moment that 
is significant, but rather it is the continuance of movement that creates the world we 
enter. It may be said that this world, as continuance of movement, is not of the 
moment, but of the next moment. This is what evokes our sense of living and moving. 
In this future, the next moment, the hurt or joy, the fear or desire, and the shame or 
pride seem to have their roots (P2). 
Tucker (2013), drawing on Bergson and Whitehead, explored mental health users’ 
accounts of making a home for themselves, and suggested that anticipation related to 
the future was crucial to producing a sense of stability in the present. “Organizing 
present activity”, Tucker says, is done “through perception of future … [and] is a 
relational process of engaging with life that is spatio-temporally bound” (p. 30). From 
this he points to the ways in which practices within mental health could be seen as 
collaborations with service users to “make the future” (p. 26). The studies in this thesis 
(P1, P2, P3) suggest that an ethical aspect must be included to understand the 
significance of such a practice working with anticipations and “making the future”. 
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Several studies exploring experiences of mental health difficulties and recovery 
indicate this time and space dimension in terms of the future and a space to enter. This 
future and this space being open—or not open—for people to enter may be described 
by the concept of hope (Biong & Ravndal, 2007; Leamy et al., 2011; Sælør, Ness, 
Holgersen, & Davidson, 2014), or in phrases such as “being let in” or “finding my way 
in the world” (Davidson et al., 2010; Davidson et al., 2001). 
6.4. Change is a cultural event (Diagnosis) 
I used to believe I didn’t have any hope.… I thought I would drop out of everything …  
that I wouldn’t manage. I wouldn’t get a job. I wouldn’t get a house. I would never move out.  
Now I believe I can. 
(Catherine, 17) 
In hindsight, I found that the published studies seem to lack the dimension of culture 
that was important in the respondents’ descriptions. For example, when they reported 
difficulties in behaving at school or coping with social situations in general, these were 
about moving and living within a culture or a society. The difficulties were in fulfilling 
the expectations of this culture. Furthermore, their hopes or fears for the future were 
about entering roles and coping with and fulfilling these roles in an acceptable way 
according to the conventions of a culture. This theme is what I have identified as a 
cultural dimension, and I have used the concept of dia-gnosis to capture its dynamics 
(see Chapter 2). 
In the work of Levinas, we find pre-cultural ethics (P1, P3). Levinas’s distinction 
between uniqueness-as-difference and uniqueness-as-irreplaceability, which Biesta 
(2014) identifies, establishes two distinct “orders” or communities. These two orders 
may entail that the dialogues of the network meetings (or any dialogue) could be seen 
as a kind of double event. A cultural, diagnostic interplay where the participants 
understand, judge, reflect, express opinions and form meanings, and a pre-cultural 
(pre-diagnostic) interplay (and here, of course, it is difficult to name what is happening 
precisely, because we are outside, or prior to, the nameable, nevertheless …) where the 
participants are struck by, and respond to, what affects their senses and bodies perhaps 
even before what happens is diagnosed, before it is sensed as something. We may 
suggest that this is interplay in a domain of the ethical, or the strange. 
Our studies suggest that living and moving occurs between unique subjectivity and a 
cultural order. The way events in the network meetings occur in the intersection 
between the unique personal encounters and broader cultural structures is suggested by 
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the studies of Holmesland (Holmesland, 2006; Holmesland et al., 2014; Holmesland et 
al., 2010). Holmesland (2006) suggests that dialogues in network meetings take place 
at an intersection between the micro dialogues of the specific meeting and the macro 
dialogues given by the surrounding discourses of society. In addition, Brottveit (2013), 
drawing on Fairclough’s theory of discourse analysis and Turner’s theory of social 
drama, shows how dialogues 1. are concrete (bodily) communicative events in terms of 
the interaction between people in the actual meeting (the micro level of the specific 
meeting), 2. occur within social institutions (the network meeting, as an established 
form of dialogue in mental health under the open dialogue approach), and 3. are 
constructed within the social formation of society (the macro level of power structures 
and discourses in a society and culture) (pp. 27–28). The dialogue of the network 
meeting, Brottveit—drawing on Turner—suggests, can at the same time be seen as a 
social drama and a ritual of change in situations of social crises, and a dissolution and 
a re-establishment of social structures in such a situation (p. 28). 
Our studies suggest that adolescents perceive their future possibilities in terms of 
anticipations, and in particular anticipations of how their utterances and movements 
will be responded to and valued (P2, P3). These anticipations are permeated by the 
ideas of their culture. In a way, Phillip was made invalid at his new school; he didn’t 
know how to approach others, how to ask them questions, what to say, or what to do 
(P1, P2, P4). In other words, it may be claimed that he did not know how to take on 
the (cultural) forms possible in this school. Catherine (P2) told us about her experience 
of taking the bus and being at school, wherein she said she barely dared to move. In a 
sense, she attempted to do the impossible, to avoid taking on a form, to be invisible, 
and to remain outside the culture. Her movements are inevitably signs; they are seen as 
expressions, as meaning, and she is afraid of being judged, of failing when she is 
confronted by the demands of the culture and the cultural gaze of others. 
Within narrative approaches, one may claim that conversations create a cultural 
“space” that the help seekers may inhabit and in which they find their roles and 
identities (e.g. Hammack, 2008); this is narrative hermeneutics. Several studies point 
to expressive and bodily aspects outside hermeneutics (or narrative) (Rober et al., 
2008; Seikkula, 2002, 2011; Seikkula & Trimble, 2005b). Nevertheless, these studies 
point to an expressiveness or responsiveness that may be described as being within a 
cultural domain. Our studies indicate the event of dialogue as it occurs between the 
pre-cultural and the cultural. They draw attention to the origin of ethics prior to any 
diagnosis or culture, and prior to any discerning or identifying. 
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6.5. Change in mental health: Movements at thresholds 
The adolescents articulated their experiences in such ways that it is difficult to extract 
any distinct mental aspects from their descriptions; as if there was something mental 
that precedes, or is positioned outside, the social interplay they describe. 
I attempt to illustrate how these dimensions are involved in change by turning to 
Catherine and recounting her story of approaching the new girl at school (P2) through 
the use of these themes. Catherine’s steps into the world (and within the world at the 
same time) involve: 1) Dia-conia: an ethical event in which she is moved from the 
“outside”. The other girl in the classroom made her move towards her despite 
Catherine’s decision not to say “Yes” to anyone; 2) Dialogue: her movement is dia-
logos; she moves through words. Her movement is a saying and an expressivity, which 
responds to the saying and expressivity of the girl; 3) Diachrony–diatopy: what she 
moves into is, in a sense, a before-event, a dia-chrony; it is her anticipations of what 
may come that form the landscape she is entering. In a sense, she moves in response to 
the continuance of the movements of the other girl. Consequently, the place she enters 
is also a future place, a dia-topy; the place given for her steps is not where she stands, 
but where she is going, but she is still not there; and 4) Diagnosis: her movements also 
depend on the cultural possibility of discerning what lies in front of her. Moreover, she 
moves her body in ways that are determined by the forms, gestures and styles of the 
culture she inhabits. 
6.6. Levinas and Bakhtin—some considerations 
Badiou (2001) offers a philosophy of the event and of ethics in opposition to that of 
Levinas. He rejects Levinas’s philosophy as any philosophy at all; the otherness that is 
fundamental for Levinas is bound up in a religious axiom. Badiou goes on to claim 
that any ethics of otherness should be abandoned. He states that alterity, the other, 
difference, is always there, so the challenge lies in recognizing what is the same. “No 
light is shed in any concrete situation by the notion of ‘recognizing of the other’” (p. 
27). Badiou focuses on what follows the event, and what “comes to be” or is 
constructed in the trace of the event. Our capacity for science, love, politics and arts is 
found in “truth procedures” that follows the event. The important task, to which 
Badiou dedicates his work, is to discover the ways in which we can find something in 
common, or something shared. Being faithful to the event, Badiou says, is to invent 
new ways of being in the trace of this event. 
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Nordtug (2015) analyses some examples of how the ethics of Levinas are applied to 
health-care practice. She is critical of the way in which several authors seem to apply 
Levinas’s ideas directly to solving practical problems and normative questions, despite 
the “metaphysical and non-normative” character of Levinas’s analyses (p. 51). In her 
view, the critical radicalism of Levinas’s ethics is lost, as authors seem to transform 
his ethics according to their own approaches. 
With regard to the dialogism derived from Bakhtin, Sullivan (2012) makes some 
observations. Referring to Hirschkop, he points out the power or “enforcement” 
involved in the becoming of the subject within language that seems to be lacking in 
accounts based on Bakhtin. The “picking and choosing of language forms takes place 
not on a level playing field, but in an unevenly structured linguistic world” (Hirschkop 
in Sullivan, p. 167). Some speakers and some institutions have more power and 
influence than others. Bakhtin’s dialogue seems to be about “verbal give and take”, 
and others words are seen as gifts. Sullivan suggests “a dark side of dialogue”, and 
refers to Emerson, who states that many accounts of Bakhtin suggest that dialogue 
“brings truth, happiness, or honesty” (Emerson in Sullivan, p. 171). If you read 
Bakhtin’s work carefully, Emerson states, nowhere does he suggest this. Dialogue, in 
the Bakhtinian sense, only brings the possibility of some forward movement. “By 
having a real other respond to me, I am spared one thing only: the worst cumulative 
effects of my own echo chamber of words” (Emerson in Sullivan, p. 171). 
6.7. Methodological considerations 
Latour, in his classical work “Laboratory life—the construction of scientific facts” 
(Latour & Woolgar, 1979), conducted an anthropological study of scientists in their 
own context, at their workplace, within a scientific community. The study explored the 
norms, rules and cultural aspects that formed their work. From this, Latour makes a 
distinction between positive and negative modalities. Negative modalities are found in 
scientific claims that integrate the conditions in which the knowledge is produced into 
the claim. Attention is directed toward the context of the activities of the researchers. 
Conversely, positive modalities are found in scientific claims that do not seem to draw 
attention to or integrate the conditions in which the knowledge is produced. Attention 
is directed away from the context of the activities of the researchers. In line with this 
suggested negative modality, this thesis has attempted to display the context, processes 
and people involved in such a way that the readers can make their own judgments 
about the findings. The multitude of people, conversations and arenas involved in the 
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studies makes it impossible to offer any full account of the explorative process. 
Nonetheless, I have made an effort to make the process transparent in a way that 
should make it possible to judge the trustworthiness and the quality of craftsmanship 
(Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009) found in the methodological procedures in this particular 
study. 
The most common evaluation criteria in research are found in the concepts of 
“validity”, “reliability” and “generalizability”. Kvale & Brinkmann (2009) retain these 
concepts in evaluating the quality of knowledge generated in interviews, but remark 
that they must be reinterpreted. They emphasize that a “strong emphasis on reliability 
may counteract creative innovations and variability” (p. 245) because variations in 
styles of interviewing and analysing, following up hunches and similar activities may 
not be given space. 
Sullivan (2012) questions the view that these criteria (validity, reliability and 
generalizability) should be proposed as decisive in the evaluation of qualitative 
research. He suggests that research should be evaluated from within its own theoretical 
framework and introduces two main criteria: polyphony and identification of material 
features. The criterion of polyphony concerns the involvement and influence of voices, 
voices of subjects participating from their unique perspective and with their unique 
judgments. On the other hand, words are dialogic and historic in their nature. Words 
can never be seen as “pure” expressions of a unique subject. Voices and utterances 
take on a form in a context, within a dialogue, in a chain of historical and cultural 
utterances. This leads Sullivan to propose a second broad criterion: identification of 
material features, which draws attention to these contextual aspects. 
Polyphony as a criterion suggests that a dialogical qualitative methodology makes a 
multitude of voices visibly (audibly) interact within the scientific analysis and text. 
Many of the respondents’ utterances have been quoted in the published papers. This, 
Sullivan states, gives the voice of the respondents the opportunity to “hover above the 
interpretation” (Sullivan, 2012, p. 151). In the studies in this thesis, many voices have 
been invited to participate—the respondents’ voices being the most important. 
However, the co-researchers, practitioners, other adolescents and supervisors were also 
included, in addition to the voices of scholars and philosophers. The inclusion of this 
variety of voices could be seen as a strength of the study; it creates a polyphonic 
conversation around—and includes—the voices of the respondents. This multiplicity 
of voices prevented the exploration from becoming one-sided and monological. 
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Kvale & Brinkmann (2009) advocate a social construction of validity, stating that “in a 
postmodern era, truth is constituted through a dialogue; valid knowledge claims 
emergence as conflicting interpretations and actions possibilities are discussed and 
negotiated among members of a community” (p. 247). They emphasize that 
communicative validity may be an empty global term without clarity regarding the 
how, why and who of the process of such validation. In our study, we have sought to 
facilitate open dialogues in the interviews, in the subsequent conversational processes 
around the data and in emerging findings, in various arenas (how). The co-researchers 
have participated throughout the process, and the respondents—adolescents, people in 
their networks and the practitioners—have been invited to respond to preliminary 
ideas and findings (“member validation”). We have included the responses from other 
adolescents with first-hand experience (“audience validation”) and responses from 
other scholars—colleagues and peers—when presenting emerging findings in various 
contexts (“peer validation”) (who). The involvement of this multitude of voices was 
designed not only to include various responses in the processes of analysis, 
interpretation and formulation of findings, but also to facilitate dialogues that could 
inform practice and those already involved in the ongoing research process (why). 
We received responses when we presented preliminary findings to other adolescents 
and to various groups of practitioners. Adolescents could recognize their own 
experiences in the concepts and descriptions suggested. Moreover, practitioners 
responded that the preliminary ideas could be useful in their understanding of their 
own practices. We also received responses suggesting that important aspects had 
perhaps not been captured in our preliminary findings. These responses both validate 
and call into question the ideas presented; they indicate that findings are transferable 
to other contexts and highlight the limitations of such transferability. According to 
Kvale & Brinkmann (2009, p. 53), the complexities of transferability and validity in 
quality research “need not be due to an inherent weakness in qualitative methods, but 
may on the contrary rest on their extraordinary power to picture and to question the 
complexity of the social reality investigated.” 
Kvale & Brinkmann, referring to Latour, give the norm of objectivity in research a 
somewhat specific and literal significance. They state that maximum objectivity is 
obtained when “allowing the objects to object” (2009, p. 243). In this study, we 
interviewed the respondents several times (in six of the eight cases); this allowed us to 
present preliminary findings to the respondents, and we were able to include their 
responses in the process. The participants (objects) were allowed to object. 
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Kvale & Brinkman state that the aim of this validation process is not necessarily to 
achieve consensus (Habermasian tradition). Referring to Lyotard’s concept of 
paralogy, Kvale & Brinkman suggest that the validation process is a way of creating 
new ideas and new differentiations (2009, p. 255). Our study has continuously 
facilitated dialogues that include a variety of perspectives and has aimed at retaining 
the complexity and multidimensionality found in the data material. However, it should 
be noted that despite these efforts, perhaps the studies could have generated greater 
differentiation and displayed this in a way that maintained both the diversity and even 
the contradictions inherent in the material. In a way, the published findings fit together 
too well. 
The polyphonic, multivoiced nature of our study has been a great challenge, and is 
perhaps also a weakness of the study. Maintaining an overview of all the 
conversations, participants and utterances/voices, and including them, has been 
difficult.17 There was such nuanced richness in the experiences articulated in the 
interviews that the ongoing process of analysis in a sense had to leave some of the 
utterances, voices, sequences, ideas, experiences, and so forth behind. The process of 
exploration was to provide room for voices, but it also excluded voices, utterances, and 
nuances in the material. In a sense, as indicated in the chapter outlining the 
methodology, the process could be seen as a continuous loss and betrayal of all the 
nuances, complexities and possibilities that all the voices offered. 
Identifying material features concerns the way in which data and findings are tethered 
to the material of the discourse (Sullivan, 2012, p. 151). As described in the chapter 
outlining the methodology, we identified key moments in the material. On a micro 
level, we identified aspects that formed the utterances, such as the type of 
language/genre used, the people who were present in the interview, who was addressed 
by the respondent and what other addressees the respondent might have had in mind. 
All language, and consequently any description, depends on the genres already present 
in the culture and discourses surrounding us. Therefore, we paid attention to the way in 
which genres at the macro level influenced the data. Respondents knew that this was a 
study of mental health practice and they could probably have been influenced by the 
perspectives and language they associated with mental health. The co-researchers 
                                                 
17
 The conversations that were part of the systematic process were all planned, conducted and documented, so 
in this sense we have provided an overview. Nevertheless, the richness, multiplicity and multivoicedness of the 
material and of the analytical process was impossible to include, maintain or do justice to. 
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introduced themselves at the very beginning of the interviews, and made it clear that 
they were participating because of their own experiences, and not as representatives of 
any profession. We began with questions concerning the experience of difficulties 
prior to contact with mental health services. We also asked about experiences in areas 
other than the service. We did this to avoid dominance by the perspectives and 
language of therapy, psychology and professional care. 
In particular, we paid attention to sequences where the respondents stuttered, struggled 
to find words, hesitated, or said something and then appeared to withdraw it. Such 
abrupt speech could indicate that a significant point was being put into words for the 
first time, but there was no ready-made form of articulation or genre. 
We invited the respondents to choose the location of the interviews: at their homes or 
at the location of the service. Approximately half of the interviews were conducted in 
the homes of the respondents and the other half at the service location, in accordance 
with their choices. This implies that both the “voice of the home” and the “voice of the 
institution” were part of the study. This attention to place and materiality is in line with 
Larsen (2011), who states that qualitative studies must not neglect the significance of 
places, objects and surroundings, and the way these influence what we talk about, the 
way we speak and the impressions we derive. 
In the exploration of the material, the co-researchers “brought in” perspectives and 
language that added to my perspectives as lead researcher. Although my perspectives 
were indeed formed by my own experiences of living, feeling and thinking, they were 
also influenced by my theoretical/philosophical preferences and my ongoing reading 
of theory and literature. In this way, the voices of theoreticians were part of the 
exploration. This may be viewed as a kind of theoretical validation (Kvale & 
Brinkmann, 2009), whereby emerging ideas and findings can be evaluated in the light 
of relevant theory related to the phenomena explored. The co-researcher was important 
in this respect, both through preventing narrow theory-based interpretations and 
through the way in which theoretical ideas that were introduced had to undergo “a 
test” when communicated to the co-researchers to establish whether or not they 
seemed meaningful. 
Freeman (2011) states that traditional science may have an inherent wish to impose a 
structure or some law upon “the movements of life”. Referring to Heidegger, he claims 
that Western thought has taken the “real” to mean the factual. Reality is seen as the 
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sum of facts. Freeman (2011) points to fidelity as the phenomenon that science takes as 
its primary value. According to Freeman, this entails that science should respect “the 
movement of life in all its messiness” (p. 390), and have respect for the otherness of 
the other. Writing should be oriented not only towards the epistemological aim of 
increased knowledge, but should also aim to do justice to the phenomenon in question 
by including “the ethical aim of increasing sympathy and compassion” and the 
“aesthetic aim of moving the reader” (p. 395). 
This thesis emerged from movements at thresholds—moving into the world of 
adolescents struggling, being moved by them, moving them, participants moving into 
the explorative process, being moved by it, moving readers and readers moving others 
in “the movement of life in all its messiness”. 
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7. Conclusion … or no last words? 
[W]hat straightens my back, lifts up my head, and directs my gaze forward? 
Is it really pure givenness …? 
[No, it is] my being present to myself as someone yet to be 
 … [My] real center of gravity … is located solely in the future …  
I believe insanely and inexpressibly in my own noncoincidence with [the] inner givenness of 
myself. 
(Bakhtin, 1990, p. 127) 
This thesis is intended to be faithful to the concept of unfinalizability in articulated 
findings. They are suggestions, and there is an inherent wish that they may lead to 
future responses. The findings and the texts are only some of the ways of describing 
and understanding the dynamics involved in change within a multitude of possibilities. 
The results of science, and the findings of qualitative research, are not facts about 
reality; rather, they may point to certain aspects of reality. Scientific exploration may 
produce new ways of saying things, and from those new sayings new aspects of the 
world, and others in that world, become visible and audible. Scientists must not forget 
that when their findings reveal, they inevitably also conceal. 
7.1. Anything new? The originality of the study 
In these studies, the relational and ethical aspects of change related to mental health 
have been explored. This exploration has taken the articulated experiences of 
adolescents and others involved in network meetings as a point of departure and 
brought these into dialogue with some theoretical ideas from dialogical philosophy. 
When the respondents told us about the difficulties of their lives and about change to 
better ways of living, they seemed to report events and experiences in relation to 
others. From the social aspects that we have identified in the material, we have 
suggested some concepts, findings, models and themes that retain the complexity of 
dialogical events of change. 
If I were to point out the particular contribution of the studies, perhaps it is captured in 
the following key words: movement, ethics and future. Perhaps it may be expressed 
like this; change for the better is ethically evoked movement into the future. 
The first substudy offered a view of change as an ethical event by exploring some 
ideas from Bakhtin and Levinas, by whom the human subject is described as 
originating in an ethical event. The discovery that moving, or difficulty of moving, 
seemed to be involved in so many of the adolescents’ descriptions was rather 
  
68 
 
unexpected. The conditions for the feeling of being able to move—or not—seemed to 
lie in the interplay of moving in relation to others. In particular, we presented this in 
paper 2. In this paper, we also introduced the concepts of “Before-Event”, “Event”, 
and “After-Event”. It is suggested that the condition for moving may lie not in the 
event/the present, but in the anticipation of future responses. The feeling of being 
either able or unable to move depended on the ethical aspect of anticipated future 
responses; “Will I be valued or devalued?”. This may indicate an emphasis on 
movement, ethics and future, which may differ from an emphasis on (mutual) 
understanding and the present moment (including spontaneity and immediacy) 
common to many current accounts of relational and dialogical practices in mental 
health. The primordiality of ethics is suggested in the concepts of “ethical time” and 
“ethical space”, which may capture the apparent ethical “quality” that is inevitably 
involved in our sense of the time (future) and the space (future place) that makes it 
possible to move (forward)—or not. Current studies pointing to the significance of 
movement and the body may not clearly point to the fundamental ethicality present in 
the conditions for movement (see Chapter 6). 
The network meetings seemed to be experienced as helpful in their ethical, expressive 
and hermeneutic dimensions (paper 3). Our studies suggest that perhaps the ethical and 
expressive dimensions of the dialogue are as crucial as the hermeneutical dimension: 
the attention to understanding. Moreover, the movement of the body should be seen as 
part of dialogue, because movement is expressive and responsive. As movement is 
always into a future, we point to the significance of dialogues as future-opening 
events. In this way, our studies may offer a slightly different perspective to those of 
many studies of relational approaches in mental health that focus on the present shared 
moment and emphasize aspects such as synchronicity, simultaneity and immediacy. In 
this thesis, we have suggested that diachrony may be a concept that points to the 
apparent inclusion of time in responsive movement, in the sense that the future, the 
“yet to come”, should be seen as fundamental to dynamics of change. 
The fourth study showed how inner dialogues—ideas and feelings that are not 
uttered—must be included to describe the dynamics of network dialogues. It indicated 
that participants’ inner dialogues could be seen as responses to the future (within the 
actual meeting), such as when a therapist in her inner dialogue seeks a way to speak 
that will not end a dialogue with an adolescent, but will make him speak in response 
(in the immediate future of the meeting). This is a matter of movement (in terms of 
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expressing something), the future (in terms of anticipation and facilitating what is to 
come) and ethics (in terms of concern about allowing another to speak/move). 
7.2. So what? Implications for practice and further research 
Following the ideas in dialogical theory, we perceive and sense the world through 
finding and uttering words. I suggest that these studies may be fruitful in the sense that 
practitioners and help seekers may sense their situations differently, notice other 
aspects, imagine alternative future possibilities and accordingly act and move in 
different ways. 
Some further implications for practice are suggested. These studies indicate the 
importance of developing initiatives with a network orientation, where people from the 
social arenas of the help seekers are included. The significance of events in various 
social arenas should be recognized. The studies indicate that attention should be paid 
to bodily aspects, expressiveness and responsiveness in the encounters facilitated by 
the services. 
The findings demonstrate the significance of the ethical aspects of the encounters. This 
may imply that to “open up” possibilities for moving and living by those involved, 
being inviting and attentive to the speech of the other may be crucial. The 
unconditional welcome of this inviting attentiveness is perhaps necessary to initiate 
change in ways that enhance the vitality of those who struggle. The significance of 
ethics in experiences of time and space (for movement) suggested in this thesis 
indicates that what happens in the dialogues cannot be accounted for solely by the 
participants’ presence and responses in the moment. It seems essential to include 
relations with the past and future to understand the change-generating aspects that are 
in play. Movement in the moment is conditioned by past and future. Consequently, 
practitioners are encouraged to create space for participants to talk about what has 
passed and what is coming in their lives, thereby enabling new vitality and movement 
in the present to emerge. 
Perhaps the main challenge for the practitioner is to respond to aspects of the 
encounter that lie in the unknown or in the otherness of the other. This sensitivity is of 
an ethical kind, as it is a kind of readiness to care for and respect the other through 
one’s responses. Perhaps the value of the practitioner’s answers is not found in their 
content, but in the practitioners’ hospitality and respectfulness. The practitioner is 
perhaps challenged to put himself/herself, his/her knowledge and even his/her 
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judgments on hold, and to be sensitive to the uniqueness of the other and the 
singularity of the encounter. The starting point for eliciting the right action for a 
practitioner is perhaps not found by identifying the “case at hand” and asking an 
ontological question such as “What is this?” (or even “How can we together create 
meaning in this?”). The crucial aspect may be found in asking an ethical question such 
as “How can I find (future) steps into this encounter in a way that evokes space for 
other participants to take their (future) steps?” 
The studies in this thesis point to aspects and domains of change within human living 
in general and in mental health in particular that implicate some possibilities for 
further research. I will briefly point out some domains of themes without going into 
specifics. 
Ethics at work in mental health. It seems that many studies point to the significance of 
being respected, seen, heard and given dignity. Perhaps our studies point to some 
directions for further research in which such ethical aspects could be elaborated and 
which may lead to more nuanced articulations. The way in which the body is 
profoundly involved in this ethical dynamics could also be investigated further. 
Bodily movement in mental health. Our studies indicate that movements of the body 
seem to be at the core of mental health difficulties, and suggest ways out of such 
difficulties. This is not about the body as an object of description from the perspective 
of the disciplines of natural science. The body we refer to here is woven into 
expressiveness, ethics, experience, anticipation and culture. Further scientific 
exploration of mental health practice as a practice engaging with an ethical, 
phenomenological, hermeneutical and cultural body is called for. 
Future-opening practice. One of the main suggestions in the studies presented in this 
thesis is that dialogues in mental health may offer helpful dynamics in the way they 
open up the future for those involved. How can we understand this future-opening 
aspect? In what ways could mental health practices be future opening or future 
forming? Our studies suggest that what we refer to as the moment must in a sense 
include the immediate future in terms of feelings expressed in questions such as “How 
may I respond?”, or “How will I be responded to?”, or “Will there be a place for me in 
this?” This could be explored further in dialogical practices. 
Ethics, time, space, movement, body, anticipation, experience and culture. This is 
simply a list of the some crucial ingredients of this thesis, and ways of interrelating 
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these ingredients have been suggested. Further studies comprising this multitude of 
ingredients may pave the way for developing better practices that embrace the 
complexities involved. The concepts of Before-Event, Event, and After-Event have 
been suggested (P2). These concepts, in my opinion, could indicate a direction for 
further research. The concepts offer the possibility of diffracting the moment and 
bringing experience and anticipation into descriptions and understandings of 
movement and change. 
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Kunz, G. (2010). The Epoché is Demanded by the Other in Levinas’ “Phenomenology 
of Action”. In Les Collectifs du Crip (pp. 191–207) Retrieved 16th May 2015, 
from http://www.cirp.uqam.ca/CIRP/18–Kunz.pdf. 
Kvale, S., & Brinkmann, S. (2009). InterViews: Learning the craft of qualitative 
research interview. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Larner, G. (2009). Integrating family therapy in adolescent depression: An ethical 
stance. Journal of Family Therapy, 31(3), 213–232. 
Larner, G. (2015). Dialogical Ethics: Imagining the Other. Australian and New 
Zealand Journal of Family Therapy, 36(1), 155–166. doi: 10.1002/anzf.1093 
Larsen, I. (2011). Materiality talks. Including materiality in mental health research. In 
A. J. W. Andersen & A. Salvini (Eds.) Interactions, Health and Community (pp. 
101–113). Pisa: Plus. 
  
78 
 
Latour, B., & Woolgar, S. (1979). Laboratory Life. The Construction of Scientific 
Facts. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications. 
Leamy, M., Bird, V., Le Boutillier, C., Williams, J., & Slade, M. (2011). Conceptual 
framework for personal recovery in mental health: Systematic review and 
narrative synthesis. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 199(6), 445–452. doi: 
10.1192/bjp.bp.110.083733 
Levinas, E. (1969). Totality and Infinity. Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press. 
Levinas, E. (1982). Ethique et infini: dialogues avec Philippe Nemo. Paris: Fayard. 
Levinas, E. (1985). Ethics and infinity (1st ed.). Pittsburgh: Duquesne University 
Press. 
Levinas, E. (1987). Collected philosophical papers. Boston: Kluwer Academic. 
Levinas, E. (1993). Den annens humanisme. [“Humanism of the Other” in Norwegian 
translation and comments by Asbjørn Aarnes] Oslo: Aschehoug. 
Levinas, E. (1996). Basic philosophical writings. Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press. 
Levinas, E. (1998a). Entre nous. Thinking-of-the-other. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Levinas, E. (1998b). Of God who comes to mind. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Levinas, E. (1998c). Otherwise than Being or beyond Essence. Pennsylvania: 
Duquesne University Press. 
Levinas, E. (1999). Alterity and transcendence. New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
Linell, P. (2009). Rethinking Language, Mind and World Dialogically. Charlotte, NC: 
Information Age Publishing Inc. 
Lingis, A. (1994). The community of those who have nothing in common. Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press. 
Løgstrup, K. E. (1997). The ethical demand. Chicago: University of Notre Dame 
Press. 
Manen, V. (2004). Lived experience. In M. S. Lewis-Beck, A. Bryman & T. F. Liao 
(Eds.), The SAGE Encyclopedia of social science research methods (pp. 579–
580). Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications. 
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). Phenomenology of perception. New York: Routledge. 
Mezzich, J. E., Snaedal, J., Van Weel, C., & Heath, I. (2010). Conceptual Explorations 
on Person-centered Medicine 2010: Introduction to conceptual explorations on 
person-centered medicine. International Journal of Integrated Care, 10, 1–2. 
  
79 
 
Mezzina, R., Borg, M., Marin, I., Sells, D., Topor, A., & Davidson, L. (2006). From 
Participation to Citizenship: How to Regain a Role, a Status, and a Life in the 
Process of Recovery. American Journal of Psychiatric Rehabilitation, 9(1), 39–
61. doi: 10.1080/15487760500339428 
Mezzina, R., Davidson, L., Borg, M., Marin, I., Topor, A., & Sells, D. (2006). The 
social nature of recovery: Discussion and implications for practice. Archives of 
Andrology, 9(1), 63–80. doi: 10.1080/15487760500339436 
Moltu, C., Stefansen, J., Svisdahl, M., & Veseth, M. (2013). How to Enhance the 
Quality of Mental Health Research: Service Users’ Experiences of Their 
Potential Contributions Through Collaborative Methods. American Journal of 
Psychiatric Rehabilitation, 16(1), 1–21. doi: 10.1080/15487768.2013.762295 
Morson, G., & Emerson, C. (1990). Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a prosaics. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. 
Murray, J. W. (2000). Bakhtinian answerability and Levinasian responsibility: Forging 
a fuller dialogical ethics. Southern Communication Journal, 65(2–3), 133–150. 
Ness, O., Borg, M., Semb, R., & Karlsson, B. (2014). “Walking alongside”: 
Collaborative practices in mental health and substance use care. International 
Journal of Mental Health Systems, 8(1), 1–8. 
Ness, O., Karlsson, B., Borg, M., Biong, S., Sundet, R., McCormack, B., & Kim, H. S. 
(2014). Towards a model for collaborative practice in community mental health 
care. Scandinavian Psychologist, 1, e6.  
Norcross, J. C., & Wampold, B. E. (2011). Evidence-based therapy relationships: 
Research conclusions and clinical practices. Psychotherapy, 48(1), 98–102. doi: 
10.1037/a0022161 
Nordtug, B. (2015). Levinas’s ethics as a basis of healthcare—challenges and 
dilemmas. Nursing Philosophy, 16(1), 51–63. 
Nyttingnes, O. (2007). Vet fagfolk best? [Do professionals know best?] In A. K. 
Ulvestad, A. K. Henriksen, A.-G. Tuseth & T. Fjeldstad (Eds.), Klienten - den 
glemte terapeut. [The client—the forgotten therapist.] (pp. 64–77). Oslo: 
Gyldendal Norsk Forlag. 
Online Etymological Dictionary (2015). Pennsylvania: Douglas Harper 
(http://www.etymonline.com) 
Oxford English Dictionary (2015). Oxford: Oxford University Press 
(http://www.oed.com) 
  
80 
 
Piippo, J., & Aaltonen, J. (2004). Mental health: Integrated network and family-
oriented model for co-operation between mental health patients, adult mental 
health services and social services. Journal of Clinical Nursing, 13(7), 876–885. 
Piippo, J., & Aaltonen, J. (2008). Mental health care: Trust and mistrust in different 
caring contexts. Journal of Clinical Nursing, 17(21), 2867–2874. 
Redner, H. (1982). In the Beginning was the Deed: Reflections on the Passage of 
Faust. California: University of California Press. 
Rober, P. (2005). Family therapy as a dialogue of living persons: A perspective 
inspired by Bakhtin, Voloshinov, and Shotter. Journal of Marital and Family 
Therapy, 31(4), 385–397. 
Rober, P., Elliott, R., Buysse, A., Loots, G., & De Corte, K. (2008). Positioning in the 
therapist’s inner conversation: A dialogical model based on a grounded theory 
analysis of therapist reflections. Journal of Marital and Family Therapy, 34(3), 
406–421. doi: 10.1111/j.1752-0606.2008.00080.x 
Rose, D., Thornicroft, G., & Slade, M. (2006). Who decides what evidence is? 
Developing a multiple perspectives paradigm in mental health. Acta 
Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 429, 109–114. doi: 10.1111/j.1600-
0447.2005.00727.x 
Sackett, D. L., Rosenberg, W., Gray, J., Haynes, R. B., & Richardson, W. S. (1996). 
Evidence based medicine: What it is and what it isn’t. British Medical Journal, 
312(7023), 71–72. 
Sackett, D. L., Straus, S. E., Richardson, W. S., & Haynes, R. B. (1997). Evidence-
based medicine. How to practice and teach EBM. New York: Churchill 
Livingstone. 
Schon, U.-K., Denhov, A., & Topor, A. (2009). Social relationships as a decisive 
factor in recovering from severe mental illness. International Journal of Social 
Psychiatry, 55(4), 336-347. doi: 10.1177/0020764008093686 
Seikkula, J. (2002). Monologue is the crisis—Dialogue becomes the aim of therapy. 
Journal of Marital and Family Therapy, 28(3), 283–284. 
Seikkula, J. (2011). Becoming Dialogical: Psychotherapy or a Way of Life? Australian 
and New Zealand Journal of Family Therapy, 32(3), 179–193. 
Seikkula, J. (2011). Dialogue is the change: Understanding Psychotherapy as a 
Semiotic Process of Bakhtin, Voloshinov and Vygotsky. Human Systems, 22(2), 
521–533. 
Seikkula, J., & Arnkil, T. E. (2006). Dialogical meetings in social networks. London: 
Karnac. 
  
81 
 
Seikkula, J., Karvonen, A., Kykyri, V. L., Kaartinen, J., & Penttonen, M. (2015). The 
Embodied Attunement of Therapists and a Couple within Dialogical 
Psychotherapy: An Introduction to the Relational Mind Research Project. 
Family Process, x (x) (early online publication).  
Seikkula, J., Laitila, A., & Rober, P. (2012). Making Sense of Multi‐Actor Dialogues 
in Family Therapy and Network Meetings. Journal of Marital and Family 
Therapy, 38(4), 667–687. 
Seikkula, J., & Trimble, D. (2005). Healing elements of therapeutic conversation: 
Dialogue as an embodiment of love. Family Process, 44(4), 461–475. 
Sheets-Johnstone, M. (2009). The corporeal turn: An interdisciplinary reader: Exeter: 
Imprint Academic. 
Sheets-Johnstone, M. (2011a). The Corporeal Turn. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 
18(7/8), 145–168. 
Sheets-Johnstone, M. (2011b). Embodied minds or mindful bodies? A question of 
fundamental, inherently inter-related aspects of animation. Subjectivity: 
International Journal of Critical Psychology, 4(4), 451–466. doi: 
10.1057/sub.2011.21 
Sheets-Johnstone, M. (2011c). The primacy of movement. : Amsterdam: John 
Benjamins Publishing. 
Shotter, J. (2003). Cartesian Change, Chiasmic Change: The power of Living 
expression. Janus Head, 6(1), 6–29. 
Shotter, J. (2006). Vygotsky, Bakhtin, Goethe: Consciousness and the dynamics of 
voice. http://pubpages.unh.edu/~jds/SanDiego.htm 
Shotter, J. (2010). Movements of feeling and Moments of Judgement: Towards an 
Ontological Social Constructionism. International Journal of Action Research, 
6(1), 16–42. 
Shotter, J. (2012). Bodily Way-finding our Way into the Future: Finding the guidance 
we need for our next step within the taking of our present step. Tidsskrift for 
Psykisk Helsearbeid, [Norwegian Journal of Mental Health] 9(2), 133–143. 
Shotter, J. (2013). Reflections on Sociomateriality and Dialogicality in Organization 
Studies: From ‘Inter-’ to ‘Intra-Thinking’ in Performing Practices. In P. R. 
Carlile, D. Nicolini, A. Langley & H. Tsoukas (Eds.), How Matter Matters 
(pp.32 - 57). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
  
82 
 
Shotter, J. (2014). Practice-based methods for practitioners in inquiring into the 
continuous co-emergent “stuff” of everyday life. In G. Simon & A. Chard 
(Eds.), Systemic inquiry. Innovations in reflexive practitioner research. (pp. 95–
123). London: Everything is Connected Press. 
Shotter, J. (2015). On being dialogical: An ethics of ‘attunement’. Context, 137, 8–11. 
Sjølie, H., Karlsson, B., & Kim, H. S. (2010). Crisis resolution and home treatment: 
Structure, process, and outcome – a literature review. Journal of Psychiatric 
and Mental Health Nursing, 17(10), 881–892. 
Slåttelid, R. T. (1998). Bakhtins translingvistikk. [Bakhtins’ translinguistics] In 
Bakhtin, Spørsmålet om talegenrane [The Problem of Speech Genres] (pp. 47–
85). Bergen: Ariadne. 
Sullivan, P. (2012). Qualitative data analysis using a dialogical approach. London: 
Sage Publications. 
Sullivan, P., & McCarthy, J. (2005). A Dialogical Approach to Experience-based 
Inquiry. Theory & Psychology, 15(5), 621–638. doi: 
10.1177/0959354305057266 
Sælør, K. T., Ness, O., Holgersen, H., & Davidson, L. (2014). Hope and recovery: A 
scoping review. Advances in Dual Diagnosis, 7(2), 63–72. 
Tew, J., Ramon, S., Slade, M., Bird, V., Melton, J., & Le Boutillier, C. (2012). Social 
Factors and Recovery from Mental Health Difficulties: A Review of the 
Evidence. British Journal of Social Work, 42(3), 443–460. doi: 
10.1093/Bjsw/Bcr076 
Thomas, P., Bracken, P., & Timimi, S. (2012). The limits of evidence-based medicine 
in psychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 19(4), 295–308. 
Topor, A. (2003). Recovery - At komme sig efter alvorlig psykiske lidelse. [Recovery - 
from severe mental disorder] København: Hans Reitzels Forlag. 
Topor, A., Borg, M., Di Girolamo, S., & Davidson, L. (2011). Not just an individual 
Journey: Social aspects of Recovery. International Journal of Social 
Psychiatry, 57(1), 90–99. 
Topor, A., Borg, M., Mezzina, R., Sells, D., Marin, I., & Davidson, L. (2006). Others: 
The Role of Family, Friends, and Professionals in the Recovery Process. 
American Journal of Psychiatric Rehabilitation, 9(1), 17–37. doi: 
10.1080/15487760500339410 
Tucker, I. (2013). Anticipating the future in the organisation of home: Bergson, 
Whitehead and mental health service users. Outlines: Critical Practice Studies, 
14(1), 26–40. 
  
83 
 
Ulland, D., Andersen, A., Larsen, I., & Seikkula, J. (2014). Generating Dialogical 
Practices in Mental Health: Experiences from Southern Norway, 1998–2008. 
Administration and Policy in Mental Health and Mental Health Services 
Research, 41(3), 410–419. doi: 10.1007/s10488-013-0479-3 
van Manen, M. (2006). Writing qualitatively, or the demands of writing. Qualitative 
Health Research, 16(5), 713–722. 
Verhaegh, M. J., Bongers, I. M., Kroon, H., & Garretsen, H. F. (2009). Model fidelity 
of assertive community treatment for clients with first-episode psychoses: A 
target group-specific application. Community Mental Health Journal, 45, 12–
28. 
Volosinov, V. N. (1986). Marxism and the Philosophy of language. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
Wampold, B. E. (2001). The Great Psychotherapy Debate: Models, Methods and 
Findings. Hillsdale: Erlbaum. 
Welz, C., & Verstrynge, K. (2008). Despite Oneself: Subjectivity and Its Secret in 
Kierkegaard and Levinas. London: Turnshare Ltd. 
Wexler, L., & Eglinton, K. A. (2015). Reconsidering Youth Well-Being as Fluid and 
Relational: A Dynamic Process at the Intersection of Their Physical and Social 
Geographies. In J. Wyn & H. Cahill (Eds.) Handbook of Children and Youth 
Studies, (pp. 127–137), Singapore: Springer Singapore. 
Wifstad, Å. (1997). Vilkår for begrepsdannelse og praksis i psykiatri. En filosofisk 
undersøkelse. [Conditions for concepts and practice in psychiatry. A 
philosophical investigation.] Oslo: Tano Aschehoug. 
Wifstad, Å. (2008). External and Internal Evidence in Clinical Judgment: The 
Evidence-Based Medicine Attitude. Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology, 
15(2), 135–139. doi: 10.1353/ppp.0.0179 
Winness, M. G., Borg, M., & Kim, H. S. (2010). Service users' experiences with help 
and support from crisis resolution teams. A literature review. Journal of Mental 
Health, 19(1), 75–87. doi: 10.3109/09638230903469178 
World Health Organization (2015). Mental health: A state of well-being. Retrieved 
25th April 2015, from http://www.who.int/features/factfiles/mental_health/en/ 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
Appendices 1-4:  
Published papers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paper 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Change is an Ongoing Ethical Event:
Levinas, Bakhtin and the Dialogical
Dynamics of Becoming
Tore Dag Bøe1, Kjell Kristoffersen1, Per Arne Lidbom2, Gunnhild Ruud
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In this article, we use the intersubjective ethics of Bakhtin and Levinas and a case illustration to explore change in
therapy as an ethical phenomenon. We follow Lakoff and Johnson in their emphasis on the way our conceptions
of change seem permeated by metaphors. Bakhtin and Levinas both suggest through a language in which meta-
phors play a crucial role, that human existence—the consciousness and the subject—emerge within the dialogue
of the encounter. They both describe the dynamics of human existence as ethical in their origin. Following this,
we argue that change may be seen as an ongoing ethical event and that the dynamics of change are found in the
ways we constantly become in this event. We investigate the ethical dynamics of this ongoing event through three
themes illuminating the contributions of both Bakhtin and Levinas: (1) we become as responsible, (2) we become
in speaking, (3) we become in answering the unknown. We explore these themes through a case illustration.
Finally, we briefly point out some possible implications for mental health practice.
Keywords: Bakhtin, dialogical practice, ethics, Levinas, mental health, metaphor
Key Points
1 Change has its dynamics in dialogue as an ethical event.
2 We understand change through metaphors.
3 Emmanuel Levinas and Mikhail Bakhtin say we become through responsibility.
4 Our thoughts, feelings and acts are responses to others in the joint event of life.
5 Mental health practice and therapy is an ethical event.
This article explores the possibility of understanding change related to mental health
as an ethical phenomenon. We elaborate this ethical–relational perspective on
change with the help of Mikhail Bakhtin (1895–1975) and Emmanuel Levinas
(1906–1995) and through a case illustration from practice. Inspired by Bakhtin’s
(1993) notion of being as an ongoing event, we use the formulation ‘change is an
ongoing ethical event’ as a starting point. It should be noted that our point of
departure is that change is a general human phenomenon, where mental health
practice including therapy is one of many arenas for change in human life. We start
by referring to the role of metaphors in our attempts to understand the dynamics
of change.
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Understanding Change: A Matter of Metaphors?
The observation by Shotter (2011b) that ‘metaphors reveal and conceal’ entails that
we should recognise the way we speak, think, and understand through metaphors.
We are also urged to question the metaphors we use in an ongoing search for new
and diverse metaphors. Lakoff and Johnson (1980/2003, 1999) show us that the ways
we think and speak about human phenomena are embedded in metaphors, and they
point to the essence of metaphor as understanding and experiencing one kind of thing
(target domain) in terms of another (source domain) (1980/2003, p. 5). They point
to the way we are dependent on metaphors to think and speak of various aspects of
human life. These metaphors permeate our everyday language in such a way that we
no longer recognise them as metaphors. They have become conventional metaphors
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980/2003, p. 139).
Indeed, Western views on change seem dominated by the idea of causation. Lakoff
and Johnson (1999) suggest this idea of causation is based on metaphorical thinking.
A causal perspective of change is built on the prototypical metaphor: the manipulation
of objects by force (p. 177). Examples relating to mental health include: ‘He’s in a deep
depression (…) She’s out of her depression.’ (p. 180). Thus, depression is understood
metaphorically as a location you are in and can be moved out of, by some force. Our
conceptions of change as causal are in this way based on metaphorical thinking.
Concepts from our experience with physical objects in time/space (the source
domain), are applied in our understanding of complex aspects of human life (the tar-
get domain). Through this kind of metaphorical understanding, change may take on
a mechanical character.
Change, as a concept, may have connotations of this causal understanding. Our
investigation in this article implies an exploration of other ways of understanding
change outside this language of (mechanical) causation. From a dialogical point of
view, as we shall see, human existence cannot be conceived as a fixed state that can be
changed from the outside by a manipulating force that results in a new fixed state, so
to speak. Instead, human existence may be seen as constantly emerging in the inter-
play of the world with others in this world. This implies a shift from speaking of
human existence in terms of who we are to speaking in terms of the way we constantly
become. Change, then, is the question of how our experiences, thoughts, feelings, and
ways of acting are constantly becoming.
Clearly, this approach to change remains dependent on metaphors, but may
imply different metaphors or different uses of metaphors. We can see that the meta-
phors we use could have their attachments to various ‘models of the world’. An
illustration of this can be found in Shotter’s (2003) quote from Heidegger: ‘A world
picture, when understood essentially, does not mean a picture of the world but the
world conceived and grasped as a picture’ (p. 27). Shotter suggests that this overrid-
ing metaphor in Western thought (i.e. ‘the world is a picture’) permeates our con-
ceptions of change in both everyday life and in science. Change is understood by
identifying demarcated, static entities in this picture and through (metaphorical) the-
ories of causal connection.
Shotter (2003) emphasises the need to alter our metaphors for change within
human existence, as humans are living, expressive bodies who experience and move
through interaction rather than demarcated elements in a picture. In his philosophy,
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Shotter (2003, 2010, 2012), based on the works of Bakhtin among others, is in
search of metaphors that place us within the dynamics of a joint world. Shotter
(2003) writes metaphorically in his search for an understanding of change outside a
causality model based on the picture metaphor vis a vis the world and says that our
becoming is our ‘walking into a landscape’ (p. 17).
In this landscape that appears between ourself, the world and others in the world,
we should explore change. Our assumption in this article is that this space between us
is ethical in its origin and in its dynamics.
Relational and Dialogical Practices
In the last decades, relational and dialogical practices have emerged within a contextual
approach to mental health (Brown, 2010; Larner, 2010; Seikkula, 2011a; Shotter,
2011a). The case we present is drawn from a dialogical practice inspired by Open
Dialogue Approach, as developed in Western Lapland, Finland (Aaltonen, Seikkula &
Lehtinen, 2011; Seikkula, Aaltonen, Alakare, Haarakangas, Ker€anen & Lethinen,
2006; Seikkula & Arnkil, 2006). Open Dialogue Approach emphasises that help
should start immediately and have a social network perspective from the outset
(Seikkula & Arnkil, 2006). The approach is need-adapted through flexibility and
mobility. In social network meetings the practitioners aim to give occasion to a diver-
sity of feelings and utterances without being instructive or conclusive. Tolerance of
uncertainty is emphasised in facilitating this process.
From a metaphorical perspective, we find bodily and spatial metaphors emphasis-
ing the inter-human sphere. Occasioning change is seen as an (metaphors in italics)
inter-subjective, dialogical enterprise, where professionals themselves are situated
within the process of change and the understanding of the crises evolves from inside
the encounters and dialogues. Emphasis is placed not on what goes on inside our
heads or minds but rather on what goes on between us. These are metaphors that
offer a position inside a shared event. It should be noted that along with these meta-
phors that point to what we are in together there are also metaphors that point to the
fundamental alterity vis a vis others, as in the Bakhtinian concept of outsideness (Bakh-
tin, 1990; Pollard, 2011), or in the way Levinas speaks of a distance in the proximity
of the other (Dueck & Parsons, 2007; Levinas, 1998).
What are the dynamics of this event in the space between us? In narrative
approaches emerging from social constructionism, the suggestion is that the creation
and recreation of narratives, meanings and understandings is the healing element in
therapy (Larner, 2008). Within the Open Dialogue Approach, the social network meet-
ings can be seen as a space for a semiotic process that constructs new meaning (Seikku-
la, 2011b). Dialogical practice increasingly addresses also the ethical aspects of the
dynamics of change (Seikkula & Trimble, 2005; Shaw, 2011). There is perhaps an eth-
ical modality of the dynamics of change that is not captured by the semiotics of the
dialogue focusing on meaning, narratives and understanding. More succinctly, some
ethical aspects inherent in these semiotic processes are worthy of further elaboration.
It is precisely these ethical aspects of the dynamics of change that we want to
investigate further. This investigation must depend on and concern metaphors.
However, before we look more closely into Bakhtin and Levinas we will introduce an
illustrative case.
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Philip and His Story
In 2010, a program for research and development related to dialogical practices
titled ‘Dialogical collaboration in Southern Norway’ was established in Agder, Nor-
way. The program includes a study of the dynamics of change as they relate to
adolescents receiving network-oriented, dialogical help. In this study, we interviewed
adolescents seeking help, along with at least one person in their social network,
focusing on change related to a variety of social arenas that are important during
adolescence (e.g., home, school, friends, and leisure activities). The present study
was approved by The National Committee for Medical and Health Research Ethics
and the case illustration presented here was collected from the study. We inter-
viewed a boy, we here name him Philip, and his brother three times during a
9-month period.
Philip, aged 16 years, lived with his parents and his older brother. He was referred
to the mental health service by his general practitioner after his mother reported sleep
problems and an increased tendency toward isolation. Philip’s brother reported that
he had noticed paranoid thinking in Philip. The mental health practitioner invited a
colleague to join him in the case and in the first meeting they met Philip and his
mother. Philip’s mother participated in nearly all the meetings. Philip’s father,
brother, and his teacher attended some. Over a period of around 9 months, regular
meetings were scheduled two times per month or when needed.
Philip told us that his difficulties began in second grade, when his schoolmates
bullied and rejected him and talked about him behind his back. Such attitudes and
behaviours were new to Philip and he suffered confusion and hurt, saying: ‘I didn’t
understand. Why did they do those things to me? (…) They shut me out all the time.
So gradually I got like problems. After a while I didn’t dare speak with them’. Conse-
quently, Philip stopped approaching others and spent more time alone.
Philip viewed the social-network meetings as a chance to ‘learn to be more social.’
Over time, he began to feel that ‘people [were] not rude or cruel,’ that they ‘respect
me and what I say’. He valued the meetings as a place where people spoke with him
about his problems, adding that his mother or brother can ‘help [me] talk in case [I]
don’t find anything to say’. We will return to Philip and his story, bringing with us
notions of the ethicality of change drawn from Bakhtin and Levinas.
Change is Our Becoming in the Ethical Event
Both Bakhtin and Levinas have impacted on a variety of disciplines and practice fields
(Aasland, 2007; Bell & Gardiner, 1998; Linell, 2009). The dialogism of Bakhtin has
had substantial impact in mental health practice and psychotherapy. Within self-
psychological perspectives, Hermans (2001, 2003), drawing on Bakhtin, has contrib-
uted to a theory of a dialogical self and corresponding approaches in psychotherapy.
Within cognitive analytical psychotherapy, Leiman (1997, 2012) and Pollard (2011)
have contributed to the approach through Bakhtinian perspectives. Within family
therapy, Bakhtin has inspired the emphasis on the multi-voiced (polyphonic) aspect
of therapeutic meetings (Anderson & Gehart, 2007; Rober, 2005, 2010). In the
Open Dialogue Approach we find a social network-oriented approach focusing on a
multi-voiced, transdisciplinary collaboration involving those concerned by the crises
(Holmesland, Seikkula, Nilsen, Hopfenbeck & Arnkil, 2010; Seikkula, 2011a; Seikk-
ula & Arnkil, 2006).
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Levinas also has inspired an ethically grounded intersubjective psychology (Gantt
& Williams, 2002; Kunz, 1998). Further, initiatives in therapy and mental health
practice influenced by Levinas explicitly put ethics at the core of the therapeutic
encounter both in family therapy (Andersen, 2001; Larner, 2008) and individual
psychotherapy (e.g. Dueck & Goodman, 2007). Some present the implications of
Levinas’ ethics as incompatible with a modern approach based on diagnoses and cor-
responding methods (Dueck & Parsons, 2007). Another possibility we see in Larner’s
(2011) suggestion that Levinasian relational ethics can offer a context for an integra-
tive practice in which knowledge and methods from modern approaches is included
in assuming responsibility.
Bakhtin and Levinas—similarities and divergences
Several scholars view the intersubjective perspectives and ethics of Bakhtin and Levin-
as as similar as regards their understanding of how the subject arises through dialogue
in the interpersonal encounter (Erdinast-Vulcan, 2008; Gardiner, 1996; Murray,
2000; Nealon, 1997). In the view of both Levinas and Bakhtin, subjects only arise in
the intersubjective realm. The encounter with the other determines the subject as it
arises as an answer to the other(s) in the event of this encounter. The subject cannot
be described as if it existed prior to, and independent of, the interpersonal encounter.
According to Erdinast-Vulcan (2008) both Levinas and Bakhtin outline ‘the ethical
subject as living on borderlines, facing the other, irremediably vulnerable and infi-
nitely responsible’ (p. 43). The animating ‘force’ at this borderline is the fundamental
alterity of the other. When my consciousness and my actions are seen as responses to
the other, this presupposes his/her fundamental alterity. I will never coincide with the
other. Still this fundamental alterity of the other sustains the ongoing dynamics of the
encounter, and, through this, the ongoing dynamics of myself as subject. Both Bakh-
tin and Levinas would claim that without this alterity of the other, dialogue ends.
This responsiveness in the roots of our being is of an ethical nature, as the demand
for a response exposed to us inevitably is a demand to recognise, respect and take care
of the other. In this way they both offer an ethics built not on our universal same-
ness, but on our radical alterity (Erdinast-Vulcan, 2008, p. 49).
Apart from these similarities, fundamental divergences are also noted. In a com-
parative analysis Nealon (1997) notes that the ‘radical asymmetrical intersubjectiv-
ity’ of Levinas emphasises my approach towards the other and his strangeness, to
the point where I give myself for the other. My movement towards the other is
with no return. On the other hand Bakhtin in his intersubjectivity aims at return-
ing to oneself in an enriched way. Nealon concludes by favouring Levinas for his
ethics as an ethics of the other in which he breaks with Western subject-centred
philosophy. Erdinast-Vulcan (2008) points to the way Bakhtin’s dialogism gives an
understanding of ethical intersubjectivity within discourse and thus offers an ethics
of reciprocity; whereas Levinas moves beyond discourse and rejects any notion of
reciprocity, as he sees responsibility for the other as an unconditional subjection
before the demand of the other. Erdinast-Vulcan favours the ethics of reciprocity
within discourse that Bakhtin offers. A third possibility is presented by Murray
(2000) who regards them as complementary where Levinas provides a metaphysical
account of the other that is missing in Bakhtin’s architectonic structure of dialo-
gism (p. 148).
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To some extent we follow Murray in his view that Levinas may supplement Bakh-
tin in the way his ethics points to the otherness of the other as the centre of gravity
in dialogue.
As indicated, both Bakhtin and Levinas put responsibility at the heart of human
existence. Further, they both put language and our speaking at the core of this respon-
sibility. This responsibility, answered in speaking, is awakened by the alterity and
unknown of the other. We now explore the ethicality of our ongoing becoming
through the following headings: I become as responsible, I become in speaking, I
become in answering the unknown.
The ethicality of ongoing becoming
I become—as responsible. In Bakhtin’s (1993) early work ‘Toward a Philosophy of the
Act’, he puts the ongoing event of being at the heart of our existence in the world. Our
existence is explored in terms of the way we act within life as an ongoing event. The
literal meaning of the Russian word for act—postupok—is ‘the taking of a step’
(Bakhtin, 1993; s. xix). Thus, my existence is my ongoing steps into life as an event.
Bakhtin gives an account of the way these steps are answers to the event and to the
others in this event. In this way, Bakhtin places answerability at the core of human
nature (Bakhtin, 1990, 1993). We become as an answering act, and Bakhtin incorpo-
rates our thoughts, feelings, and actions in this act:
‘[E]verything in me – every movement, gesture, lived-experience, thought, feeling –
everything must be such an [answerable] act or deed; it is only on this condition that I
actually live, that I do not sever myself from the ontological roots of actual being’
(Bakhtin, 1993, p. 44).
In what way is this answerability, through which I become, ethical? Bakhtin says
the event of being appears to us as an ‘ought’ (p. 30). I am obliged to act. And fur-
ther; I am obliged to act in a way that answers the other and creates a space for his/
her answers in this joint event. The ought, and thus my answerability, is in this way
ethical, and no one can replace me and my answerability in the event. This is what
Bakhtin identifies as my non-alibi in Being (1993, p. 42). This ought which I cannot
escape elicits my acts, my steps and my existence.
Levinas perhaps even more radically puts the other at the core of the event of
being, when he says that responsibility to the other precedes my freedom and my sub-
jectivity (Burggraeve, 2007; Levinas, 1998; Murray, 2000). For Levinas (1969), the
consciousness is always a moral consciousness. In what he calls ‘the first event of the
encounter’ (p. 199) the strangeness, nakedness, and vulnerability of the other haunts
me and demands something from me—it demands my response. This ethical obliga-
tion to the other is the predisposition of my being. Levinas puts the face in the midst
of this event. It is the face of the other that exposes a vulnerability that interrupts and
animates me as my thoughts, feelings, and actions are responses to the demand of this
vulnerability.
I become—in speaking. From both Levinas and Bakhtin we can draw an understand-
ing of language as ethical in its origin. Language and our speaking originate with a
concern for the other. For Bakhtin, language gradually became the centre of his phi-
losophy. He continues his exposition of an ethical subject; only now the word takes
place of the act from his earlier works (Morson & Emerson, 1990). Bakhtin found in
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the dynamics of the word also the dynamics of human existence. Thus, Bakhtin
(1986) may say that our being is semantic not psychological (p. 170).
Bakhtin describes our consciousness in terms of utterance, speech and voice. Our
consciousness has its dynamics in our voice, including both what we say and what we
leave unsaid, as inner speech. In this way our consciousness has its life in language
and dialogue. The ethical is inherent in the dynamics of language as our voice, our
utterances and words (both the said and the unsaid) arise to answer other’s voices.
Our consciousness, as inner and outer speech, is born on the threshold of the
other. A threshold constituted in language as dialogue. On this threshold our exis-
tence is at risk:
‘To be means to communicate. Absolute death (non-being) is the state of being unheard,
unrecognized, unremembered (…). To be means to be for another, and through the
other for oneself. A person has no internal sovereign territory, he is wholly and always
at the boundary’ (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 287).
In this way our saying, our voice, and thus our being, is first for others and then
for ourselves.
Levinas delineates an essential distinction between the saying and the said, where
saying precedes the said (Levinas, 1998). The said pretends to identify what is, falling
within ontology, whereas the saying is our turning toward the other, our approach
toward him/her and therefore saying is ethics. In this ‘ethical event of communica-
tion’ (Levinas, 1987, p. 125), our saying is the origin of our becoming. Our
existence, as saying, originates in the space opened by the other. My speaking, my
words, have their roots in the vulnerability of the other revealed to me in his face. As
Levinas puts it:
‘I accept without question that speaking is the most godly thing in us. The word is
breath par excellence, from the beginning formed for, and turned to, the Other, my life
for the Other’ (Levinas in Goud, 2008, p. 25).
My consciousness is brought to life when the other touches me (i.e., in the saying)
even before I recognise him, before I represent him in language (i.e., in the said ) and
thus see him as something. When the other’s speaking touches me, I am brought in
contact with his singularity. My response lies not in establishing knowledge of him,
which would violate his singularity, but in my approach towards him, in my saying.
We live by the word—not in the said as knowledge, but in the saying as ethics.
This may imply that the ethical dynamics of change unfolds within this event as
an event of saying and not in the said as some product of this event. In the said we
are too late—the becoming event has passed by.
I become—answering the unknown.The answering act that ‘I am’ is born through
doubt (Bakhtin, 1993; p. 45; see also Bender, 1998). The ought that appears in the
event imposes doubt about how to conceive the event and doubt about how to
answer, how to take a step into it. In this doubt is incorporated a fear that my act, or
my word, could suppress others in the event—not giving them place. This makes the
doubt an ethical doubt. Therefore, one might say that our consciousness is doubt
(i.e., the presence of many possible answers). My answer in the event is an answer to
‘everything that is not I’ (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 42), acknowledging that the other, as a
unique being in his alterity, is the centre of my answerability.
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Paradoxically, within the event of being, the roots of my existence lie in the other
where the other in his/her alterity is unknown to me. Bakhtin’s concept of outsideness
points to the way the other always brings a surplus to my being and I bring a surplus
to his/her being. The reciprocal fundamental outsideness vis a vis the other secures
the ongoing productiveness of life as an event. The fundamental alterity, the funda-
mental outsideness with respect to others prevents ‘the merging of all into one’ (Bakh-
tin in Pollard, 2011; p. 9). This unknown of the other which I am obliged to answer
gives my being a fundamental ‘open-endedness’ and ‘unfinalizability’ (Bakhtin, 1984).
Hence, our existence is always in the hands of others, always ‘yet to be determined’
(Bakhtin, 1993; p. 36, see also Shotter, 2012). We are constantly in this undeter-
mined ethical leap, answering the unknown, and ourselves waiting to be answered.
Perhaps even more radically, Levinas suggests that there is a danger that the pri-
mordial and fundamental strangeness of the other from which we emerge may escape
our efforts to describe and understand human existence. This danger of totalisation in
knowledge is where the infinite and otherness of the other is forgotten and rejected.
Knowledge suppresses alterity. From the Levinasian perspective, any attempts to
understand the person (psychological, sociological, biological, philosophical and so
forth) may lose sight of this origin, which is situated in that which we cannot grasp.
Our existence is an answer to this unknown of the other that is beyond knowledge.
As Levinas (1998) says there is an ‘abyss in proximity’ (p. 93). He suggests an
event that is, metaphorically speaking, on the edge of an abyss, the origin of our exis-
tence. We become by approaching what always escapes; the unknown and the absence
that approach me in the other are the source of my becoming. In this paradoxical
tension and movement between proximity and distance, contact and apartness,
presence and absence, grasping and losing the other, we become while our conscious-
ness is constantly awakened by an interruption of our being. The subject itself is ‘a
rupture, an interruption of being’ (Levinas in Goud, 2008; p. 5). The otherness of
the other, the trace of vulnerability in his/her face, which escapes my attempts at
grasping it, is the starting point of my becoming. ‘The psyche’, Levinas says, ‘is the
way a relationship between uneven terms, without any common time, arrives at a
relationship’ (Levinas in Bevis, 2007, p. 324).
Metaphors in Bakhtin and Levinas
As we see, metaphors originating in the domain of the sensing–expressive body’s pres-
ence in the world are key components of the philosophies of Bakhtin and Levinas
(see also Bevis, 2007; Erdinast-Vulcan, 2008; K€upper, 2000). In Bakhtin we find
metaphors such as the voice, being heard, borderline and threshold; whereas in Levinas
metaphors such as face, approach, touch, proximity, and distance appear. The metaphor
of the face (Levinas) and of the voice (Bakhtin) is core to their notions of responsibil-
ity. Interestingly, Erdinast-Vulcan (2008) noted that the face and the voice may be
understood both literally and metaphorically. Consequently, words such as face, voice
and also boundary, proximity, and distance for Bakhtin and Levinas have literal sig-
nificance as physical, bodily phenomena. At the same time, such words tend towards
a metaphorical significance that surmounts the literal, blurring the line between
non-metaphorical and metaphorical meaning. Their textual use of face and voice orig-
inates literally in the lived body, suggesting both Levinas and Bakhtin be considered
philosophers of the body. At the same time, the meaning exceeds the literal; the face
means the face and more. Or as in Bakhtin, ‘having a voice’ and ‘being heard’ means
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exactly that: being able to make the oral sound with my body and other people hear-
ing, with their bodily senses, the sound that I produce. At the same time, ‘having a
voice’ and ‘being heard’ clearly contain meanings that point to aspects of being
human in relation to the world and others in the world that exceed their literal mean-
ings. Their metaphors point perhaps, not to aspects ‘outside’ the physical body, but
to experiences of embodied life that are beyond what can be captured in literal
speech.
Levinas and Bakhtin each in their own way use metaphors to create an inter sub-
jective landscape of an ongoing ethical event with its own dynamic of change. Our
existence comprises our continuing steps into this landscape of ethical event-ness
opened by the other. This landscape is embodied and is both literal and metaphori-
cal.
Change as Ethics and Philip’s Experiences
Our impression is that Philip describes his difficulties in a manner that consistently
refers to interactions with others in his life. What we refer to as ethical–relational
terms appear to be at the core of how he expresses his difficulties. He tells us about
how his difficulties began with bullying, rejection, exclusion, talking behind his back,
personal violation and fear of making a fool of himself. He tells us that this resulted
in him becoming ‘like unsocial’, ‘afraid to make a fool of himself’, ‘has to be very
careful of what he says to others’, and ‘gave up approaching the others’.
The way he is pushed away and the way he himself withdraws from relationships
could be characterised as an ethical–relational breakdown. This breakdown in turn
leads to what we could term mental health difficulties of emotional, cognitive, and
existential complexity. In line with the way both Levinas and Bakhtin describe the
subject as constantly emerging from the intersubjective encounter, one might say
that Philip’s descriptions disclose the way his existence is at stake: In these difficult
experiences, Philip’s being, consciousness, and acting in the world are losing their
roots.
Similarly, Philip uses positive ethical–relational terms when he describes how
things have improved: ‘dare talking to the others’, ‘say what I want to friends’, ‘they
answer me’, ‘they were kind to me’, ‘be more social’, ‘be praised’, ‘be comforted’.
In what seems to be the heart of Philip’s story of his way into his difficulties, he
tells us: ‘If I went over to some friends, they would leave. In some way they didn’t
want me to be with them. And then they suddenly began to talk behind my back. It
wasn’t any fun.’ When we ask how he felt about this, he answers by posing a ques-
tion, which he repeats in a tone of emotional despair: ‘I felt like “Why would they
do such a thing?” I just felt inside like “Why would they do such a thing?”’. And
when he makes an attempt to enlarge his description of how he felt, he utters some
striking words: ‘It’s like being killed’.
The meaning of Philip’s surprisingly powerful words reverberate and expand
within the framework of Levinas and Bakhtin through Bakhtin’s (1984) words: ‘abso-
lute death (non-being) is the state of being unheard, unrecognized, unremembered’
(p. 287).
When we ask Philip about what he calls ‘the problems inside’, strikingly, his
answers do not point to something within him, but instead to his relationships with
others: ‘It’s … It may be some things that I want to say, but then I don’t say them.
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After all, because I think ‘maybe he thinks what I say is weird’. That’s something that
is inside of me’. What Philip refers to as ‘problems inside him’ seems intrinsically
intertwined with his relationships to others, and these difficulties in relation to oth-
ers give rise to difficult emotions, thoughts, and doubts on how to act. He describes
his ‘problems inside’ as related to whether he feels he can dare to speak to others
or not.
Philip goes on to tell us that his schoolmates talked behind his back, and that this
hurt him and made him feel uncertain and rejected. Talking behind someone’s back
might be a way of using language that also represents a relational–ethical breakdown.
As discussed earlier, both Levinas and Bakhtin regard language as ethical in its origin,
meaning that in our saying and in our words reside a concern and care for the other.
Following this, we might say that talking behind someone’s back, as in Philip’s expe-
rience, represents a use of language that departs from its ethical origin.
According to Bakhtin, all language is dialogical, yet he points to how persons in
their utterances can pretend not to be dialogical, and in this way their speaking may
take on a monological character (Morson & Emerson, 1990). Monologue is dialogue
rejecting its dialogisity. In such attempts to detach utterances from dialogue, language
no longer answers the other. Language now represents the other and language
becomes a monological attempt to deny place to the other. ‘Monologue pretends to
be the ultimate word’, expecting no answer (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 293).
In this way, Philip’s experiences may be seen as being met by a monologising
approach or a ‘misuse of language’ that strikes him in his very existence. He is
deprived of a place to speak and consequently he is deprived of a place to become.
Without a place in dialogue, he is lost in the distortion of language: ‘I always was
afraid to say something. When I saw that they behaved that way to me, that nearly
all of them were like that, then I didn’t dare do anything’.
Both Philip and his brother find the network meetings helpful, and his brother
says that the conversations ‘seem to have left traces in him. I absolutely think there
should be more meetings. He has to talk about things; he must put things into
words…because through that he can find himself a bit’. In our last meeting with Phi-
lip, we asked how he is now, compared to when he sought help almost a year ago.
He says: ‘It’s easier now. I can tell my friends what I want and they answer me in a
good way. They really answer me if I ask them something. And they no longer talk
behind my back. So I feel better now’. Phillip changes in the event of speaking and
being answered.
Concluding Reﬂections
If change is an ethical event, we can consider therapy in mental health practice as an
ethical event. This ethicality lies not simply in the norms and principles of the profes-
sional or the institution. Changing practices within mental health are ethical from
‘within’ the basic dynamics of the encounters.
Within a modern scientific paradigm, core elements in the changing enterprise of
mental health practice would be the professional’s knowledge and skills within a
process of identifying the problem/disorder and applying appropriate treatment
modalities. Within a postmodern paradigm, the changing enterprise in mental health
as we find it are in approaches derived from social constructionism; knowledge and
meaning is still in focus but is now seen as contextual co-constructions. One might
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say that knowledge, as a co-construction of reality, still remains the ‘layer’ that is of
most interest. The ethical aspects we have addressed in this article point to a primor-
dial ‘layer’ prior to knowledge and meaning. A ‘layer’ of language prior to and more
fundamental than the linguistic representation or co-construction of reality: the ethical
in the event of saying. Mental health practice in this way may have its fundamental
dynamics in the saying, not in the said; in the answering, not in the answers; in eth-
ics, not in ontology or knowledge.
What is the challenge to the family therapy practitioner in this? If therapy is an
ethical event, this may lie in letting this dynamic of change emerge through a pres-
ence of sensitivity and ethical responsiveness. The form of the communication, not
the content comes into our focus.
Thus Philip and his family took new steps during their search for help—steps that
brought them into new encounters within the social network meetings. Philip said he
felt respected in the meetings and that he could say what he wanted without being
afraid of making a fool of himself or being rejected. Perhaps then, the main challenge
for the practitioner is to respond to aspects of the encounter that lie in the unknown
or in the otherness of the other. This sensitivity is of an ethical kind, as it is a kind
of readiness to care for and respect the other through one’s response.
In the case of Philip, his experience of being respected and heard in the meet-
ings could be because of the practitioner’s way of receiving his presence and his
utterances through responses—not simply because of the content of what he said,
but perhaps more importantly because his saying was an exposure of his vulnerabil-
ity. Perhaps the value of the practitioner’s answers lay not in their content, but in
their hospitality, welcoming and respectfulness. The practitioner is perhaps chal-
lenged to put himself/herself, his/her knowledge and even his/her judgments on
hold, and to be sensitive to the particularity of the other and of each meeting as a
singular event.
The starting point in eliciting our right action as a therapist is perhaps not found
by asking an ontological question such as: ‘What is this?’ or ‘What is this for the cli-
ent?’ or even: ‘How can we together make meaning of this?’ The crucial aspect may
be found in asking an ethical question such as: ‘How can I find a way to step into
this encounter in a way that creates space for other participants to take their steps?’
Perhaps Tom Andersen is referring to the ethicality of the encounter residing in
the unknown, in his concept of ‘neither–nor reality’ (Andersen, 2007; Seikkula, 2008).
He proposes that our approach to some aspects of reality, the visible non-moving, is
to identify them as ‘either–or’. We approach other aspects of reality, the moving and
visible, by asking for a multiplicity of possible perspectives as ‘both–and’. Andersen
suggests a third interesting aspect of reality: the moving but invisible, the ‘neither–nor
reality’; something is happening, we are in touch with something that we cannot
grasp, yet it is fundamental to our being.
How are we able to describe and appreciate such a ‘neither-nor’ aspect of reality?
Tom Andersen (2007) points precisely to the metaphors to assist us in getting a
feeling of what we are in touch with (p. 83). Our steps into this landscape of ethical
‘neither–nor’ is perhaps what Shotter (2003) metaphorically describes as ‘the ‘move’
to an orchestrated, indivisible world of ‘invisible’ presences’ (p. 17). It is in this world
of becoming through metaphor and dialogue, that change in therapy can be under-
stood as an ethical event.
Tore Dag Bøe et al.
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Abstract Within mental health research, the promise of
exploring the lived experience of those affected is
increasingly acknowledged. This research points to the
significance of social aspects. The present study is part of a
series of qualitative studies exploring network-oriented
practices in southern Norway. The aim of this study was to
explore the social dynamics of change related to adoles-
cents in psychosocial crises. From the perspective of lived
experience the study focused changes related to the ado-
lescents’ ways of existing in various social arenas. Data
from qualitative interviews with adolescents receiving help
from a mental health service, persons in their social net-
work, and the practitioners involved were explored through
a dialogical phenomenological–hermeneutical process.
Two co-researchers, on the basis of their own experience
with mental health problems, participated throughout the
research process. Concepts from the thinking of Mikhail
Bakhtin, Franc¸oise Dastur, and John Shotter were used as
interpretative help. Main theme: change is the event of
becoming through movement in Ethical Time and Space.
Two dimensions, conceptualized as Ethical Space and
Ethical Time, were identified: (1) ‘‘A place for me’’ or ‘‘No
place for me’’ (Ethical Space), and (2) Before-Event of
anticipation—Event of movement—After-Event of expe-
rience (Ethical Time). Four aspects within these dimen-
sions emerged: (1) an opening Before-Event: offering
space for my movement; (2) a closing Before-Event: not
offering space for my movement; (3) a life-giving After-
Event: the experience of being valued; and (4) a life-
deteriorating After-Event: the experience of being deva-
lued. The results are discussed in relation to other studies
investigating how bodily responsiveness is at the core of
human becoming.
‘‘She Offered Me a Place and a Future’’—condensed meaning, not
exact quote.
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Introduction
Before, I always sat alone in the corridor. At this new
school, if I go out and see someone sitting on the
bench I can just go over and talk to them. I know
them.
Perhaps the simple way in which this girl speaks of
change in her life captures an essential aspect of what
mental health is about: our experience of being able to
move—or not—in relation to others. The aim of this study
was, precisely, to explore the social and existential
dynamics of change related to people in psychosocial crises
from the perspective of lived experience. Both ways into,
and out of, psychosocial difficulties are explored in terms
of ways of being in the world together with others. Qual-
itative interviews form the empirical basis for the study.
Phenomenological and hermeneutical perspectives from
Mikhail Bakhtin, Franc¸oise Dastur, and John Shotter were
included in the exploration to reveal aspects in the material
that otherwise could have gone unnoticed and to concep-
tualize the findings. The context of this study was mental
health services in the southern part of Norway, where
dialogical and network-oriented practices in mental health
have been implemented and developed over the two last
decades (Ulland et al. 2013). In 2010, a program for
research and development related to dialogical practices
titled ‘‘Dialogical collaboration in Southern Norway’’ was
established and provided an opportunity for a series of
qualitative studies of dialogical practices (e.g., Bøe et al.
2013; Grosa˚s 2010; Hauan 2010; Holmesland et al. 2010;
Lidbom et al. 2014; Ropstad 2010; Ulland et al. 2013),
from which this study emerged.
The Perspective of Lived Experience
Mental health can be, and has been, explored from various
perspectives; for instance, through observation and the
descriptions of the observer or through neurobiological
approaches made possible by technological advances. Such
approaches may represent a kind of ‘‘externalism’’ related
to mental health (Wifstad 2008) that fails to include the
subjective perspective found in the lived experience or the
lifeworld of the ones suffering (Kogstad et al. 2014). From
this recognition of a bias, leading to a neglect of people’s
lived experiences of suffering and recovering, we now see
a growing body of studies from the perspective of lived
experience (e.g., Borg and Davidson 2007; Davidson et al.
2008; Wickstrom 2009; Hartzell et al. 2009, 2010). The
concept of lived experience, as used in the phenomeno-
logical and hermeneutical tradition, derives from Husserl’s
concept of ‘‘erleben’’ which literally means ‘‘living
through something’’ (Van Manen 2004), and Husserl’s
point was exactly that the phenomena of the world could
not be investigated from any position outside (externalism),
only from the way that they were experienced or ‘‘lived
through.’’ Accordingly, describing and understanding
mental health should start with an exploration of the way
that it is experienced.
Previous Research
Reviews of studies of mental health and recovery from the
perspective of lived experience clearly point to the sig-
nificance of social aspects (Leamy et al. 2011; Tew et al.
2012). When persons describe their difficulties it seems to
be about their lives and experiences in various social are-
nas: family, work, friends, school, and society (Topor et al.
2006, 2011). These difficulties could be interpreted as
resulting from a feeling of not being recognized or as
struggles for recognition (Andersen and Svensson 2012;
Eriksen et al. 2012) or in terms of feeling outside, or denied
access to, social arenas and relations (Davidson et al.
2001). Furthermore, their difficulties could be experienced
as a kind of ‘‘not knowing how to make their way in the
world,’’ like ‘‘being stuck’’ or in an ‘‘impasse’’ (Davidson
et al. 2010, p. 101 and p. 105), or like ‘‘living in a maze’’ or
a ‘‘social death’’ (Biong and Ravndal 2009, p. 8), or
‘‘feeling like a stranger in life and places’’ (Andersen and
Larsen 2012), or ‘‘not belonging’’ (Mezzina et al. 2006).
These experiences may be in the realm of personal rela-
tions (Topor et al. 2006) or in the sense of being outside
society, deprived of civil rights or citizenship (Andersen
and Svensson 2012; Mezzina et al. 2006; Tew et al. 2012).
Experiences and accounts of recovering similarly point
to the significance of relations and social aspects (Schon
et al. 2009; Topor et al. 2006) and the qualities of the
communication they are involved in (Gurega˚rd and Sei-
kkula 2014; Lidbom et al. 2014). In one study, Mezzina
et al. conclude that recovery could be seen as an ‘‘ongoing
interpersonal and social process’’ in which the significance
of others can be expressed in terms of ‘‘standing alongside
me,’’ ‘‘being there for me,’’ or ‘‘doing more for me’’
(Mezzina et al. 2006, pp. 63, 68, 77). Choosing carefully
whom to turn to for help and doing this through making
sound judgments about persons available is described as an
important aspect (Topor and Di Girolamo 2010). Addi-
tionally, material aspects such as having a home and hav-
ing an occupation and money are directly or indirectly
conditions for access to social arenas that are important
during recovery (Borg et al. 2005; Topor et al. 2011) and
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the significance of dealing with crises in an everyday life
context is emphasized (Borg and Davidson 2007; Winness
et al. 2010). Social aspects also seem to include being able
to accept support from family, friends, or services as well
as being able to give support to others (Schon et al. 2009).
Some of these studies suggest that mental health perhaps
should be understood as a relational and social concept
belonging to the interpersonal, social, and political domain
(e.g. Andersen and Svensson 2012; Mezzina et al. 2006;
Strong et al. 2014).
This research indicates that further advances in mental
health could be made through exploration of (1) the social
aspects of processes of change related to a variety of social
arenas, (2) practices where social network perspectives are
included, and 3) the social–relational aspects of the phe-
nomena that we refer to as mental health difficulties. This
was the origin of the present study.
Theoretical Perspectives
In the following, we will give a brief sketch of some ideas
and perspectives that helped us in our process of inter-
pretative analysis. In a ‘‘corporeal turn’’ (Sheets-Johnstone
2009) within the phenomenological tradition, we find the
recognition of the body as a point of departure in exploring
human living and experience. Bodily movement and the
way that we experientially relate to the movement, our own
and others, should be at the core of investigations into
human existence (Gallagher 2012; Gallese 2005; Merleau-
Ponty 2011; Quillman 2012; Sheets-Johnstone 2011;
Shotter 2010).
Movement involves the categories of time and space,
and phenomenological perspectives suggest that time and
space should be examined in terms of ‘‘something’’ that we
experience and not ‘‘something’’ objectively (pre)given
(Dastur 2000; Merleau-Ponty 2011; Tucker 2013). Time
and space are ‘‘experiential realities’’ that emerge from our
interplay with the world and others in the world (Sheets-
Johnstone 2009). In this study, such a notion provided the
possibility of interpreting the descriptions of the respon-
dents as experiences of movement taking place in what we
conceptualize as Ethical Time and Ethical Space. The term
‘‘ethical’’ here refers to an experiential quality (This will be
further explicated when presenting the findings).
Bakhtin (1993) puts ‘‘the ongoing event of being’’ (p.
17) at the core of his thoughts on human living, and we
become, he says, as we participate in ‘‘being-as-event’’
through our ‘‘answerable acts’’ (p. 39). We have explored
change as event, and the accompanying ethical aspects, in a
previous study suggesting that change may be described as
an ‘‘ongoing ethical event’’ (Bøe et al. 2013). Drawing on
the intersubjective ethics of Emmanuel Levinas and Mik-
hail Bakhtin, we suggested that responsibility (Levinas)
and answerability (Bakhtin) seem to be fundamental in the
dynamics of change. We become, and change, in a realm of
intersubjective responsiveness as our acts, thoughts, and
feelings are adressive in nature and originate as responses
to others. This responsive becoming take place in the event.
Becoming happens.
Dastur (2000), in her article ‘‘The Phenomenology of the
Event,’’ explores these relations between the event, time,
and human becoming. The experience of time ‘‘as a suc-
cession of events,’’ she says, ‘‘requires (…) not to be
completely immersed in time’’ (p. 179), and human
becoming is found in a multifaceted kind of temporal
relating: to what has happened (the past), in experience,
and to one’s own possibilities (the future), in anticipation.
‘‘We never experience the events of life as contempora-
neous,’’ she says, ‘‘only (…) in a past time, in the mode of
‘‘it happened to me’’ (p. 186), in a kind of ‘‘After Event’’ (p.
183). Lived experience emerges in delay, relating to what
(just) happened.
Shotter (2005, 2012) explores the significance of relat-
ing to the future, to what is about to happen, and suggests
that we orient ourselves, and move, from sensing and
imagining the continuance of what is happening. Our
movements are conditioned by this sense of the future
through ‘‘action guiding anticipations’’ (Shotter 2005).
Shotter refers to a quote from Kierkegaard: ‘‘We live for-
wards, but only understand backwards’’ (Shotter 2012,
p. 136). He adds to this that the steps that we take seem to
gain their landscape from a judgment in which our sensing
and imagining of what is ‘‘yet to be,’’ the future, are
included. We move and relate to movements both by
‘‘looking’’ backward (relating to the past) and by ‘‘look-
ing’’ forward (relating to the future).
These perspectives seemed to reveal significant aspects
of the experiences described by the adolescents and were
used as aids in organizing and interpreting their lived
experiences.
Aim of Study and Research Questions
The aim of this study was to explore the social dynamics of
change related to people in psychosocial crises from the
perspective of lived experience. The focus was on life as
lived and experienced in various social arenas (and con-
sequently, the impact of the services was not a key focus).
The goal was to contribute to an elaborated understanding
of the social dynamics of change in a language deriving
from lived experience, useful to advances in practice. Our
focus was on change related to mental health in general,
although respondents were recruited from cases related to
adolescents.
The study originated in the following questions. How do
people in psychosocial crises describe their experiences of
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the way that their lives are changing? How can their
experiences help us to understand the social aspects of the
dynamics of change related to mental health?
Methodology
Methodological Approach: Participatory Research
In this study, two co-researchers (Ruud Lindvig and Za-
chariassen) participated, on the basis of their own experi-
ences with mental health difficulties, throughout all stages
of the research process. This kind of involvement is used
increasingly in mental health research as a means of
attaining findings that are as relevant, valid, and useful as
possible (Borg and Kristiansen 2009; Moltu et al. 2013;
Rautiainen and Seikkula 2009; Telford and Faulkner 2004;
Trivedi and Wykes 2002; Wallcraft 2012; Wallcraft et al.
2009).
A group of adolescents with experience of mental health
difficulties helped us both in our preparation of the study
and in the process of interpretation through discussion of
preliminary findings. Practitioners involved in the selected
cases and the researchers met regularly, and preliminary
findings were discussed, and the practitioners, in this way,
contributed to the process of exploring the material. This
participatory research design provided an ongoing two-way
opportunity: the participants’ contribution to the explora-
tion and validation of the study, and the study’s ongoing
contribution to practice and participants (Borg et al. 2012).
This process of including practitioners and adolescents
went on parallel to the methodological procedure described
below.
Participants
The participants in this study were eight adolescents aged
from 16 to 18 years in psychosocial crisis and seeking help
from the mental health care system for the first time, and
receiving network-oriented help. The adolescent chose one
or two additional respondents from his or her family/social
network. Practitioners involved were included as respon-
dents in the final interview in each case, together with the
adolescent (in two cases, such an interview was not con-
ducted). In total, we interviewed the eight adolescents
referred to, four mothers, one father, two friends, one sister,
and six practitioners; i.e., 22 respondents in all.
Creating Data: Procedures
Twenty-eight interviews, lasting from 1 to 2 h, were
conducted by the first author and the two co-researchers.
The participants were interviewed individually or together
with the respondent(s) one person in from their network,
according to their own choice. Interviews took place in
settings chosen by the participants: at Sorlandet hospital or
in the respondent’s own home. In two cases, only one
interview was conducted. In six cases, a series of inter-
views were carried out over a period varying from 7 to
12 months. To get a close sense of the bodily expressive
way in which the participants responded, interviews were
videotaped and transcribed by the first author. A diary note
(five pages long) that was obtained from one of the ado-
lescents was included as data.
Procedure of Analyses and Interpretation
The first author and the two co-researchers formed a
working group in the process of analysis and interpretation,
and met regularly.
First, we read through the texts with ‘‘deliberate nai-
vete´’’ (Kvale and Brinkmann 2009), to get a sense and first
impression of the material. Impressions and ideas were
discussed, and notes were taken.
In a second step, following Sullivan’s (2012) dialogical
approach to qualitative data analysis, we reread the texts
and identified ‘‘key moments’’ throughout the material. A
key moment, as suggested by Sullivan, is a sequence of
utterances/voices in which we find a significant meaning
unit, and the key moment is characterized by its readiness
for further responses (p. 72). Key moments were chosen
from a mix of what we were struck by, what seemed most
interesting, what seemed particularly laden with feelings
and importance to the respondent, and what seemed most
relevant to the research questions.
Attention to what seemed laden with feelings was an
important aspect when choosing key moments. Drawing on
Bakhtin, Sullivan puts the concept of ‘‘voice’’ at the core of
his analytical approach. In the voice, a point of view is
expressed through intonation. ‘‘Intonation is the sound that
value makes’’ (Sullivan 2012, p. 44), and ‘‘such intonation
gives discourse a textured feeling of heaviness and lightness
and also colour as discourse becomes lived experiences’’
(italics added). When exploring lived experiences, focus
cannot be reduced to the said (content); the saying
(expressiveness) must be included. Consequently, attention
was given to the emotional aspects and expressiveness of
what was said: tone of voice, bodily gestures, pace in
speaking, and so on.
In a third step key moments were analyzed by the first
author, identifying units of meaning and possible themes.
Following Sullivan (2012), and drawing on Cresswell
(2012), the analysis of key moments also included identi-
fying the conditions in which meaning and possible themes
emerged, in terms of addressees (who is talking to whom),
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discourse genre (in what kind of language/words), emo-
tional aspects (with what feelings), bodily dynamics (with
what gestures and movements), and ethical aspects (how
are expressions answered). This helped us to take into
account how lived experience, meaning, and dialogue are
interconnected.1 Preliminary suggestions of themes were
discussed with co-researchers, and key moments were
reread in light of emerging ideas.
Following a dialogical hermeneutical approach (Cres-
swell and Smith 2012; Sullivan and McCarthy 2005), we,
in a fourth step, included theoretical perspectives (intro-
duced above) as interpretative help in the explorative–
analytical process. These outlined steps were not chrono-
logical but rather an ongoing multivoiced process of co-
creation of meaning in which theoretical perspectives were
included.
Ethical Considerations
In this study, adolescents and persons in their network were
invited to be interviewed about sensitive aspects of their
lives. It was emphasized that respondents should not feel
compelled to speak about themes uncomfortable to them.
The interviews could have a character close to therapeutic
conversations, and clarifying the role of the interviewers
was important. Possible emotional difficulties from inter-
views could be followed up in the ongoing mental health
care initiatives. The study was approved by The National
Committee for Medical and Health Research Ethics.
Findings: Emerging Through Explorative Dialogues
In the following, we present the emerging findings in a
way that also displays the dialogical explorative process.
This is done through three steps. First, we describe some
sensitive points in our exploration that were decisive for
the findings. Key moments from two of the cases are
introduced. Then, we present the findings in terms of a
main theme, two dimensions, and four aspects, and
display these in a diagram. Finally, we explore these
findings further through key moments from a third case
by pointing to a possible dynamics of change in the
girl’s movements into, and out of, her difficulties.
Although they are presented through key moments cho-
sen from three cases, the findings emerged on the basis
of all data.
Meeting Phillip2
Movement in Relation to Others’ Movement: A Matter
of Life and Death
Phillip, a 16-year-old boy, told us about how he was bullied
in school.
I walked over to some friends, but they walked away.
I felt, ‘‘Why would they do such a thing?’’ (said with
a raised voice and in a tone of despair). It was vio-
lation. It hurt so much it was hardly bearable. It was
like being beaten to death.
This utterance stood out as particularly laden with feelings
and made a strong impression and moved all three of us (First
author and co-researchers). We again and again returned to
this key moment in our discussions.3 We saw that this utter-
ance turned out to be a possible prism in our search for crucial
experiences in the respondents. Phillip’s description of this
event is about movement, it is about movement in relation to
the movement of others, it is about his experience of move-
ment. And—perhaps the reason that his utterance is so strik-
ing—he experiences this event as a matter of life and death.
This key moment, along with movement and experience
of movement as key concepts, we brought with us in a new
reading of all the chosen key moments, and we found that
many of them involved movement in relation to the
movements of others.
Meeting Monica
Dimension 1: A Place for Me—No Place for Me (Ethical
Space)
In our ongoing exploration of the material, we found some
concepts that helped us to find a way of revealing aspects
related to movement and experiences of movement that
seemed to run through many of the chosen key moments.
From Monica, we got the idea of the first dimension that
we found essential in many of the adolescents’ experi-
ences: Ethical Space: A place for me—No place for me.
Monica told us that at a difficult time in her life, she had a
quarrel with her foster parents, and they ‘‘called me some
very nasty things,’’ which ended with her foster father’s
voice saying, ‘‘You have totally disappointed me. Please
leave.’’ Monica remembered this very well and felt it as
very hurtful; it was like a betrayal, she says, and continued
as follows.
1 These dialogical conditions were taken into account in our process
of analyzing but are only indirectly part of our presentation of results.
2 All names are pseudonyms.
3 This utterance and the story of Philip are elaborated on in our article
‘‘Change is an ongoing ethical event: Levinas, Bakhtin and the
dialogical dynamics of becoming’’ (Bøe et al. 2013).
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Because then I went to my room and I sat there for, I
don’t know how long I…, and I cried and I cried and
I cried and I cried. I didn’t know where to go. You are
in so much pain that you consider taking your own
life. It’s a bit difficult to explain.
She expresses her despair in ‘‘I didn’t know where to
go.’’ She felt that the ones that she always knew she could
go to were no longer there for her. This feeling literally
turned into thoughts of killing herself. It was a matter of
life and death socially, existentially, and bodily. Monica
also expressed the way that things turned for the better,
after a period of withdrawing from her social life, in terms
of having someone to go to and somewhere to go: ‘‘My
friend, she got me out of my shell. She is my rock.’’ Her
friend offered her a space in which she could move, we
might say. ‘‘She gave me safety,’’ she said.
This spatial feeling of ‘‘a place for me’’ or ‘‘no place for
me’’ seemed to articulate a dimension at the core in the
adolescents’ experiences of their difficulties and ways out
of difficulties. We conceptualized this as Ethical Space to
capture the way that their sense and experience of this
space seemed to have a fundamental relational and ethical
quality. This space, as an experiential reality, seemed to be
ethically laden by the way that others valued or devalued
their movements. To move and feel alive, they needed this
life-giving Ethical Space to be offered to them by others.
Conversely, not being offered this space seemed to lead to
a feeling of deterioration, space taken away from them.
Interpretative Help from Bakhtin, Dastur, and Shotter
Dimension 2: Before-Event of Anticipation—Event
of Movement—After-Event of Experience (Ethical Time)
The second dimension, Ethical Time: Before-Event of
Anticipation—Event of movement—After-Event of experi-
ence, was articulated with help from some of the theoretical
ideas and concepts presented above. We found that the
concepts of ‘‘event,’’ ‘‘anticipation’’ (of the future in
advance), and ‘‘experience’’ (of the past in delay) seemed to
offer a possible understanding of how movements, and the
experience of movements, were interrelated. These concepts
were found in the writings of Bakhtin, Dastur, and Shotter, as
briefly presented above. Following Bakhtin, the episodes, or
events, that the respondents describe are about their partic-
ipation in ‘‘being-as-event’’, and what is at stake is their
ongoing becoming through responsiveness to these events.
Dastur (2000) points to a diachronicity in our becoming. Our
experience is always in delay, in what we could name an
After-Event of experience. In this After-Event, the adoles-
cents relate to the movements of the event, their own and
others. Furthermore, following Shotter (2005, 2012), their
movements seem to be formed from, or made possible (or not
possible), by their anticipations of the future, their sense of
the continuance of the movements of the event. This we
could name, as a correlate to the After-Event of experience,
as a Before-Event of anticipation.
This temporality of Before-Event—Event—After-Event
seemed to articulate another essential dimension at the core
of the adolescents’ descriptions of their experiences. We
conceptualized this as Ethical Time to capture the way that
their sense of time seemed to have an ethical and relational
quality. This Ethical Time, as an experiential reality,
seemed to emerge from the valuing responses of others,
experienced in the After-Event or anticipated in the Before-
Event. To move and feel alive, they needed this life-giving
time to be offered to them by others. Conversely, experi-
ence and anticipation of devaluing responses led to a
feeling of deterioration, time taken away from them.
In the case of Phillip and the episode in the schoolyard,
the Before-Event of anticipation is his sense of the situation
that he is moving into, of the landscape that he enters, in a
way prior to the event itself. He approaches the others in
anticipation that he will be met and answered by them.
This makes Phillip’s steps toward the others possible. Then
there is the Event of movement itself, his actual bodily steps
in the schoolyard and the actual movement away by the
other children. Then there is the After-Event of experience,
in which Phillip is left with a difficult, hurtful feeling.
It is at this point that we would like to summarize and
organize conceptualizations of ethical time and ethical
space that we have so far used in making sense of Philip’s
and Monica’s experiences:
Main theme: change is an event of becoming through
movement in Ethical Time and Ethical Space. Two
dimensions: (1) A place for me—No place for me: Ethical
Space, and (2) Before-Event of anticipation—Event of
movement—After-Event of experience: Ethical Time.
Within these two dimensions, we suggested four aspects:
(1) an opening Before-Event—offering space for my
movement, (2) a closing After-Event—not offering space
for my movement, (3) a life-giving Before-Event—the
experience of being valued, and (4) a life-deteriorating
After-Event—the experience of being devalued.
This could be displayed as a multifaceted ‘‘event of
becoming through movement’’, as in the following dia-
gram4 (Fig. 1).
4 We present such a diagram with hesitation. Life and experience
cannot be captured in any diagram. As said in a meeting with the
adolescent-group when we presented a version of this diagram: ‘‘Life
isn’t just this, it’s always so much more’’. Still the youths
participating in this meeting related many of their own experiences
to the display of the diagram. Our hope is that it may reveal, or point
to, aspects of living, despite the fact that it may hide other aspects of
living.
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This diagram offer a possible way to display the many
aspects involved in ‘‘the event of becoming through
movement’’ in which the dynamics and processes of
change happen. It is not a model that shows the dynamics
by identifying a certain process of change with a starting
point and an end point. Rather, it displays the multifaceted
nature of the ongoing event of becoming in the sense that
the adolescents are always in movement, always in the
After-Event of what (just) happened and always in the
Before-Event of what is about to happen—all at the same
time. Its meaning is to show the way that this event of
becoming through movement is constituted at the threshold
between past and future, at the threshold between ‘‘me’’
and others, and at the threshold between what happens and
my relation to what happens.
We have already met Philip and Monica. We now turn
to Katherine to explore these findings further by pointing to
the possible dynamics of change in the girl’s movements
into, and out of, her difficulties.
Meeting Katherine
The Way they Said My Name—I was Frozen Out—I
Became a Zombie
A primordial line of becoming in human living may be
found in the way that we are welcomed by others in the
world and through this are called and allowed to move; as
an opening Before-Event—offering space for movement. In
a way, we see this in what Katherine tells us. When she was
a child, she says, ‘‘I could just walk around and talk to
people.’’ Her movements find space within her anticipation
of being offered space (opening Before-Event) and the
experience of being responded to and valued (life-giving
After-Event), but then, something happens that she does
not quite understand. The other children at school look at
her, speak to her, and move in a way that she, at first, does
not understand. She remembers this as follows.
[C]ruel looks and mocking words and me walking
past the row of boys in the class, who quickly jerk
away when they see me… Their faces twisted in
disgust. (From diary note)
‘‘It hurt,’’ she says; it was ‘‘like being frozen out…, but I
couldn’t tell anyone, because, in a way, it wasn’t any-
thing.’’ This may be identified as A closing Before-Event:
not offering space for my movement. In this episode, we see
the way that it starts from the bodily way that the others
respond to her approach (movement). The future, and her
space to move in, gradually closes through the voice, the
gaze and the movement of others. She is left with an
experience (of what she now names as bullying) that was
obscure but hurtful, and we may say that it was an expe-
rience of being devalued, A life-deteriorating After-Event:
An opening Before-Event:
oﬀering space for
my movement
Event of movement:
I move - others move
- in response
A life-giving Aer-Event:
the experience of
being valued
A closing Before-Event:
not oﬀering space for
my movement
A life-deteriorang Aer-Event:
the experience of
being devalued
A place
Ethical 
space
No
place
Ethical me
Fig. 1 Event of becoming through movement
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the experience of being devalued. The vital conditions for
moving and feeling alive were deteriorated, taken away
from her.
She said, ‘‘I withdraw to my own world’’ and ‘‘I stopped
talking to them, because if I did, my last hope that they
might like me could be lost.’’ She withdraws somewhat
from the threshold of senses and relations to others and
into her own secluded imagination to protect herself. At
school, she is a ‘‘Zombie,’’ she says, one of the living dead.
I couldn’t say a word. I feel excluded and alone. I feel
that I am in a completely wrong world. I don’t belong
at all. Everything in me turns inwards. Nothing in me
manages to go outward to meet other people. As if I
am behind walls of glass that shut out all air, colors,
light. I promise myself never to become visible again,
never to speak if no one asks me to, never to look into
the eyes of others, never to attract any attention,
never to hope, ‘cause it just hurts if you fall. (From
Diary note)
In seeing and hearing and being seen and heard, she may
lose her existence through the devaluing gazes, voices, and
gestures of others; still, in not seeing and hearing and not
being seen and heard, she also may lose her existence
through the lack of valuing responses. She is on the verge
of life, on the verge of falling out of the movements of life.
She Asked Me to Go With Her—I was About to Say No—
But I Said Yes
Katherine describes her need of, and search for, a way out
of this withdrawal to her imaginative ‘‘preferred world.’’
She wants to take the steps into a living in which she again
manages and dares to meet others. She says, ‘‘I wish I
didn’t need any of them,’’ but she realizes that she does. In
terms of our findings, she is searching for An opening
Before-Event: offering space for her movement and hoping
for a life-giving After-Event: the experience of being val-
ued. As a kind of turning point, Katherine describes an
episode when she walked over to a new girl at school and
started to talk with her. ‘‘Suddenly, I just did it’’ in a
‘‘bang’’ as she says, somewhat despite herself. What hap-
pened? She found, perhaps, a kind of invitation coming
from this girl; she sensed hints of possibilities in the way
that the girl moved and expressed herself, and these
inviting hints perhaps played along with a readiness in
Katherine. She now could respond in a way that was pre-
viously impossible when her decision was to withdraw
totally from the world of others. Her attention now was
more open to others, and she was able to discriminate
between invitations and absence of invitations in others’
demeanor. It seemed to happen, in terms of our findings, as
an ethical event of becoming, located on the threshold
between her and the other girl, constituted by moving and
sensing. Change in a way originated in the other girl, or on
the threshold between them. An invitation was given, an
opening was offered, and Katherine noticed and was ready
to say ‘‘Yes’’.
And it is questions like that I look for, that they
would take the initiative so that I dare to go with
them. And some days later, another girl asked me and
then, kind of, again I was about to say ‘‘No,’’ I felt
that but managed, kind of, not to do it, and actually to
say ‘‘Yes.’’
To move and to be visible became a possibility. The
world, as a future, as a place—also for her—is again
offered, and she enters it.
Discussion
The findings of this study seem to be in accordance with
other studies based on lived experience by the way that
they point to the significance of social aspects (e.g.,
Mezzina et al. 2006; Tew et al. 2012; see also the ‘Intro-
duction’). When we ask the adolescents to describe their
difficulties and their ways into and out of these difficulties,
they tell us about happenings and experiences in relation to
others in various social arenas. Based on their descriptions,
we have presented a possible elaboration of what these
social aspects are ‘‘about’’ by describing a ‘‘landscape of
becoming’’ in which experience, movement, time, space,
relations, and ethics interrelate. Although the adolescents
do not necessarily use these words, it seems that their hurt
and joy, hope and hopelessness, shame and pride, fear and
safety, trust and mistrust, regret, anxiety, self-condemna-
tion, guilt, sense of belonging, sense of meaning, love, and
suffering…, all seem to emerge within this interplay, on
this threshold between the themselves and others in the
events of life. In this multifaceted ongoing event of
becoming, their ‘‘movement-generated experience of
aliveness’’ (Sheets-Johnstone 2011, p. 124) may arise—or
not arise, we might add, as we have seen in the adolescents’
experiences of ‘‘being a zombie,’’ ‘‘being beaten to death,’’
and ‘‘having nowhere to go.’’ Perhaps what we refer to as
mental health could best be described and understood in
terms of the way that feelings and experiences appear in the
life-deteriorating or life-giving qualities of this interplay.
In our study, we found how profoundly movements of
the body were present in the adolescents’ descriptions. This
is in accordance with other studies pointing to the way that
human existence perhaps is best described in terms of
bodily responsiveness (Gallagher 2012; Quillman 2012;
Sheets-Johnstone 2008, 2009). Sheets-Johnstone, through
her studies, shows how human movement should be
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considered to be ‘‘our mother tongue’’ (2008, p. 213) and
explored as language, because movements are expressive,
semantically laden, gestures directed toward an addressee
(2009, p. 223). This implies that movements are relational
and meaningful. What we feel, and even what we believe
and value, have a dynamics congruent to the dynamics of
movement in this domain of intercorporeality. ‘‘[I]t is not
only that one moves, but how one moves that is doxically
and axiologically meaningful, for others as for oneself’’
(Sheets-Johnstone 2008, p. 212). What we corporeally
express in our movements, Sheets-Johnstone says, is
authenticated and affirmed through the responsivity or lack
of responsivity of the addressee of the movement (2009,
p. 231). Bodily movements are evaluative vis-a`-vis others
and in that sense ethical.
Our study revealed how the descriptions of movement
included various aspects and modalities: movement is the
movement of the body (mine and others) directed toward or
away from something/someone, as indicated by the
respondents in ‘‘He moved toward me’’ or ‘‘I wanted to
flee.’’ Further movement is the body’s expressiveness, such
as tone of voice, facial expression, gestures, and posture,
as indicated in ‘‘The way she said ‘Hey’’’ or ‘‘The way they
looked at me.’’ Movement also is a physical activity, like
heartbeat, sweating, and bodily tension and so on, as in ‘‘I
felt sick,’’ ‘‘My heart thumped,’’ or ‘‘I felt a rush in my
body.’’ All these aspects and modalities were involved in
‘‘the event of becoming through movement’’ as described
by the respondents. We also find the significance of these
various aspects of movement, and the way that they are
interwoven in communication, in studies from therapeutic
settings. Quillman (2012) pointed to the way that aspects
like the tone and pitch of our voice, facial expressions, and
the posture of our body, seems to be of more importance in
therapy than the content of what is said. We respond to our
sense of these bodily appearances of others through our
own bodily responses, ‘‘as in the rumble of panic in the
belly when we feel dropped by another or the flush of
pleasure in the chest when we feel seen, accepted, loved’’
(Quillman 2012, p. 5). This seems to be in line with the
way that our study revealed not only the relation between
movement and change but also the way that there is ethi-
cality (‘‘feel dropped,’’ ‘‘feel seen’’) in the midst of sig-
nificant events of movement.
We also found that metaphors deriving from the domain
of bodily movement were important in many of the
descriptions of the respondents (although the line between
literal and metaphorical meaning often could appear
blurry), as in ‘‘They froze me out’’ or ‘‘Everything in me
goes inward, nothing goes outward,’’ and even the expe-
rience of space, as in ‘‘A place for me—No place for me,’’
focused on in this study, could be identified as having both
literal and metaphorical meanings. This indicates that
experiences that we can identify as social or existential are
given meaning through everyday language related to bodily
experiences (see also Bøe et al. 2013). Furthermore, this
may also indicate that the connection between our bodily
living and what we identify as social or existential aspects
of living are more interwoven than is usually thought.
If we again turn to Bakhtin (as presented by Sullivan
2007) he expresses precisely this fundamental dependence
on others. Social and existential aspects are inherent in the
bodily event of the encounter: We ‘‘find ourselves’’ through
the ‘‘emotional–volitional tones of others’’ (p. 112) and
only these tones of the voice, the look, the gestures, the
movements of others ‘‘can’ vivify’ or give life to the self
from outside the self. This cannot be done alone’’ (p. 113).
Philip, cut to the bone, expresses it as follows.
Now I can go to them, they say ‘Yes’, they don’t say
‘No’. So now I’m much better.
Strengths and Limitations
It seems that the participation of the coresearchers, and the
way that they used their personal experience, facilitated a
focus on the most significant aspects of the lives of the
respondents, both during interviews and in reading the
material. We also invited other adolescents and practitio-
ners to share their thoughts related to presentations of
preliminary ideas in our interpretative process of analysis.
This, we suggest, may have contributed to valid and useful
findings, and to keeping close to practice and lived expe-
rience. Our study made use of certain theoretical perspec-
tives that revealed certain aspects of the material but
probably concealed others.
Conclusion
What may be the implications for practice? Perhaps we
again could turn to Shotter. He suggests that research is not
about ‘‘‘seeing’ finished patterns existing objectively in the
world’’ but rather is about finding possible articulations of
‘‘unfinished processes still open to many different kinds of
expressive realizations’’ (Shotter 2014, p. 4). In this way,
research can offer, in Shotter’s terms, a kind of ‘‘showing
sayings’’ from which we can re-relate, re-orient and ‘‘see’’
‘‘possibilities previously unnoticed’’ (pp. 4–5). The find-
ings presented in this study—deriving from the language of
the adolescents and molded by us in a further dialogue with
theoretical perspectives—perhaps may show possibilities
previous unnoticed in the lives of people in psychosocial
crisis as well as within the initiatives of the practitioners.
We could point out that this study indicates the importance
of developing initiatives with a network orientation where
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people from within the social arenas of the client are
included. The significance of what happens in various
social arenas should be recognized. The study also indi-
cates that attention should be given to bodily aspects,
expressiveness and responsiveness, within the encounters
facilitated by the services. Through our bodily expres-
siveness, we may offer an Ethical Time and Space—a
place and a future—that may be life-giving to those we
meet.
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‘Through speaking, he ﬁnds himself . . . a
bit’: Dialogues Open for Moving and Living
through Inviting Attentiveness, Expressive
Vitality and New Meaning
Tore Dag Bøe1, Kjell Kristoffersen1, Per Arne Lidbom2, Gunnhild Ruud
Lindvig2, Jaakko Seikkula3, Dagﬁnn Ulland1, and Karianne Zachariassen2
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Studies exploring the experiences of recovering from mental health difficulties show the significance of social and relational
aspects. Dialogical practices operate within the realm of social relations; individual perspectives are not the primary focus
of attention. The present study is part of a series of qualitative studies from southern Norway, exploring dialogical prac-
tices and change from the perspective of lived experience and in relationship with network meetings. Two co-researchers,
who themselves had experienced mental health difficulties, were part of the research team. Material from qualitative inter-
views was analysed through a dialogical hermeneutical process where ideas from Emmanuel Levinas and Mikhail Bakhtin
were used as analytical lenses. Six interdependent dimensions emerged from our interpretative analysis, comprising three
temporal dimensions (1. Dialogues open the moment, 2. Dialogues open the past, and 3. Dialogues open the future) and
three dimensions of speaking, which operated across the three temporal dimensions (4. Ethical: Dialogues open through
inviting attentiveness and valuing, 5. Expressive: Dialogues open for new vitality, and 6. Hermeneutical: Dialogues open for
new meaning). These dimensions were incorporated into one main theme: Dialogues – beginning by others being invit-
ingly attentive – open for moving and living. The way the findings point to change events as an opening for movement –
‘moving in’ as if from the outside, and ‘moving on’ as opposed to being stuck – are discussed in relation to other studies.
We conclude by suggesting that the salient point of change-generating conversations is in the ethics of being invitingly
attentive, and such conversations should take into account multidimensionality, that relates to the past and the future.
Keywords: mental health, dialogical practice, lived experience, change, Bakhtin, Levinas
Key Points
1 When mental health initiatives generate change the lived experience of those involved is core to the pro-
cess. Consequently, investigations into change should also consider how mental health difficulties, and the
encounters that help, are experienced.
2 The lived experiences of the participants in dialogical practices reveal the way network meetings are com-
plex and multi-dimensional events in which change occurs.
3 Three dimensions of Speaking seem to be involved in the dialogical event of change: Beginning with ethics
(others being invitingly attentive to us), that allow expressivity (the interplay of body and senses), which cre-
ate meaning (new ways of perceiving and understanding one’s possibilities).
4 Another three dimensions of Time seem to be involved in the dialogical event of change: Dialogues open the
past, dialogues open the present and dialogues open the future. The dialogue of the present makes it possible
to re-relate to past and future, which in turn changes ways of existing in the dialogue of the present.
5 When describing and understanding change, attention to the ethical and expressive dimensions of dialogue
seems to be just as important, or even more important than attention to the dimension of meaning.
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He must speak. . . . He must put things into words, he must . . .’cause through speaking
he finds himself . . . a bit. (Mona, Phillip’s sister1)
In this way, the sister of a struggling boy shows the significance of what takes
place in the network meetings. ‘Finding oneself through speaking’ seems to characte-
rise the respondents’ descriptions of the dialogues in the network meetings. So what
then were the dynamics and aspects of these speaking events, and in what ways could
speaking bring about change in the lives of those involved? This article explores these
questions.
Change related to mental health has been widely investigated from various per-
spectives. In a previous study (Bøe et al., 2013) we suggested that what we refer to as
mental health difficulties, and ways out of such difficulties, could be explored in terms
of the conditions existing in the ongoing events and encounters of life. Using the
ideas of both Bakhtin and Levinas to explore a single case, we argued that change
could be seen as an ongoing ethical event. In another study (Bøe et al., 2014) based on
the same empirical data as this present paper, we investigated change through focusing
on adolescent experiences of a number of important social arenas. We found that the
experience of being able to move – or not – in relation to others seemed to be a sig-
nificant aspect.
Such approaches to the question of change in mental health may differ from what
we might refer to as causality models. Shotter’s ideas on change can highlight the
inherent problems with causality models. He points to the way change may be
approached from two opposite points of departure: either we take ‘what is invariant
as . . . primary subject matter’ and this makes change problematic or we take ‘activity
and flux as primary’ and this makes stability problematic (Shotter cited in Jaworski &
Coupland, 1999, p. 22). Causality-models of change seem to take invariance and sta-
bility as primary and consequently understand change in terms of how identifiable
and stable objects or states are changed through manipulation by some specific force.
With the alternative starting point, where movement and flux is primary, change is
always already ‘there’ and the challenge lies in finding ways to describe and under-
stand this constantly changing reality of living, which may be ‘vague, fluid, unspecific,
diffuse, slippery, ephemeral, elusive or indistinct, . . . changing like a kaleidoscope, or
the intra-mingling streams of hot and cold air in the atmosphere’ (Shotter, 2014, p.
112).
In this article we adhere to such ways of exploring human living. We investigate
the lived experiences of the participants in network meetings and explore these experi-
ences through some ideas from the dialogical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas and
Mikhail Bakhtin.
Network dialogues initiated by mental health services to help adolescents with psy-
chosocial difficulties in the southern part of Norway have been explored. In southern
Norway dialogical and network-oriented practices have been implemented, developed
and explored over the last two decades (Bjørnstad, 2013; Bøe et al., 2013; Grosas,
2010; Hauan, 2010; Holmesland, Seikkula & Hopfenbeck, 2014; Holmesland et al.,
2010; Lidbom et al., 2014; Ropstad, 2010; Ulland, Andersen, Larsen, & Seikkula,
2013). Dialogical practices, in this context, refer to initiatives that include persons in
the social network of the help-seeker through network meetings, where the aim is to
facilitate change-generating dialogues. In other words, it is something more than iden-
tifying and solving problems.
Tore Dag Bøe et al.
168 ª 2015 Australian Association of Family Therapy
PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Recent studies exploring the experiences of people engaged in the process of recovery
from mental health difficulties show the significance of relational, social and contextual
factors in the processes of change and recovery (Tew et al., 2012; Topor, Borg, Di Girol-
amo & Davidson, 2009; Topor & Denhov, 2012). Reviews (Leamy et al., 2011; Tew
et al., 2012) found that connectedness, both social and interpersonal, was one of the sig-
nificant factors in recovery, common to all the included studies. They further indicated
that ‘hope and optimism about the future’ that emerge from ‘hope-inspiring relation-
ships’ characterised the experiences of recovery (Leamy et al., 2011, p. 448). These
‘hope-inspiring relationships’ are found both inside and outside mental health services.
Studies within family and couple therapy challenge the belief that the method is
the main component in change, and point to the need for qualitative studies that can
help to identify the multitude of factors involved in the processes of change (e.g.,
Blow et al., 2009; Blow, Sprenkle & Davis, 2007; Pinsof & Wynne, 2000; Sprenkle
& Blow, 2007). Inquiry into dialogical practices offers a way forward for such studies.
Dialogical practices operate in the domain of social relations and are theoretically
based on the assumption that human existence itself is relational and that the dynam-
ics of the subjective coincide with – or even are preceded by – the dynamics of the
intersubjective (Seikkula, 2011b; see also Erdinast-Vulcan, 2008). Responsiveness is
understood as the core of our existence and this displaces the ‘locus’ of interest from
the subjects and privileges the interplay between subjects (Bøe et al., 2013).
Dialogical practices have been widely described from theoretical perspectives (e.g.,
Rober, 2005; Seikkula, 2011a, 2011b; Shotter, 2010, 2012) and their clinical applica-
tion to couple and family therapy (Brown, 2012; Rober, 2008, 2010). The effective-
ness of dialogical approaches has also been documented, in particular the Open
Dialogue Approach developed in Finland (e.g., Aaltonen, Seikkula & Lehtinen, 2011;
Seikkula et al., 2006; Seikkula, Alakare & Aaltonen, 2011). The dialogical aspects of
change in family therapy and network meetings have been explored through analysis
of the dynamics and qualities of the actual dialogue. Seikkula (2002), through
sequence analyses of conversations, found that in good outcome cases the clients
seemed to have both interactional and semantic dominance (as opposed to therapists
having dominance), the dialogue took place in a symbolic language (as opposed to
indicative language) and in a dialogical form. Seikkula, Laitila and Rober (2012) used
the concepts voice, words/action, position and sequentiality as analytical tools in explor-
ing a family therapy session. Their findings included the suggestion that the voices in
the investigated sequence created room, not only for a new story but also for new
positionings between the interlocutors.
Fewer studies have explored such practices from the perspective of the lived experi-
ences of the participants involved; both in terms of the experience of the meetings
specifically and how such initiatives are influencing their lives. Piippo and his col-
leagues used qualitative interviews to explore the ‘Integrated Network and Family Ori-
ented Model,’ which includes mental health services with both municipal social
services and relatives in multidisciplinary treatment (Piippo & Aaltonen, 2004, 2008,
2009). Patients reported that the facilitated collaboration created an atmosphere where
one felt free to say what one ‘wanted and needed to say,’ and this led to an experi-
ence of release from a ‘single, inevitable interpretation’ and opened up a variety of
possible views (Piippo & Aaltonen, 2004). The participation of relatives led to mutual
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trust, increased a mutual feeling of safety and opened the way for new kinds of good,
supportive, relationships in which fears for the future diminished, and worries and
burdens decreased (Piippo & Aaltonen, 2009).
Another study of a dialogical, network-oriented approach, Open Dialogue, con-
firmed the significance of including social networks (Brottveit, 2013). Based on obser-
vations and interviews with clients, persons from private networks and practitioners,
Brottveit suggested that the significance of the meetings is not found by asking ‘What
was said?’ but rather by asking ‘What happened?’ He proposed that what happened
was not a matter of ‘speaking about life’ but a matter of ‘speaking in life.’ What hap-
pened was experienced as real and felt in the body in terms of physical and emotional
responses. Brottveit’s study posited that change did not require a detour via insight or
understanding because what happened in the meetings had a direct impact on the
‘social reality’ of the participants’ lives (ibid). The aspects facilitating change were
‘direct and dynamic’ and not ‘reflective and representational’ (p. 246) because the sig-
nificant others were present.
Holmesland and her colleagues (Holmesland et al., 2010, 2014) also explored
the Open Dialogue approach through interviews with professionals and observations
of the network meetings. They found that this transdisciplinary approach called for
a process of role transformation by the professional; a release of role by reducing
the impact of therapeutic skills and allowing the help-seeker to guide the communi-
cation with the aim of increasing their activity. The professionals pointed to the
way that self-disclosure of their own thoughts, feelings and physical reactions
seemed to promote the dialogue and personal growth of the participants (Holmes-
land et al., 2014).
Lived experiences related to participation in network meetings were explored in
terms of inner dialogues in some recent studies in southern Norway (Grosas, 2010;
Lidbom et al., 2014; Ropstad, 2010). Lidbom et al. (2014) showed how the
dynamics of the interplay between inner and outer dialogues contain a richness of
different experiences that opened the way for new meanings to emerge in the con-
versation.
These studies, exploring change through the way in which it is experienced, show
how therapeutic network dialogues operate within the social reality of the participants,
and call for further investigation of the complexities of the dialogical and social
dimensions of mental health initiatives. This is the aim of this article.
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
Dialogical philosophy is important in the evolution of dialogical practices, including
ideas from Mikhail Bakhtin and Emmanuel Levinas. The influence of such perspec-
tives on the present study was somewhat ambiguous. On the one side the researchers
were inspired by dialogical theory from the outset and this consequently formed and
informed the explorative process.2 On the other side, the aim was to explore the lived
experience of those involved in such practices without any predefined theoretical or
conceptual ‘lens.’ In the course of our exploration and analysis (see Method section
below), we discovered that some specific ideas from Emmanuel Levinas (1906–1995)
and Mikhail Bakhtin (1895–1975) could shed a useful light in our further exploration
of the material. These ideas we want to briefly outline.
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Levinas: speaking—an ethical, expressive and hermeneutical event
Levinas, in his essay ‘Sense and meaning’ (1996) describes the way that contemporary
philosophy seems to analyse language and speaking by using two aspects: the hermeneuti-
cal structure, which gives meaning to what we perceive, and the expressiveness of the
subject, which find its forms through the gestures, signs and words of language. ‘Has a
third dimension not been forgotten?’ Levinas asks, and he introduces a dimension
that he suggests is most fundamental, the ethical: ‘the direction toward the other . . .
whose presence is already required for my cultural gesture of expression’ (p. 52).
This ethical directedness, prior to expressivity and hermeneutics, is responsibility for
the other; responsibility as a ‘saying prior to anything said’ (Levinas, 1974, p. 43,
cited in Peperzak, 2013, p. 46; see also Bøe et al., 2013).
Human expressions take on forms within a culture, whereas the ethical responsibil-
ity is pre-cultural – evoked by a primordial vulnerability revealed in the face of the
other. For Levinas ethics precedes and is a precondition for language, and ethics pre-
cedes and is a precondition for the subject. He thus breaks with a Kantian ethics
where the free and rational subject comes first and where human freedom and ratio-
nality, in turn, makes the subject a moral subject. In other words, Levinas claims that
subjectivity is not prior to responsibility, it is responsibility that evokes subjectivity,
or, as he puts it, ‘I find myself facing the Other’ (p. 52). For Levinas, subjectivity is
an ethical event (Biesta, 2014). This event makes us express ourselves to the other in
dialogue, and through this we give meaning to the world, in the hermeneutical dimen-
sion of speaking. This means that the way that the world appears to us as meaningful
is not an intuition prior to the language of dialogues but is, from the very beginning,
a ‘narrative, verbal, linguistic intentionality’ (Levinas, 1987, p. 110). Only through
dialogue – speaking – does the world become meaningful to us.
These three dimensions of speaking (ethical, expressive and hermeneutical) seemed
to reveal significant and relevant aspects in the respondents’ descriptions and offered a
way to conceptualise and understand the many aspects of their experiences.
Bakhtin: speaking—words answering the past and waiting for future answers
In his essay ‘Discourse in the novel,’ Bakhtin (1981) explores the dynamics of human
existence through the dynamics of the spoken word. He describes the way that the
spoken word is a response to what has already been said, the past. Yet, it is also
formed for, and in anticipation of, answers that are yet to come, the future. Bakhtin
(1981) writes, the word is ‘forming itself in an atmosphere of the already spoken’ (p.
279) and has the ‘taste’ (p. 293) of previous uses. At the same time, the spoken word
positions itself in relation to past uses, as an answer. Furthermore, he writes, the word
is ‘oriented toward a future answer-word’ and is, in fact, ‘determined by that which
has not yet been said.’ The word is formed by the future answering word that it
‘needs, . . . anticipates and structures itself towards’ (p. 279). Thus human existence is
found in expressivity within the event of speaking. This expressivity is a responsive
leap between past and future: we borrow our words from others (past), adding on our
own ‘emotional-volitional tone’ (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 36) (moment), and this tone is
determined by anticipation of future answers (future).
Bakhtin (1981) goes on to write about the word as a path; going from the speak-
ing subject to the objects of the world. This path goes through a ‘complex play of
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light and shadow’ found in dialogues where the objects of the world are both ‘high-
lighted’ and ‘dimmed’ (p. 277). This path to the world goes through a ‘dialogical agi-
tated and tension-filled environment of alien words, value judgements and accents,
weaves in and out of complex interrelationships’ (p. 276). This means that words
found in dialogue are our path to the world, but this path both reveals (dialogue
opens) and conceals (dialogue closes) the world from us.
This offers three temporal dimensions of dialogue: Through the spoken word in
1) the moment, we relate to 2) the past and 3) the future. We found this framework
helpful as it seemed to reveal significant aspects that characterised the respondents’
experiences.
AIM OF STUDY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The aim of this study was to explore change from the perspective of lived experience
and its relationship with network meetings within dialogical practices in mental
health. To do this, we formed the following research questions:
1. How do the participants in dialogical practices describe their network meeting
experiences?
2. On the basis of these descriptions, how can the dynamics of change in dialogical
practices be described and understood?
METHODOLOGY
The study is exploratory in nature and based on a dialogical research design (Borg,
Karlsson, Kim & McCormack, 2012; Cresswell, 2012; Shotter, 2014; Sullivan, 2012;
Sullivan & McCarthy, 2005). Our exploration was phenomenological-dialogical, fol-
lowing Cresswell (2012) who proposes that phenomenological experience is ‘linguisti-
cally constituted’; that experience emerges in and through dialogue. Furthermore, our
exploration was hermeneutical-dialogical in the sense that possible ways of understand-
ing emerged through dialogues and an ongoing back-and-forth process with the mate-
rial (Shotter, 2014).
In this process theoretical ideas influenced our perception of the material, and the
material influenced our ways of including theoretical ideas. In qualitative analysis, data
do not speak for themselves, rather they are mixed with theory in unpredictable ways
(Sullivan, 2012, p. 65). Themes related to the research questions emerged from this phe-
nomenological-hermeneutical-dialogical explorative process and these themes were fur-
ther developed using certain ideas from Bakhtin and Levinas (presented above).
Participatory research
This study created dialogues between many participants. Data originated in the dia-
logues with the respondents in interviews. The following reading and analyses of data
included a multitude of additional dialogues and participants. Throughout the study,
two of the co-researchers (Ruud Lindvig and Zachariassen) participated on the basis
of their own experiences with mental health difficulties, and together with the
first author they formed a core-group in the planning and implementation of data
collection, follow up readings and analysing the material. The involvement of persons
with experiential competence provides a means to add new perspectives and to make
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research more relevant, valid and useful (Beresford, 2007; Telford & Faulkner, 2004;
Trivedi & Wykes, 2002; Wallcraft, 2012; Wallcraft, Schrank & Amering, 2009).
A participatory, dialogical research design (Borg et al., 2012; Shotter, 2014) pro-
vided the opportunity for ongoing interactional influence between research and prac-
tice. The research team shared and discussed ideas and impressions from our reading
of the material in regular meetings with practitioners and also with a group of adoles-
cents with experience related to mental health difficulties.
Respondents
Respondents were selected among all referrals to a child and adolescent mental health
care unit at a hospital in Southern Norway over a limited period. Inclusion criteria
were: 1) aged 16–18 years of age; 2) not in receipt of prior specialised mental health
care; 3) those who were offered help through network-meetings. The included adoles-
cents selected one or two additional respondents from their social networks, and the
practitioners involved were included as respondents in the final interview in each case.
In total, we interviewed 22 respondents: eight adolescents, four mothers, one father,
two friends, one sister, and six practitioners (Table 1).
Creating data
Twenty-eight interviews, individually or together with the person from the adolescent’s
network, were carried out. In six cases, a series of interviews was carried out over periods
ranging from 7 to 12 months. In the interviews we asked about concrete and significant
events and experiences – both difficult and good – related to family, friends, school,
work, being alone and the network-meeting. Interviewers specifically were encouraged
to pursue what seemed to matter most to the adolescent. The interviews were video-
taped, and this gave the opportunity to take bodily expressivity into account.
From a dialogical perspective, experience is not ‘something’ prior to dialogue
which is already ‘there’ to be communicated. Rather it is through the expressions that
happen in dialogues that experiences emerge and take form (Cresswell, 2012). Our
interviews with the respondents could be seen as such experience-forming dialogues.3
This implies that when we ask about the experiences of the network meetings, these
experiences are (re)formed and created by the dialogue of the interview. Nevertheless,
our focus is on the network meetings as changing events rather than the interviews.
Interviews were conducted in Norwegian and all interviews were transcribed in
Norwegian by the first author, with the inclusion of descriptions of bodily expressivity
where considered relevant. For the purpose of this paper, quotes were translated into
English by the first author in co-operation with a Norwegian speaking colleague with
a masters degree in English.
Ethical considerations
This study invited respondents to be interviewed about sensitive aspects of their lives
and it was emphasised, in writing and verbally, that respondents should not feel com-
pelled to speak about themes with which they were uncomfortable. Any emotional
difficulties experienced as a result of the interviews were able to be followed up by
practitioners in their existing clinical teams. All participants gave their qualified
informed consent. In this paper all cases are de-identified. Hard-disks with data and
copies of transcribed text were securely stored. The study was approved by the Norwe-
gian National Committee for Medical and Health Research Ethics (2010/2973-1).
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Analyses
The first author and the two co-researchers read all the transcripts in a thematic and
affect-sensitive exploration. Shotter (2014) suggests that feelings be included when
exploring data, ‘beginning with feelings rather than calculations . . . the sense of a
‘something’ of importance and value here.’ Sensitivity to feelings was directed both
toward the researchers own feelings and feelings noticed in the respondents.
In a first step we read through the texts with ‘deliberate naivete’ (Kvale & Brink-
mann, 2009) to get a sense and first impression of the material. We then, in a second
step, re-read the material, identifying and using key moments, in accord with Sullivan’s
(2012) dialogical approach to qualitative data analysis. Key moments were chosen not
only on judgements about the thematic relevance of what was said to research questions,
but also affective, bodily and interactional aspects observed in the interviews, such as
tone of voice, bodily gestures, and pace of speech, which were included as relevant.
According to Sullivan (2012), such dialogical qualities should be taken into
account when exploring lived experience because in discourse, the ‘intonation is the
TABLE 1
Overview Respondents and Interviews
Case Number of respondents
Number of
interviews
Time from first
to last interview Remarks
1 3 (adolescent, sister, one
practitioner)
5 8 months
2 4 (adolescent, mother, two
practitioners)
6 12 months
3 2 (adolescent, one
practitioner)
3 10 months The adolescent did not
want us to interview
persons in social
network
4 4 (adolescent, father,
mother, one practitioner).
5 12 months
5 4 (adolescent, mother, two
practitioners)
4 6 months
6 1 (adolescent) 1 Contact with the service
was closed soon after
first interview
7 3 (adolescent, friend, one
practitioner)
3 7 months
8 2 (adolescent, friend) 1 Contact with the service
was closed soon after
first interview
Total:
8 cases
Total of 22 respondents
(same practitioner in case
1 and 3)
Total of
28 interviews
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sound that value makes’ (italics added), and this intonation gives the feeling of ‘heavi-
ness,’ ‘lightness’ and ‘colour’ in which ‘discourse becomes lived experiences’ (p. 44).
Bodily aspects could be tone of voice, laughter, crying, facial mimic, look, ways of
breathing, shift of position, posture or movements of hands, arms, head and so on.
Attention to lived experience is not only about ‘what’ is in the content of experience,
it is also about ‘how’ this matters to, and affects, the one experiencing – this includes
the way the body and feelings are involved in the saying and the said.
In a third step the key moments were re-read by the first author, and possible themes
related to the research questions were identified. Ideas about themes found in the key
moments and the ways of conceptualising these themes were discussed by the core group
and the research team in regular meetings. Guided by these emerging themes we, in a
fourth step, (re)turned to Bakhtin and Levinas, using some of their theoretical ideas to
shed new light on the material. This helped us in our further search for important
aspects, and revealed possible ways of organising and understanding the material.
FINDINGS
Six interdependent dimensions emerged. Bakhtin’s ideas provided an analytical tool
that gave us three temporal dimensions:
1. Dialogues open the moment,
2. Dialogues open the past, and
3. Dialogues open the future.
Levinas’ ideas provided an analytical tool that differentiated speaking into three
dimensions:
4. Dialogues open through inviting attentiveness and valuing (ethical dimension).
5. Dialogues open for new vitality (expressive dimension), and
6. Dialogues open for new meaning (hermeneutical dimension).
These latter dimensions of speaking appeared to operate across the three first
temporal dimensions.
We incorporated these six dimensions in a main theme: Dialogues – beginning by
others being invitingly attentive – open for moving and living.
These findings represent a possible way to describe and understand the dynamics
of change within dialogical practices. We now present these findings through the
three-first temporal dimensions and show how the three latter dimensions of speaking
(ethical, expressive, hermeneutic) operated across these. These findings are displayed
as interrelated in the following table, which includes selected quotes4 (Table 2).
The respondents seemed to describe the dialogues in the network meetings as
helpful when they had an experience of daring to speak and an experience of having
their utterances answered and valued. The phrase ‘dialogues . . . open for moving and
living’ in our main finding captures the way difficulties were described as difficulties
of moving in relation to others (both literally and metaphorically) and described as
not feeling alive or not wanting to live (see also Bøe et al., 2014).
The findings suggest that in the network dialogues, the participants responded to
each other ethically, expressively and hermeneutically. The findings suggest that ‘all
this’ began in the responsiveness of the moment (second column, Table 2) and even
more precisely in the ethical dimension of this responsiveness of the moment, which
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we have named the inviting attentiveness (first row). At the same time, the responses
of the moment could be seen as responses to the past (first column) and to an antici-
pated future (third column).
We now present and explore each of the three temporal dimensions through a par-
ticular case and its associated key moments, and show how the three dimensions of
speaking operate across the temporal dimensions.
Dialogues open the moment
She fell out of the conversation; the practitioner noticed and invited her to speak.5
(Katherine’s mother)
This first dimension articulates the way that the network dialogues seemed to be
experienced as, in our conceptualisation, opening the moment for them to move into
(second column, Table 2). Bakhtin (1981) indicated that utterances are formed in the
movement of the moment and are still profoundly determined by both past and
future. Utterances of the moment are about such things as corporeal and situated
voices, gestures, gazes, and facial expressions. The respondents described how, when
TABLE 2
The Multidimensionality of the Dialogical Event of Change
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they experienced the dialogue as good and helpful, they sensed that the others appre-
ciated their speaking and therefore they dared to speak.
Katherine and Her Mother.Katherine described her experiences of being rejected and
bullied in her early school years. She told us how she was met by mocking faces,
gazes, and voices. She described her difficulties in terms of not daring to show herself
to others and living in her inner, imaginative world. She had stopped believing that
she could manage school, or cope with a future job or family life.
She described the network meetings, together with the help from her mother and
her own efforts, as very important for her. In the last interview, she described how
she now felt that she was part of the social life at school.
In one of our chosen key moments, Katherine’s mother, who had participated in
several of the network meetings, told us about a specific meeting that they had the
day before and how she experienced it as ‘a breakthrough.’ Her descriptions were
about what happened from moment to moment in the conversation. Seen through
the dimensions of speaking as described by Levinas (1996), a multidimensional view
of the sequence as a changing event may be revealed (suggested in brackets).6
Mother: Uh, yesterday I at least felt . . . uh . . . I felt there was like a small
breakthrough. Yes, I felt (expressive vitality) it . . . it was about . . . it escapes
me [laughs]. Looking back I see . . ..
Int1: [Laughs and interrupts] Yes, what do you see?
Mother: I can see how one of the practitioners turned specifically towards
Katherine and asked her (ethical attentiveness) . . .. At first the practitioners
spoke a lot. But then one of the practitioners turned specifically towards
Katherine and asked, kind of, if Katherine had a solution (hermeneutical).
No . . . anyway, we then came to the understanding that the main thing, it
was not school, really. It is people that are the problem for her
(hermeneutical—new meaning). She doesn’t know how to relate. So,
yesterday something happened. I was very touched, tears ran (expressive
vitality) when I heard her talking about what she, kind of, had felt and
experienced regarding these things. I felt, ‘Aahh . . . this may actually turn
out well.’
We noticed that when Katherine’s mother described the meeting as a break-
through she referred to a feeling. The content was not clear to her: ‘I felt. . . No, now
it escapes me . . ...’ This indicates that the breakthrough was perhaps not primarily
about understanding (hermeneutics), nor about something being solved, but about
something outside the content of the conversation; an atmosphere, a feeling or a hap-
pening that reverberated in her that she tried to recapture in order to tell us.
The ideas introduced by Levinas may reveal the breakthrough that the mother
describes as a speech event in which the moment opens ethically, expressively and
hermeneutically. It is ethical in the sense that the practitioner sensed that Katherine
had fallen out of the conversation and through her attentiveness invited her back in.
Katherine herself, in another interview, articulates her experience of this particular
practitioner in a similar way: ‘It’s just as if she always notices and makes a comment
if she senses that I . . . detach.’ We may suggest that this is about opening the
moment in an ethical sense through the way the practitioner was invitingly attentive
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towards Katherine as well as the way that Katherine responded to this invitation. It is
expressive in the sense that Katherine was invited to express herself and that she filled
the space offered to her with her speech and her expressive vitality. It is hermeneutical
in the sense that Katherine, after being asked by the practitioner, now said something
that was an ‘eye opener’ to them all and changed the understanding of her difficulties.
New meaning evolved from her utterances: ‘People are the difficulty . . . not school.’
Dialogues open the past
We talked about what had happened. At first it was hard . . . then it turned into kind
of a good feeling.7
(Isabelle, 17)
The second dimension articulates the way that the dialogues in the network meet-
ings seemed to be experienced, in our conceptualisation, as opening the past, allowing
participants to respond and move in relation to the past in new ways (first column,
Table 2). As Bakhtin (1981) showed, we relate to the past through dialogue in two
ways. Firstly in the sense that the words of dialogue are a ‘path’ that put us in a the-
matic, emotional and valuing relationship with the past. Secondly in the sense that
the words that we use are passed on from the past and have the ‘taste’ of past uses.
The possibility of opening up the past still seems to lie in the ethical aspect of the
present, the others inviting attentiveness that allowed the participants to speak and to
find words for the past. By being attentive to the other, the therapist, or indeed the
participants, invited the other to express themselves, allowing him or her to find
words for the past.
The adolescents all seemed to have experiences of past events that were difficult
for them to relate to. Their relationship to those experiences of the past were
described as changed by the network dialogues.
Isabelle and Her Father. Isabelle’s mother died one year before the network meetings
started. This was a loss of ‘someone to fall back upon,’ as she put it. She now felt
that she did not ‘fit in anywhere.’ She had stopped going to school, she could not
‘bear talking to people,’ and she could not ‘bear all the gazes . . . and expectations of
everyone.’
She said that the network meetings were helpful because they let her ‘speak about
things.’
Before, I didn’t use to speak about anything, it was just spinning in my head, and it
became worse, and I didn’t understand what happened or what to do. The therapists
do everything to make me explain, and we can look at things both from the outside
and from my point of view.
Isabelle told us about a meeting in which she, her father and the practitioners par-
ticipated. Both she and her father talked about their experiences at the time that Isa-
belle’s mother died. Again, reading the excerpt through the prism of Levinas’
dimensions of speaking (suggested in brackets), we discovered multidimensionality in
the way that they (re)related to the past through this dialogue. Isabelle told us about
how her father spoke about his experiences and her responses to this.
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Isabelle: Yes, I had . . . I had more sympathy with him (ethics), and I got a
better understanding of what he was saying (hermeneutics).
Int1: Can you remember what your father spoke about?
Isabelle: I don’t remember very much. He spoke about how his relationship
with me and my sister had been. I hadn’t actually heard how he had felt
about this and how he had experienced it (Isabelle’s ethical inviting
attentiveness and her father’s new expressive vitality).
Int1: Can you tell me something about the feelings at work?
Isabelle: A lot of different feelings. It was hard to hear some of the things
he said, and old feelings appeared, many of them hurtful. I don’t know . . .
gradually it turned into kind of a good feeling (expressivity—new vitality).
Int1: Did you experience your relationship with your father differently after
that meeting?
Isabelle: Yes, I did. Very differently. Even if our relationship still is not so
good, I feel I understand him better, I can relate to him, in a way (ethics—
new value).
It seemed there was a quality to the dialogue of the network meeting that allowed
(ethics) her father to tell how he felt and experienced events at this time (expressivity),
and from what he said, his daughter discovered and understood what had happened
in new ways, with new meaning (hermeneutics).
Furthermore, we noticed that Isabelle told us how this meeting began with diffi-
cult feelings, ‘hard to hear,’ ‘old, bad, feelings.’ This shifted during the conversation
to ‘kind of a good feeling.’ Through speaking about the past, she (and her father)
responded affectively to the past in new ways (expressive—new vitality).8
When we ask Isabelle what her father spoke about, she started by saying that she
did not remember much. This, again, may indicate that the impact of the dialogue is
found in dimensions outside the thematic content (hermeneutical). There was an ethi-
cal side to it – she felt ‘compassion’ for him. Through her inviting attentiveness
towards her father, which allowed him to speak about the past, her relationship with
him changed; it is now ‘very different,’ she says. Through this opening of the past,
which allowed new ways of responding to the past, they could now relate to each
other again.
Dialogues open the future
He is the best therapist in the world; you have to see him, you have to hear him
laugh.9
(John, 17)
The third dimension articulates the way that the network dialogues seemed to be
experienced, in our conceptualisation, as opening the future, to move into (third col-
umn, Table 2). The difficulties of the adolescents seemed to be described in terms of
a future that appears difficult to enter, closed, and with no possibilities for them. This
experience of a seemingly closed future was changed to one that was more open,
through speaking in the dialogues.
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John and the Practitioner. John, 17, told us about the difficulties that he experienced
in entering various social arenas.
Then, you only see such warning signs. They are very small, but almost at the same
time, they are very big. The most I can withstand is perhaps one hundred warning
signs. At school, it was like one million, nine hundred and seventy-four.
Going to school was an everyday struggle. He was afraid that he might be ‘booed
at’ and that he might break down and cry. His ongoing sense of the future seemed to
be permeated by fear and doubt, which appeared as ‘signs of danger’ to him.
John, his mother and his father all told us that the meetings facilitated by the
practitioner made an important difference to John. His mother and father partici-
pated in many meetings, but sometimes John met the practitioner alone.
In a sequence that caught our attention, John told us that the practitioner meant
a lot to him and had helped him to manage to continue at school. He said that this
practitioner must be the ‘best therapist in the world,’ and he searched for words to
describe what it was that made this practitioner so good:
Int2: He is quirky you said?
John: Yes. It’s something about him. He is quirky [smiles broadly, twisting
his body]. He is . . . he is like . . . sometimes I have said that he is . . . he is
like . . . he is quirky actually [laughs loudly] (expressive vitality). He is weird.
He is a real . . . No, everyone should have one like him. So he is . . . he
must be . . .. No, he is simply the best therapist in the world, insanely good.
Int1: What is it that makes him the best therapist in the world then?
John: Well, it is . . . the way he . . . just to see him, the way he looks
[smiles broadly and twists his body].
When we met him some months later, we told him that we were curious about
the way that he described the practitioner as ‘quirky.’
John: Simply quirky. Unfortunately, I cannot describe him with any other
words than that. Uh . . . [smiles, shakes his head]. The first thing he does in
the conversation is kid about something and laugh completely wildly. Ha,
ha, ha [he presumably imitates the practitioner].
In this excerpt, Levinas’ three dimensions of speaking are perhaps not self-evident.
What struck us perhaps were not the words that he found but the way that he strug-
gled to find words for this ‘something about him’ and the fact that the words that he
found emerged from an experience that really seemed to matter to him. He ends up
by pointing to ‘quirky’ to describe the way that the practitioner appears – his
demeanour and the way that he laughs.
We have interpreted this, with the help of Levinas, as an attempt to describe a pri-
mordial ethical event in the encounter: the corporeal appearance of the practitioner
that says ‘welcome’ to this boy – an inviting attentiveness in his expressiveness (ethical).
In what way was this a dialogue that opened the future to the boy? It was as if the
boy was both in what was there before him in the moment – the inviting, attentive
appearance of this practitioner – and at the same time he was in the continuance of it,
in what was to come – an even more appreciative demeanour. It’s not the quirkiness
per se that is important, but the therapist’s way of being that is invitingly attentive
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toward John. This allowed expressivity, a new vitality for John as he spoke back. And
this might have been a necessary precondition for a joint search for new meaning (her-
meneutics) in the network meetings.
From John’s further descriptions it seemed that he brought with him into his
everyday life the anticipation of being responded to in a valuing way. Hope and belief
that, in future encounters with this practitioner, he will be welcomed and liked rever-
berates in him. In a way, we saw this directly before us in the interview, revealed in
his corporeal expressivity: when John told us about the practitioner, he smiled, and
his whole body seemed to show pride and joy. His body – expressively, affectively –
was in a kind of positive anticipation of, or directedness towards, this practitioner.
DISCUSSION
This paper opened with the utterance of a sister – ‘He must speak,’ cause through
speaking he finds himself . . . a bit.’ The multidimensionality involved in this chang-
ing event of speaking has now been suggested through the findings presented in this
paper. We have suggested that speaking seemed to be about so much more than just
finding words to understand (hermeneutics). Speaking was as much an ethical and
expressive event.
We now briefly focus on the aspect of movement because implicit in our findings
there is the notion that speaking is moving. This is evident both in the main theme:
Dialogues . . . open for moving and living, and in the three temporal dimensions: ‘Dia-
logues open the moment, the past, the future.’ The ‘helpfulness’ of the dialogues seemed
to be experienced and expressed in terms of movement in two senses. First we suggest
that dialogue offered an opening through which the participants in the network meet-
ing could, through their act of expressive speaking, move into the moment, as from an
outside position. Secondly we suggest that dialogue offered a way to move on, as from
a position of being stuck or hindered. In short, dialogues seemed to offer an opening
for moving into life and a way of moving forward in that life. Descriptions related to
movement seemed to have both a metaphorical and a literal meaning.10
This way of describing both difficulties and recovery related to mental health in
terms of movement seems to correspond with the results of other studies exploring
experiences of change. In another study related to the same material (Bøe et al.,
2014) there was a focus on experiences at various social arenas. Based on how the
respondents described their experiences, we suggested that change seemed closely
related to movement. Further we suggested that time, in terms of the future they
moved into, and space, in terms of a place to move, could be conceptualised as ethical
time and space because it was experienced as a feeling of whether others offered them
a place and a future.
In fact the vocabularies found in recovery research based on people’s own experi-
ences seem to be permeated by concepts and metaphors related to movement. We
find the metaphorical dimension of inside–outside – for example, in the description
‘simply to be let in’ (Davidson et al., 2001) – and the opposite experience of being an
outsider (Biong et al., 2008, p. 38) or frozen out (Biong, 2009, p. 327). These experi-
ences of being inside or outside may refer to personal relations (Topor et al., 2006) or
to community or society (Andersen & Svensson, 2012; Mezzina et al., 2006; Tew
et al., 2012). Difficulties are expressed in terms of being outside or excluded (from
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relations, society, the world, the good life), while recovery is expressed in terms of
entering, to come inside, or to be included.
In our findings we perhaps capture such aspects through the way we describe dia-
logues as opening up the moment for moving and living. We also find that a meta-
phor for living is moving ahead: The difficulties of living may be described as ‘not
knowing how to make their way in the world,’ ‘being stuck’ or being at an ‘impasse’
(Davidson et al.,2010, p. 101, 105), like ‘living in a maze’ or ‘being in a fog’ (Biong
& Ravndal, 2009, p. 8), or ‘hitting the wall’ (Borg, Karlsson, Lofthus & Davidson,
2011). Difficulties are expressed in terms of not being able to move on or find a way,
and conversely, recovery is expressed in terms of moving on, and finding a way. In our
findings we perhaps capture such aspects through the way we describe dialogues as
opening up the future in a way that include ethical, expressive and hermeneutical
dimensions.
This present paper may offer both a way of describing and understanding the
multi-dimensionality involved in such changing and ‘movement-facilitating’ events
and a way to conceptualise such events as dialogical events.
Strengths and limitations
The participatory design and, in particular, the contribution of the co-researchers
allowed both the generation of data through interviews and the analytical exploration
to be thorough and to have multiple perspectives. A variety of impressions, associa-
tions and interpretations emerged from the analysis by the three of us. In our view,
this diversity of readings helped us to reveal the multidimensionality and complexity
of change in dialogical practice.
The exploration was integrated with ongoing practice and in dialogue with the
respondents made possible by a series of interviews. As a result, proximity to lived
experience was maintained, and the relevance and validity of the findings were
strengthened. A challenge was that this explorative process included so many voices,
perspectives and judgements that it could be difficult to maintain an overview, and
perhaps even more importantly, to do justice to the many voices involved.
This study sets out to explore change and we do this through exploring the way
participants experience and speak about change. The question then should be posed –
and it is a difficult one – to what extent is the experience of change or the articulation
of this experience about ‘actual’ change? We, of course, have no full answer to this.
However, we have tried to show how experience emerges through expressiveness in
dialogues. This dialogical experience cannot be discounted from the process of
change, as though ‘actual change’ only occurred outside or independent of this expres-
siveness.
The theoretical ideas of Levinas and Bakhtin helped us to reveal some dimensions
of the respondents’ experiences, however other ideas could certainly have revealed dif-
ferent aspects. We would like to emphasise that our findings and the diagram of the
dialogical event of change (Table 2) should be read as open to a variety of possible
understandings and seen as an invitation to explore further.
CONCLUSION
Approaches in contemporary family therapy and dialogical practice seem to emphasise
the significance of being present in the moment. Our study indicates that what hap-
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pens in the dialogues cannot be accounted for solely by pointing to the ways in which
the participants are present and responsive in the moment. It seems essential to include
relations to the past and future to understand the change-generating aspects that are at
play. The movement in the moment is conditioned by past and future. Consequently,
practitioners are encouraged to create space for participants to speak about what has
passed and what is coming in their lives, and through this, new vitality and move-
ment in the present may emerge.
The findings show the significance of the ethical aspects of the encounters. This
may imply that in order to ‘open up’ for the moving and living of those involved,
being invitingly attentive to the speaking of the other may be crucial. The uncondi-
tional welcome of this inviting attentiveness is perhaps what it takes to initiate change
in ways that enhance the vitality of those who struggle.
The study calls for further exploration of the ways that dialogues facilitated by the
services may open the future. After all, one might say that living is about our contin-
uous movement into a future, and opening this future is opening life.
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Endnotes
1 All names of respondents are pseudonyms. The experiences of Phillip and his family are explored in
three previous articles (Bøe et al., 2013, 2014; Lidbom et al., 2014).
2 The two co-researchers were not influenced in the same way by such perspectives and consequently
offered other point of views together with an interest for what dialogical perspectives offer.
3 The words and the expressiveness that give form to experience may be both the outer dialogue, the
uttered words, and the richness of the inner dialogues, not uttered, that the dialogue evokes in the par-
ticipants (see Lidbom et al., 2014).
4 Condensed quotes.
5 Condensed quote.
6 In line with the dialogical perspective of our methodological approach, we include the dialogue
between the interviewers and respondents in the excerpts. However, the focus is not the dialogue of the
interview but the dialogues of the network meetings in which they have participated.
7 Condensed quote.
8 We might add that it seems that within the way the dialogue of the interview allowed Isabelle to
express herself, her experiences of this particular network meeting took on new forms. For example,
she says ‘I hadn’t actually heard how he had felt about this . . .’ which may suggest that she became
aware of this aspect of the network meeting as she described it to us.
9 Summarised.
10 When describing and understanding change, and even in our experience of change, metaphors seem
to play a crucial role (see, e.g., Bøe et al., 2013; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).
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The present study is part of a series of qualitative studies focusing on dialogic practice in southern Norway. In this
article, we present a qualitative study of a network meeting focusing on the interplay between the participants’
inner and outer dialogues. The network meeting is between an adolescent boy, his mother and two network
therapists, the same adolescent case discussed previously in this journal by Bøe et al. (2013). The aim of this
study is to explore how the interplay between inner and outer dialogues contributes to significant and meaningful
moments for the interlocutors. A multiperspective methodology is used that combines video recordings of a net-
work meeting and participant interviews with text analysis. Our research found the interplay has an important
role in understanding the emergence of significant and meaningful moments in therapy. A one-sided focus on par-
ticipants’ utterances or inner dialogues was insufficient to explain their significance and meaning to the interlocu-
tors. A dialogical approach provides a theoretical frame and concepts that are useful in investigations of
therapeutic conversations.
Keywords: dialogism, dialogical practice, inner and outer dialogues, polyphony, network meeting, family therapy,
therapeutic conversations, significant and meaningful moments
Key Points
1 A dialogical framework is useful in the investigation of therapeutic conversations in a network meeting.
2 A multiperspective methodology combines video recordings of a network meeting and participant inter-
views with text analysis.
3 This research demonstrates the interplay between inner and outer dialogues and has an important role in
understanding the emergence of significant and meaningful moments in therapy.
4 The therapeutic conversation and the participants’ inner dialogues form a circle of meaning, experiences,
and negotiations, which contribute to the reactions of the participants.
5 Significant and meaningful moments in therapeutic conversations are related more to the interplay between
inner and outer dialogues and less to the number of utterances made by a participant.
6 Given the diversity of voices and dialogues present in a multipersonal therapeutic conversation it is impor-
tant to ensure sufficient time to listen to our inner voices and dialogues in the therapeutic conversation.
The aim of this article is to explore the interplay between inner and outer dia-
logues of participants in a network meeting by focusing on moments that all experi-
ence as significant and meaningful. The network meeting is based on dialogism,
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dialogical practice and a relational understanding of humans, which has a theoretical
basis similar to family therapy (Rober, 2005a; Olson, Laitila, Rober, & Seikkula,
2012; Seikkula, Laitila, & Rober, 2012).
Psychotherapy research tells us that not all the thoughts, feelings, and images of
participants during a therapy session are articulated (Baxter & Wilmot, 1985; Faber
& Sohn, 2007). Some thoughts, inner voices and inner dialogues are uttered during
the conversation, while others are not but still have a significant influence on what is
uttered and how (Rober, Seikkula, & Laitila, 2010; Seikkula & Arnkil, 2007).
Describing conversations as an interplay between participants’ inner and outer dia-
logues is not new. Both Bakhtin and Vygotsky devoted considerable attention to
investigating the character of thinking as an inner dialogue and examined how inner
and outer dialogues are related (Emerson, 1983). Today, those concepts are used both
in research (Seikkula, 2002; Seltzer & Seltzer, 2004; Rober et al., 2008) and in theo-
ries within various therapeutic approaches, such as family therapy (Andersen, 1992;
Rober, 2005b), individual dialogical self-therapy (Hermans & Dimaggio, 2004) and
open dialogues (Seikkula & Arnkil, 2007).
One central concept in dialogism is the concept of polyphony. In our study,
polyphony refers to the multiplicity of independent, distinct, and fully valid voices
that emerge through the activity of dialogue, the coevolving process of listening and
talking (Olson et al., 2012). In network meetings, there is a focus on this multiplicity
of different voices, which occurs in the interplay between the outer dialogue and the
participants’ inner dialogues (Olson et al., 2012; Seikkula, 2002). The therapeutic
process is understood as a process of finding words for those experiences in one’s life
that have not yet been expressed in words (Seikkula et al., 2012). The polyphony
contributes to the progress of the therapeutic process in the way that every utterance,
every new word, becomes a part of a joint effort to reach an adequate understanding
that can describe the experience in words.
In network meetings, a richness of inner dialogues is recognized, with the under-
standing that each contributes and responds to what has been said. Words and experi-
ences find their meaning through the interplay between inner and outer dialogues and
in the context where this occurs. The therapeutic approach used in network meetings
is in many ways similar to some of the postmodern family therapies, including where
problems are seen as socially constructed. The therapist is not engaged in making
interventions or structuring a special form of interview, rather the focus is listening
and responsively responding to what been said (Seikkula, 2011).
Most of the research on the interplay between inner and outer dialogues concerns
individual forms of therapy, especially the ‘dialogical self’ psychodynamic approach
(Hermans & Dimaggio, 2004; Seltzer & Seltzer, 2004; Stiles, 1999). Little research
has been conducted in contexts where more than two people are present. Guregard and
Seikkula (2014) investigated therapeutic work with refugees, and the ways in which
open dialogues could be useful to reduce the power and cultural differences between
therapists and family members. In a study by Rober et al. (2008) on therapists’ inner
dialogue, family therapists role-played several couple therapy sessions and described
four different positions adopted in their inner dialogues.1 Ropstad (2010), focusing on
adolescents, and Grosas (2010), focusing on one parent, studied differences in partici-
pants’ inner voices in dialogical sequences from those in monological sequences.
All these studies, which focused on one person or a chosen sample in multiperson
meetings, have provided valuable knowledge and insight into important aspects of
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these meetings. This study is an attempt to advance this kind of research and
knowledge one step further by including all participants and focusing on sequences in
the conversation that they all perceive as significant and meaningful.
In so doing, this study attempts to answer the following questions:
What characterizes the interplay between the participants’ inner and outer dialogues in
sequences that they experience as significant and meaningful?
How do the participants’ inner dialogues contribute to the outer dialogue, and how
does the outer dialogue contribute to the participants’ inner dialogues?
Method
The case example presented in this article is a part of a study entitled ‘Network meet-
ings: A meeting on the border between outer and inner dialogues’. This is a qualita-
tive study of adolescents from 16 to 18 years old who are in mental crises, seeking
help from the mental health care system for the first time and receiving network-ori-
ented help. Those adolescents were referred to the mental health care system by their
general practitioners (GP). The adolescents, members of their networks, and therapists
all participated voluntarily in this study. The same adolescents are followed in another
study entitled ‘Dialogue and the life world in mental health’ (Bøe et al., 2013). Both
studies are part of a research program entitled ‘Dialogical collaboration in southern
Norway’, focusing on different dialogical approaches and practices in the health care
system in southern Norway.
We investigated one network meeting attended by an adolescent boy, his mother
and two network therapists. The actual network meeting was conducted by the hospi-
tal and lasted for one hour and 12 minutes. There had been three network meetings
before this one. The method of gathering data in this study was developed from a
previous method used by Rober et al. (2008), whereby the researcher video recorded
the therapeutic conversation and interviewed the participants afterward. To analyze
the content of the outer dialogue, the inner dialogue, and the interplay between them,
we relied on the methodology of Saldago and Clegg (2011), who developed a dialogi-
cal approach that emphasized the relational units of dynamic and multivoiced prac-
tice, and that of Cresswell (2012), who combines a dialogical approach with
phenomenology.
The first stage was a video recording of one network meeting. The second stage was
for the researcher, the first author, to interview each participant separately within four
days following the network meeting. During this interview, each person watched the
whole of the recorded network meeting on a data screen without pause. Before they
viewed it a second time, immediately after the first time, they were instructed to stop
the video when they saw something significant or meaningful happening. When they
stopped, the researcher asked the same question, which was: What went through your
mind right there? This question was intended to elicit some of their inner dialogues
during the chosen sequences. There were no other questions prepared for the inter-
views; we attempted to make the interviews similar to a dialogical conversation, focus-
ing on listening and responding to the participants’ utterances. These interviews were
video recorded.
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The third stage was to transcribe both the network meeting and the interviews,
which were recorded for analysis and interpretation. In the fourth stage, the transcrip-
tions of the network meeting and all the interviews were combined in such a way as
to provide an overview of the whole network meeting. The outer dialogue and the
participants’ inner dialogues were juxtaposed in the correct position in relation to the
points where each participant had paused to indicate a significant and meaningful
moment (see Figures 1 and 2). From this, we could identify several sequences during
the meeting where all the participants had stopped. From those eight sequences, the
authors met and selected the two sequences presented in this article. These two
sequences were chosen because they reflected much of the content of the other six
sequences and, at the same time, illuminated the questions that we initially raised.
In stage five, we informed the participants of the possibility of an adverse reaction
to being video recorded, and they were asked for their approval after a conversation
in which they were informed of the implications of participating in this study. The
present study was approved by the National Committee for Medical and Health
Research Ethics.
The case presented
Philip is a 16-year-old boy who has been struggling with anxiety and depression after
a long history of being bullied in primary and secondary school. Philip was referred
to mental health care by his GP and participated in network meetings with the ado-
lescent and family team in a hospital in southern Norway. The family came as refu-
gees to Norway when Philip was five and his brother John was eight years old.2 At
the time when the network meeting took place, Philip had just entered high school,
and John had moved back home after a stay abroad. This meeting was the fourth
with Philip and members from his family; both his father and brother had each previ-
ously participated in one meeting with Philip and his mother. Present at the video-
recorded network meeting were Philip, his mother, and two network therapists from
the family and adolescent team.
The chosen sequences and analysis
The network meeting lasted for one hour and 12 minutes, and had four main
themes. Those four main themes were how Philip was mastering the challenges of
high school, his relationship with his father, which bus he could take home from
school and his suspicion that he was pursued by Asian men on his way to the bus
after school. The two chosen sequences are in the first half of the conversation, in
which the participants discussed Philip overcoming the challenges of high school.
The first sequence. The outer dialogue: The outer dialogue is mainly about how
Philip copes at the new school, and particularly whether he dares to ask when he is
unsure of something or does not understand. It also concerns how his new classmates
appreciate him more than previous classmates. The only utterance from the mother
in this sequence is ‘Mm’.
The inner dialogues: Therapist 1 has an inner dialogue where he asks himself
about the number of foreigners where Philip lives, remembers that Philip has been
bullied over many years and wonders whether the others see him as special. The ther-
apist views this as an important theme. He also doubts whether he can trust what
Philip says.
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The inner dialogue of Therapist 2, in relation to the outer dialogue, is about her
noticing that Philip talks more in this meeting than before and seems to have done
more to make friends at school. She then focuses on how she can ask in a way that
will not put pressure on him to report failing at school. At the same time, she doubts
that Philip copes with the school as well as he says.
Philip has an inner dialogue in which he compares how it was before, when he
never dared to ask his classmates questions, with the situation at the new school
where he can now do so.
The inner dialogue of the mother is initially about her pleasure when she hears
what Philip says and how he is progressing at school. She has always wished that he
could ask questions and speak out. Later, she has an inner dialogue about the Norwe-
gians bullying him, and her perception of a wound inside of him.
Interplay between the participants’ inner and outer dialogues: Sequence 1
This sequence, chosen by all four participants as significant or meaningful, mainly
concerns how Philip manages at school in the outer dialogue, but when we examine
the participants’ inner dialogues, we find that the dialogical process involves a multi-
tude of themes and voices, all of which are in some way interconnected.
In the beginning of this sequence, the topic of the outer dialogue is the progress
Philip has made at his new school. In relation to that, Therapist 2, Philip and his
mother all have inner dialogues about this progress, but view it from different per-
spectives. Therapist 2 focuses on Philip talking more in the network meeting, Philip
focuses on how he now dares to ask his friends at school about things he needs to
know, and the mother is pleased and reflects that she always wished he could speak
out. Therefore, in relation to their inner dialogue they understand and experience the
outer dialogue differently. This is a difference that remains unspoken, but at the same
time may contribute to the dynamic in the conversation.
Their different perspectives on the outer dialogue move them in different direc-
tions. Therapist 2 focuses on what to ask Philip in the ongoing conversation and his
mother sees the events described as progress. Therapist 2 moves from the present to
the future and back again. The mother moves from the present to the past and back
again. Philip has the same movement in time as the mother, a movement that allows
them both to see and experience his progress.
At the end of this sequence, the outer dialogue is about being a foreigner in Nor-
way and at the same time being appreciated as a person. When this becomes a theme,
Therapist 1 in his inner dialogue seeks an explanation for Philip being bullied, and
wonders whether others see him as special or different from themselves. He also sees
the importance of this theme, and then he becomes unsure whether he can be confi-
dent that the situation at school is improving. In relation to the theme in the outer
dialogue, the mother’s second inner dialogue is about the Norwegians being Philip’s
problem because they bullied him so much. She then sees that Philip is struggling
with a wound inside himself. In relation to the outer dialogue, this may be under-
stood as a result of the bullying Philip has experienced.
In the last part of this sequence we can see how both Therapist 1 and the mother
move back to the past, and how the theme of ‘bullying’ becomes important in their
understanding of being appreciated. The bullying history is not a theme in the conver-
sation but becomes important in the understanding and experience of the conversation.
A Study of a Network Meeting
ª 2014 Australian Association of Family Therapy 143
As we see in the interplay between the outer and the inner dialogues, there are a
multitude of voices and themes. Even if most of them are not expressed during this
sequence, they are important because they contribute to new understandings, both
regarding the outer dialogue and for the individual participant. Several times during
this sequence, we find that the inner dialogues go beyond the outer dialogue in a
reflective way, and we seek explanations of the outer dialogue that make sense for the
individuals. The mother makes one utterance during this sequence and conducts sev-
eral inner dialogues and voices in which she reflects on her own and Philip’s situation,
today and previously. In relation to the outer dialogue, her inner dialogue changes in
time, space, and theme. From this, we can infer that the number of utterances is not
crucial in terms of whether the participants find the conversation meaningful.
Another finding in the sequence presented is how the participants’ inner dialogues
affect what may become the next utterance and how the content of it will be articu-
lated. We also find the same outer dialogue activating various experiences and under-
standings and move the interlocutors between different positions.
The second sequence. The outer dialogue: The outer dialogue in this second sequence
has two main themes – whether Philip can raise his hand and ask questions in the
class if he is unsure of something, and that he is on his own in the breaks. It begins
with Therapist 1 asking Philip whether he can raise his hand and ask the teacher if
he is unsure of something. Then Therapist 1 connects Philip’s answer to his responses
on the ORS schema,3 and Philip states that he is on his own in the breaks at school.
The mother has non-utterances during this sequence.
The inner dialogues: In the beginning of this sequence, the mother has an inner
dialogue about how important it is for her that Therapist 1 asks Philip questions in the
way that he does, and how she has wanted to ask the questions of Philip. Then she
explains to herself why she has not done so – she does not want to start this conversa-
tion because she is reluctant to take control over Philip. The next topic in her inner
dialogue is that she tells Philip directly how important it is that he asks questions, if he
does not understand. At the same time, she does not want to be the one who nags Phi-
lip about this; she wants him to discover this on his own. She ends her inner dialogue
by appreciating the way in which they discuss this in the network meeting and sees that
she would never dare to ask the same questions as Therapist 1 does.
Therapist 1 has an inner dialogue about the way in which the outer dialogue
returns to a theme that they had discussed earlier. Then he has a feeling that Philip is
giving answers that he thinks the therapist wants to hear, so he has to repeat the ques-
tions. He ends his inner dialogue by questioning Philip’s answers.
Philip has an inner dialogue about the importance of asking the teacher when he
is unsure and admits in his inner dialogue that he does not always do that. He ends
his inner dialogue by reflecting on the need to ask the teacher questions when he is
in doubt.
Therapist 2 considers how painful it must be for Philip that he is so often on his
own during the breaks at school and how he struggles with this. She appreciates that
Therapist 1 is questioning Philip in this manner and finds that Philip is discussing
his experiences at school more openly, reporting that he is lonely. She ends her inner
dialogue by reflecting how it hurts her to hear Philip calling his new classmates his
new friends.
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Interplay between the participants’ inner and outer dialogues: Sequence 2
In this second sequence, as in the first sequence, we find that the interplay between
the outer dialogue and the participants’ inner dialogues consists of a multitude of
themes and voices. Most of these are not expressed during the sequence, but they all
contribute to the polyphony in the network meeting and thus to the constructions of
new meanings.
In the first part of this sequence, the outer theme concerns whether Philip can
raise his hand and ask if he is unsure of something at school. With access to the
mother’s inner dialogue, we can see that she realizes the importance of the theme in
the outer dialogue and how this theme has been on her mind on various occasions.
In the same part of the sequence, Therapist 1 has an inner dialogue about his reasons
for asking Philip the same questions again. He is not sure if Philip is telling the truth,
and his next utterance may be understood in relation to both Philip’s answer and his
own inner dialogue. During this part of the sequence, Philip acknowledges the impor-
tance of asking when he is unsure of something, but in addition he admits to himself
that he does not always do that, so he concludes that he has to improve that in the
future.
In this part of the sequence, we can see how the outer dialogue is understood
from different perspectives. Both the mother and Philip see the theme of the outer
dialogue as important, but from there they move in different directions. The mother
moves from present to the past and back again, by remembering her own desire to
speak with Philip about this issue. Philip moves from the present to the past and then
to the future, by admitting to himself that he does not always ask the teacher when
he is unsure of something and that he has to do that in the future. In the same part
of this sequence, Philip’s answers make Therapist 1 uncertain if he is telling the truth.
Therapist 1 moves from present to the future and back again by focusing on how to
ask Philip in a way that can reduce his own uncertainty.
In relation to Philip’s remarks that all the other students are unfamiliar to him
and that he is alone in the breaks, which becomes a theme in the second part of this
sequence, Therapist 2 has an inner dialogue on how painful this must be for Philip
and how he can now tell them more about this than previously. At the same time, it
hurts Therapist 2 to hear him call his new classmates his new friends. Therapist 1 also
has an inner dialogue on how difficult it must be for Philip to be on his own in the
breaks, and how he has become the one who sits alone. In the same part, the mother
also feels that is painful to hear that Philip is alone, but at the same time she hears
that Philip does not experience this as a crisis, which calms her.
In the second half of this sequence, there is a common experience of being hurt in
some way for Therapist 1, Therapist 2 and the mother. This reflects their presence in
the conversation and their feeling of empathy for Philip. All three are strongly
grounded in the present, but at the same time in the past in the story that Philip is
telling.
During this second sequence, we can see how the outer dialogue activates different
understandings and experiences for the participants. As in the first sequence, we find
that the participants’ inner dialogues go beyond the outer dialogue in the quest to
understand it. We also find that there are a multitude of voices and themes, most of
which are not expressed during the chosen sequence, but all of which contribute to a
polyphony in the conversation. This becomes important in the process of finding new
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words and understandings of the themes in the outer dialogue. Finally, we find that
the participants’ movements in time are different, and those different movements
interact with the participants’ different perspectives on the outer dialogue.
Discussion
Through this research, we can see how the therapeutic conversation and the partici-
pants’ inner dialogues form a circle of meaning, experiences, and negotiations in
which all in some way contribute to the reactions of the participants evoked by the
conversation. The first phenomenon that emerges from the research data is the rich-
ness of voices, themes, and different positions that the interlocutors experience in the
significant and meaningful moments.
We know from dialogical theory that polyphony of voices and dialogues plays an
important role in the therapeutic conversation because it gives access to words and
becomes a source of new perspectives, words, and meaning for the interlocutors in
this context (Bakhtin, 1986; Seikkula, 2002). The participants’ different perspectives
and understandings of the outer dialogue interact with the participants’ different
movements in time.
Another finding is that the same outer dialogue evokes different voices and inner
dialogues among the participants, differences that contribute to the expansion of the
polyphony and permit the interlocutors to adopt new perspectives and meanings in
the outer dialogue (Rober et al., 2008; Seikkula & Trimble, 2005). According to
Bakhtin (1984), the speaker does not own the words that he or she uses: a word is a
joint creation belonging half to the speaker and half to the listener. Words and utter-
ances derive their meanings as much from the listener as from the speaker (Seikkula
& Trimble, 2005). This may explain why the outer dialogue is perceived differently
among the interlocutors.
This research also shows that the number of utterances of each interlocutor during
the therapeutic conversation is not in itself a measure of how significant or
meaningful the experience of the conversation is. In both sequences, the mother
hardly speaks; her only utterance in those two sequences is ‘Mm’. However, she has
many inner dialogues in relation to the outer dialogue, during which she achieves
new understandings and experiences. This may show that a main factor in dialogical
process is the interplay between the outer dialogue and the participants’ inner dia-
logues, which through polyphony contributes to a new common language in the
actual situation and context (Seikkula & Arnkil, 2007).
All our knowledge is gained in specific situations and conversations where every-
thing that is discussed is given new meanings (Bakhtin, 1984). This may lead us to
conclude that significant and meaningful moments in therapeutic conversations are
related more to the interplay between the outer dialogue and the participants’ inner
dialogues and less to the number of utterances.
The interplay between the outer dialogue and the participants’ inner dialogues can
be seen as a process whereby the outer dialogue contributes to the participants’ inner
dialogues through the words used, the way in which they are uttered and to whom
they speak. The inner dialogues contribute to the outer dialogue by means of new
perspectives, new words, and previously used words that have been given new mean-
ings. The interplay between the outer dialogue and the interlocutors’ inner dialogues
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can be understood as a dynamic process and one basic factor in the richness of voices
and dialogues in the polyphony at any time.
It is important to bear in mind that the type of direct observation used in this
study, with video recording, interviews and analysis, does not reveal the exact content
of the participants’ inner dialogues at the actual moment, but in this way we come as
close as possible in an attempt to address our specific concern. In this context it may
be relevant to apply Bakhtin’s principle of the unfinalizable (Bakhtin, 1981, 1984):
namely that there is no fixed or final interpretation, and no one has, or ought to
have, the final word.
Conclusion
This research shows the diversity of voices and dialogues present in a multipersonal
therapeutic conversation. Perhaps this should be reflected in our therapeutic practice
by ensuring that we and our interlocutors have sufficient time to listen to our inner
voices and dialogues in the therapeutic conversation (Andersen, 2005). The present
research also shows the significance of the interplay between the outer dialogue and
the interlocutors’ inner dialogues, both in relation to the polyphony in the conversa-
tion and as a basic dynamic element in developing the therapeutic conversation. It
also shows that the number of utterances in itself does not indicate the significance
and meaning of the conversational experience.
In other words, this research confirms some of the main theoretical assumptions in
dialogical theories. That we as therapists should rely more on the therapeutic conversa-
tion as good enough in itself and less on specific interventions or interviews. The thera-
peutic conversation will take us to issues that are important when it is important to
talk about them. This is a movement that arises in the interplay between all the differ-
ent forms of dialogues that take place at the same time in the therapeutic conversation.
Some therapists may find a therapeutic attitude of having less control over the con-
versation challenging, while others may find it liberating in terms of responsibility. It is
in accordance with a ‘not knowing position’ (Anderson & Goolishian, 1988), which is
also reflexive (Rober, 2005b). This reflexive position take place as inner dialogue and
sometimes will be uttered as a part of the outer dialogue. In this way words and new
meanings seem to find their natural place in the therapeutic conversation as it evolves.
More research and knowledge is needed to gain greater insight and knowledge into
multiperson conversations as they manifest in family therapy, couple therapy and net-
work meetings, and how different forms of dialogues work in those contexts. This
would allow us to confirm, disprove, renew, or expand existing theories and practices
in dialogical and family therapy.
Endnotes
1 Each of the four positions represents a concern of the therapist and is described as: (1) Attending to
the client process. (2) Processing the client’s story. (3) Focusing on the therapist’s own experience. (4)
Managing the therapeutic process.
2 The name and the identifying information of the boy and his family have been altered to protect their
confidentiality. The boy, his family, and the therapists agreed to participate in the study.
3 The ORS (Outcome Rating Scale) is a feedback schema developed by Miller and Duncan (2000). It is
administered at the beginning of each session and provides the clinician with information that can help
to determine whether the therapy is on track.
A Study of a Network Meeting
ª 2014 Australian Association of Family Therapy 147
References
Andersen, T. (1992). Relationship, language and pre-understanding in the reflecting process.
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Family Therapy, 13, 87–91.
Andersen, T. (2005). Reflekterende Processer. Gylling: Narayana Press.
Anderson, H., & Goolishian, H.A. (1988). Human systems as linguistic systems: Preliminary
and evolving ideas about the implications for clinical theory. Family Process, 27, 371–
393.
Bakhtin, M.M. (1981). The Dialogic Imagination. Austin: University of Texas Press.
Bakhtin, M.M. (1984). Problems of Dostoyevsky’s Poetics. Minneapolis, MN: University of Min-
nesota Press.
Bakhtin, M.M. (1986). Speech Genres & Other Late Essays. Austin, TX: University of Texas
Press.
Baxter, L.A., & Wilmot, W.W. (1985). Taboo topics in close relationships. Journal of Social
and Personal Relationships, 2, 253–269.
Bøe, T.D., Kristoffersen, K., Lidbom, P.A., Lindvig, G.R., Seikkula, J., Ulland, D., &
Zachariassen, K. (2013). Change is an ongoing Ethical Event: Levinas, Bakhtin, and the
Dialogical Dynamics. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Family Therapy, 34, 18–31.
Cresswell, J.W. (2012). Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five
Approaches. London: Sage Publications.
Emerson, C. (1983). The outer word and the inner speech: Bakhtin, Vygotsky and the inter-
nalization of language. Critical Inquiry, 10, 245–264.
Faber, B.A., & Sohn, A.E. (2007). Patterns of self-disclosure in psychotherapy and marriage.
Psychotherapy: Theory, Research, Practice, Training, 44, 226–231.
Grosas, A.G. (2010). Parents’ Inner Dialogues in Network Meetings. Master Thesis, University
of Agder.
Guregard, S., & Seikkula, J. (2014). Establishing therapeutic dialogue with refugee families.
Contemporary Family Therapy, 36, 41–57.
Hermans, H.J.M., & Dimaggio, G. (Eds.) (2004). The Dialogical Self in Psychotherapy. New
York: Brunner–Routledge.
Miller, S.D., & Duncan, B.L. (2000). The Outcome Rating Scale. Chicago, IL: Authors.
Olson, M., Laitila, A., Rober, P., & Seikkula, J. (2012). The shift from monologue to
dialogue in a couple therapy session: Dialogical investigation of change from therapists’
point of view. Family Process, 51, 420–435.
Rober, P. (2005a). Family therapy as a dialogue of living persons: A perspective inspired by
Bakhtin, Voloshinov and Shotter. Journal of Marital and Family Therapy, 31, 385–397.
Rober, P. (2005b). The therapist’s self in dialogical family therapy: Some ideas about not-
knowing and the therapist’s inner conversation. Family Process, 44, 477–496.
Rober, P., Elliot, R., Buysse, A., Loots, G., & Kort, K.D. (2008). Positioning in the therapist’s
inner conversation: A dialogical model based on a grounded theory analysis. Journal of
Marital and Family Therapy, 34, 406–421.
Rober, P., Seikkula, J., & Laitila, A. (2010). Dialogical analysis of storytelling in the family
therapeutic encounter. Human Systems: The Journal of Therapy, Consultation and Training,
21, 27–49.
Ropstad, R. (2010). “-and there I was, hoping that the time was finished” A Study of the Ado-
lescents Inner Dialogues in a Network Meeting. Masters Thesis, University of Agder.
Saldago, J., & Clegg, J.W. (2011). Dialogism and psyche: Bakhtin and contemporary psychol-
ogy. Culture & Psychology, 17, 421–440.
Seikkula, J. (2002). Open dialogues with good and poor outcomes for psychotic crises: Exam-
ples from families with violence. Journal of Marital and Family Therapy, 28, 263–274.
148 ª 2014 Australian Association of Family Therapy
Per Arne Lidbom et al.
Seikkula, J. (2011). Becoming dialogical: Psychotherapy or a way of life? The Australian and
New Zealand of Family Therapy, 32, 179–193.
Seikkula, J., & Arnkil, T.E. (2007). Nettverksdialoger. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
Seikkula, J., & Trimble, D. (2005). Healing elements of therapeutic conversation: Dialogue as
an embodiment of love. Family Process, 44, 461–475.
Seikkula, J., Laitila, A., & Rober, P. (2012). Making sense of multi-actor dialogues in family
therapy and network meetings. Journal of Marital and Family Therapy, 28, 263–274.
Seltzer, M., & Seltzer, W.J. (2004). Co-texting, chronotope and ritual: A Bakhtian framing of
talk in therapy. Journal of Family Therapy, 26, 358–383.
Stiles, W.B. (1999). Sign and voices in psychotherapy. Psychotherapy Research, 9, 1–21.
ª 2014 Australian Association of Family Therapy 149
A Study of a Network Meeting
Appendix 5:  
Information and declaration of consent, the adolescent and guardians  
(in Norwegian) 
 
Forespørsel om deltakelse i forskningsprosjekt 
 
Til:  
Ungdom som får tilbud av Avdeling for barn og unges psykiske helse, og deres foresatte. 
 
Bakgrunn og hensikt 
Vi spør deg med dette om å delta i et forskningsprosjekt der hensikten er å utvikle kunnskap om hjelp 
til unge i krise. Dine tanker og opplevelser rundt den hjelpen du får ved Avdeling for barn og unges 
psykisk helse (ABUP) og hvordan denne hjelpen påvirker livet ditt vil være av stor interesse for dette 
forskningsprosjektet. Forskningsprosjektet består av to studier som gjennomføres av Tore Dag Bøe 
og Per Arne Lidbom, begge ansatt ved ABUP.  
 
Hva innebærer deltagelse i forskningsprosjektet?  
Om du sier ja til å delta vil en vanlig terapisamtale bli filmet og du vil i etterkant bli intervjuet om 
noen av de tanker og følelser du hadde i denne samtalen.  
 
Senere vil du bli intervjuet igjen to, kanskje tre, ganger. Her vil du bli spurt om dine tanker og 
opplevelser rundt den hjelp du har fått og den vanskelige tiden du har vært gjennom.  
 
Intervjuene kan avtales på sted og tidspunkt som passer for deg. Vi ønsker å gjennomføre disse 
intervjuene med ca en måneds mellomrom og så kanskje et siste intervju om et halvt år. Alle 
intervjuene vil trolig vare rundt 1 – 1 ½ time og vil bli filmet. Det er hele tiden frivillig og opp til deg 
om du vil trekke deg eller være med videre. 
 
Du vil også bli bedt om å fylle ut et par enkle skjema hver gang du har samtale ved ABUP. I tillegg vil 
også andre fra ditt nettverk som er deltagere i samtalene bli intervjuet.  
 
 
Mulige fordeler og ulemper  
De som deltar i studien får samme behandlingstilbud som de ellers ville fått.  
 
Noen kan oppleve det å bli filmet eller å bli intervjuet om personlige tema som ubehagelig. Du kan la 
være å svare på spørsmål om du synes der er vanskelig eller ubehagelige. Din terapeut i ABUP vil 
være tilgjengelig om du skulle oppleve noe som vanskelig og du har behov for noen å prate med. 
Samtidig er det slik at personer som lar seg intervjue ofte opplever dette som positivt og 
meningsfullt. Gjennom å bidra med dine tanker og opplevelser kan du i denne studien være med på å 
bedre den hjelpen ABUP gir til ungdom. 
  
Hva skjer med informasjonen fra deg?  
Intervjuene, video-filmene og de utfylte skjemaene vil bare være tilgjengelige for autoriserte 
forskere, veiledere og personell som alle har taushetsplikt. Den ene studien har med to medforskere i 
forskningsprosessen. De to medforskerne er Gunnhild Ruud Lindvig, erfaringskoordinator, og 
Karianne Zachariassen, erfaringskonsulent, begge tilknyttet Sørlandet Sykehus HF. Medforskere er 
engasjert på bakgrunn av sine egne erfaring med psykiske vansker. De vil med sin erfaring kunne 
hjelpe oss med å stille gode spørsmål og tolke det vi finner. Medforskerne vil være med i 
gjennomføringen av noen av intervjuene. 
 
Filmer, intervjuer og utfylte skjema vil bli oppbevart uten ditt navn og fødselsnummer. En kode 
knytter deg til dine opplysninger gjennom en navneliste som oppbevares et annet sted. 
 
Om sitater fra det du har sagt til oss i intervju blir brukt i artikler eller andre former for publisering vil 
dette, så langt det mulig, gjøres uten at det er mulig å gjenkjenne deg.   
 
Sluttdato for forskningsprosjektet er satt til 2018. Data vil da bli avidentifisert slik at du ikke kan 
gjenkjennes. Data gitt gjennom utfylte skjema vil bli anonymisert.  
 
Frivillig deltakelse 
Det er frivillig å delta i studien. Du kan når som helst og uten å oppgi noen grunn trekke ditt samtykke 
til å delta i studien. Dette vil ikke få konsekvenser for din videre behandling. Dersom du ønsker å 
delta, undertegner du samtykkeerklæringen nedenfor. Dersom du senere ønsker å trekke deg eller 
har spørsmål til studien, kan du kontakte Tore Dag Bøe, på tlf: 41 23 61 10/ epost 
tore.dag.boe@sshf.no eller Per Arne Lidbom på tlf: 38 07 62 51 eller 99 58 29 11/ epost 
per.lidbom@sshf.no.  
 
Vi ber om at du og en av dine foresatte svarer inne 10 dager fra du har mottatt dette skrivet. Dere 
kan levere det til ABUPs terapeut i saken eller sende det til: Per Arne Lidbom, Forskningsenheten 
ABUP, Sørlandet sykehus HF, Postboks 416, 4604 KRISTIANSAND.    
 
Kristiansand, 7. april 2011 
 
Vennlig hilsen 
 
 
Tore Dag Bøe      Per Arne Lidbom 
Forsker, ABUP, SSHF     Forsker, ABUP, SSHF 
 
Samtykke til deltakelse i studien 
Siden du er under 18 år skal en av dine foresatt også informeres og godta din deltagelse i studien.  
 
Ja, jeg er villig til å delta i studien. 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(Underskrift av deltager, dato) 
 
Jeg er informert og gir mitt samtykke til deltagelse i studien  
 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
(Underskrift av forelder eller foresatt, dato) 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 6:  
Information letter and declaration of consent, persons in network  
(in Norwegian) 
 
 
Forespørsel om deltagelse i forskningsprosjektet: 
Livsverden og dialog i psykisk helsearbeid - En studie av endringsprosesser i nettverksorientert 
hjelp til unge i krise 
 
Til: 
Pårørende eller annen person i nettverket til en ungdom som får tilbud av Avdeling for barn og unges 
psykiske helse.  
 
Hensikt og bakgrunn 
Vi spør deg med dette om å delta i en studie der hensikten er å utvikle kunnskap om hjelp til unge i 
krise. Studien er en del av forsknings- og fagutviklingsprogrammet Dialog og samhandling på Agder 
som drives i et samarbeid mellom Universitetet i Agder og Avdeling for barn og unges psykiske helse 
(ABUP) ved Sørlandet sykehus.  
 
Hva innebærer deltagelse i forskningsprosjektet? 
Du er pårørende, eller en annen person i nettverket, til en ung som får hjelp ved ABUP. I den 
forbindelse ønsker vi å intervjue deg om de tanker og opplevelser du har rundt hjelpen ABUP gir og 
om hvordan denne hjelpen, sammen med andre forhold, påvirker livet til den unge. 
 
Vi ønsker å intervjue deg to, kanskje tre, ganger. De to første intervjuene gjennomføres med ca en 
måneds mellomrom og så et mulige siste intervju om ca et halvt år. Alle intervjuene vil trolig vare 
rundt 1 – 1 ½ time og vil bli filmet. Du vil også bli bedt om å fylle ut et par enkle skjema hver gang du 
er med på samtale ved ABUP. Disse tar det bare noen få minutter å fylle ut. Det er hele tiden frivillig 
og opp til deg om du vil trekke deg eller være med videre i studien  
 
Mulige fordeler og ulemper  
Noen kan oppleve det å bli intervjuet om personlige tema som ubehagelig. Du kan la være å svare på 
spørsmål om du synes det er ubehagelige. Hvis det skulle oppstå ting du synes er vanskelig kan du ta 
dette opp i samtale med forskeren eller be han formidle kontakt med en du kan prate med. Samtidig 
er det slik at personer som lar seg intervjue ofte opplever dette som positivt og meningsfullt. Om du 
deltar i denne studien kan du bidra med kunnskap som igjen kan være med å forbedre den hjelpen 
psykiske helsetjenester gir til unge.  
  
Hva skjer med informasjonen fra deg?  
Intervjuene og de utfylte skjemaene vil bare være tilgjengelige for autoriserte forskere, veiledere og 
personell som alle har taushetsplikt. Studien har med to medforskere forskningsprosessen. 
Medforskere er engasjert med bakgrunn i sin egen erfaring med psykiske vansker. De er blant annet 
med for at vi i studien kan stille så gode spørsmål som mulig og for å være med å forstå så godt som 
mulig det vi finner. Disse vil være med i gjennomføringen av intervjuene. De to medforskerne er 
Gunnhild Ruud Lindvig, erfaringskoordinator, og Karianne Zachariassen, erfaringskonsulent, begge 
tilknyttet Sørlandet sykehus.  
 
Intervjuer og utfylte skjema vil bli oppbevart uten ditt navn og fødselsnummer. En kode knytter deg 
til dine opplysninger gjennom en navneliste som oppbevares innelåst et annet sted. 
 
Hvis sitater fra intervju med deg blir brukt i artikler eller andre former for publisering, vil dette, så 
langt det mulig, gjøres uten at det er mulig å gjenkjenne deg.   
 
Sluttdato for forskningsprosjektet er satt til 2018. Data vil da bli avidentifisert slik at du ikke kan 
gjenkjennes. Data gitt gjennom utfylte skjema vil bli anonymisert.   
 
 
Frivillig deltakelse 
Det er frivillig å delta i studien. Du kan når som helst og uten å oppgi noen grunn trekke ditt samtykke 
til å delta i studien. Dette vil ikke få konsekvenser for tilbudet til den unge eller for din videre 
deltagelse i tilbudet. Dersom du ønsker å delta, undertegner du samtykkeerklæringen nedenfor. 
Dersom du senere ønsker å trekke deg eller har spørsmål til studien, kan du kontakte Tore Dag Bøe, 
på tlf: 41 23 61 10/ epost: tore.dag.boe@sshf.no.  
 
Vi ber om at du svarer inne 10 dager fra du har mottatt dette skrivet. Du kan levere det til ABUPs 
terapeut i saken eller sende det til:  
 
Tore Dag Bøe 
Forskningsenheten ABUP,  
Sørlandet sykehus HF,  
Postboks 416,  
4604 KRISTIANSAND.    
 
  
Kristiansand, 7. april, 2011 
 
Vennlig hilsen 
 
 
 
Tore Dag Bøe       
Forsker, ABUP, SSHF      
 
 
 
 
 
Samtykke til deltakelse i studien 
 
Ja, jeg er villig til å delta i studien. 
 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(Underskrift av deltager, dato) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 7:  
 Interview guide, adolescents (in Norwegian) 
 
Intervjuguide, den unge  
 
Innledning 
 Vi holder på med en undersøkelse om ungdom som går til samtaler ved Avdeling for barn og 
unges psykiske helse (ABUP). Derfor har vi lyst å snakke med deg. Du har mye informasjon og 
kunnskap som er viktig for oss, så tusen takk for at du har sagt ja til å prate med oss. 
 Vi er en forsker og en med egenerfaring. 
 En av samtalene du har hatt har vært filmet og Per Arne har intervjuet deg om samtalen. Denne 
samtalen med deg er en fortsettelse av dette…  
 Du trenger ikke svare på alt vi spør om, du bestemmer hva det er ok å snakke om.  
 Er det noe du har tenkt på eller vil spør om før vi går videre?  
 
1. Faktadel:  
Før vi begynner er det noen opplysninger vi ønsker å få fra deg: Se eget ark.  
 
2. Erfaringer, beskrivelser og refleksjoner: 
Først om livet ditt i ulike sammenhenger: 
 Kan du fortelle litt om hvordan du har hatt det vanskelig nå og den siste tiden? 
 Hvordan merker du dette vanskelige i livet ditt på de ulike arenaer og sammenhenger du er med 
i? Hvordan har du det på de ulike arenaene i livet ditt for tiden?  
 Hvem er særlig viktige for deg i ditt liv? Nevn 3-5 personer. Fortell om ditt forhold til dem. Gjerne 
en konkret gang dere hadde det fint sammen.  
 Er det noen du har et særlig vanskelig forhold til? Nevn 3-5 personer. Fortell om ditt forhold til 
dem. Gjerne et konkret vanskelig møte.  
 Kan du beskrive en typisk dag? Hjemme, skole, med venner, arbeid, for deg selv. 
 Kan du beskrive en eller flere gode hendelser i livet ditt i det siste? 
 Kan du beskrive en eller flere vonde/vanskelige hendelser i livet ditt i det siste?  
 Hvordan har livet ditt vært i endring (til det bedre, til det verre) den siste tiden? Hvor har disse 
endringene skjedd? Hva er blitt annerledes? (Har det endret seg ”inni deg” eller mellom deg og 
andre rundt deg?) 
 Finnes det noen vendepunkt-historier i livet ditt?  
 Hvordan har du det økonomisk? Hva har penger/mangel på penger å si for ditt liv på ulike 
arenaer?  
 
Så om samtalene ved ABUP: 
 Hvordan har samtalene ved ABUP vært? Særlig nettverks-samtalene. Fortell gjerne om et konkret 
møte; hvem var der, hva ble sagt, hva sa du, hva følte du, hva tenkte du? 
 Hva har samtalen ved ABUP betydd for deg og (vanskelighetene i) livet ditt? 
 Tror du samtalene ved ABUP har gjort at ting har endret seg også på andre områder i livet ditt? 
 Hvordan har du opplevd filmingen og intervjuene til Per Arne Lidbom? Hva har de betydd?  
 
Så refleksjoner om endring:  
- Har du tanker om hva som har gjort at du har fått det bedre, eller verre? Hva har hjelpen fra 
ABUP hatt å si? Hva har nettverksmøtene hatt å si? Hva tror du skal til for at du skal få det (enda) 
bedre?  
 
 
Er det noe vi ikke har kommet inn på? Noe som du vil fortelle?  
 
Til slutt: Vi ønsker å intervjue deg igjen én eller to ganger til (gjøre avtale?). Vi ønsker også å intervjue 
en person i nettverket ditt. Er det greit? Hvem kunne det være?  
 
Man kan tenke at intervjuet har tre deler/dimensjoner: 
 
1. Faktadel (bli kjent, kartlegge) 
2. En beskrivende, fortellende del (fenomenologisk: hva skjedde, hva tenkte, følte, gjorde du, 
os.v.). 
3. En mening/refleksjon/fortolkningsdel (hermeneutisk:  hva synes du om det?, hva har det 
betydd for deg?, hvordan har møtene virket inn på livet ditt?, hva slags sammenheng ser du 
mellom…., hva tenker du er grunnen til at det ble bedre? ).  
 
Disse vil ikke være adskilte, en vil bevege seg inn og ut av de ulike dimensjonene! 
 
 
Ulike tids-faser og ulike sosiale arenaer: 
 
Før Krise/Før hjelp  Krise: I og etter krise: I og etter krise: 
Kroppen  Kroppen Kroppen 
Den unges indre verden  Indre verden Indre verden 
Familie  Familien Familien 
Skole  Skolen Skolen 
Venner  Venner Venner 
  Behandlingsverden, 
nettverksmøte 
Behandlingsverden, 
nettverksmøte 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 8:  
Interview guide, persons in network  
(in Norwegian) 
 
 
Innledning 
 Vi holder på med en undersøkelse om ungdom som går til samtaler ved Avdeling for barn og 
unges psykiske helse (ABUP). Derfor har vi lyst å snakke med deg. Du er pårørende/nærstående 
til en ung som får hjelp og dine erfaringer og din kunnskap viktig for oss, så tusen takk for at du 
har sagt ja til å prate med oss. 
 Vi er en forsker og en med egenerfaring. 
 En av samtalene har kanskje vært filmet og Per Arne har intervjuet deg om samtalen? Denne 
samtalen med deg er en fortsettelse av dette…  
 Du trenger ikke svare på alt vi spør om, du bestemmer hva det er ok å snakke om.  
 Er det noe du har tenkt på eller vil spør om før vi går videre?  
 
1. Faktadel:  
Før vi begynner er det noen opplysninger vi ønsker å få fra deg: Se eget ark.   
 
2. Erfaringer, beskrivelser og refleksjoner: 
Først om livet til deg og den unge i ulike sammenhenger: 
 Hvilken arena er det du har felles med den unge?  
 Kan du fortelle litt om hvordan den unge (og personer nær han/henne) har hatt det vanskelig nå 
og den siste tiden? På ulike arenaer og særlig den du har felles med den unge.  
 Hvordan er din relasjon til den unge? Beskriv et godt møte eller et vanskelig møte. Hvordan 
opplevde du det møtet.  
 Kan du beskrive en typisk dag på den arenaen du har felles med den unge, eller kjenner til?  
 Kan du beskrive en eller flere gode hendelser. 
 Kan du beskrive en eller flere vonde/vanskelige hendelser.  
 Hvordan har livet til den unge vært i endring (til det bedre, til det verre) den siste tiden? Hvor har 
disse endringene skjedd? Hva er blitt annerledes?  
 
Så om samtalene ved ABUP: 
 Har du vært med på samtaler ved ABUP? Hvordan har samtalene ved ABUP vært? Særlig 
nettverks-samtalene. Fortell gjerne om et konkret møte; hvem var der, hva ble sagt, hva sa du, 
hva følte du, hva tenkte du? Hvordan var dette møtet for den unge, tror du?  
 Hva har samtalen ved ABUP betydd for deg? 
 Hvordan tror du samtalene har blitt opplevd av den unge?  
 Hva tror du samtalene har betydd for den unge? Tror du samtalene ved ABUP har gjort at ting 
har endret seg også på andre områder for den unge og hans nærmeste? 
 Hvordan har du opplevd filmingen og intervjuene til Per Arne Lidbom? Hva har de betydd?  
 
Så refleksjoner om endring:  
- Har du tanker om hva som har gjort at den unge og evt du/dere har fått det bedre, eller verre? 
Hva har hjelpen fra ABUP hatt å si? Hva har nettverksmøtene hatt å si? Hva tror du skal til for at 
den unge, du eller dere skal få det (enda) bedre?  
 
 
 
Er det noe vi ikke har kommet inn på? Noe som du vil fortelle?  
Man kan tenke at intervjuet har tre deler/dimensjoner: 
 
1. Faktadel (bli kjent, kartlegge) 
2. En beskrivende, fortellende del (fenomenologisk: hva skjedde, hva tenkte, følte, gjorde du, 
os.v.). 
3. En mening/refleksjon/fortolkningsdel (hermeneutisk:  hva synes du om det?, hva har det 
betydd for deg?, hvordan har møtene virket inn på livet ditt?, hva slags sammenheng ser du 
mellom…., hva tenker du er grunnen til at det ble bedre? ).  
 
Disse vil ikke være adskilte, en vil bevege seg inn og ut av de ulike dimensjonene! 
 
 
Ulike tids-faser og ulike sosiale arenaer: 
 
 
Før Krise/Før hjelp  Krise: I og etter krise: I og etter krise: 
Kroppen  Kroppen Kroppen 
Den unges indre verden  Indre verden Indre verden 
Familie  Familien Familien 
Skole  Skolen Skolen 
Venner  Venner Venner 
  Behandlingsverden, 
nettverksmøte 
Behandlingsverden, 
nettverksmøte 
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